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ABSTRACT  
This study offers new views to the problems of the human mental by assuming that its 
primitives, atoms, molecules, and structures are formed by our memory representations of 
entities and the mental states caused by them. With the system models of human concepts and 
mind the eternal problems of human knowledge, values, motivation, language, action, and 
organisational culture are approached from a new point of view. The human experienceable 
world is produced by our brain-systems emergent abilities to transform the material afferent 
action potentials into the mental descriptions of the sensed environment and its meanings. The 
memory structures and functions are seen as metaphors of our brains' emergent abilities to 
process, store, and view memory representations of the sensed, thought, or imagined entities 
of the being. The system models of man, his memory representations, and his concepts and 
mind are postulated in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.  
The other transformation process of our brain-system is the steering effect, in which our 
thoughts, plans, and decisions are formed into situation relevant flows of efferent action 
potentials. They, in turn, have a causal control of our speech and other motor actions. The 
RA-model of man and his mental steering system built in this study aims at finding natural 
explanations for some of the eternal problems of psychology, philosophy, management, and, 
in fact, all human sciences. These problems mostly circle around the relations between the 
human body and mind. In the RA-model these problems are left hidden behind the above 
named two transformations, which offer a challenging research fields for future neurobiology, 
neuropsychology, brain researches, human scientists, and philosophers. Though sciences do 
not have good explanations of how our mental experiences are produced in our central 
nervous system, we can build memory-based tools to describe and better understand the 
substance, structures, and functions of the human mental and through them the human actions.  
In the RA-model, the dorsal and ventral streams, mirror neurons, and man's testable memory 
representations are seen as a set of facts of which one can build a system model of man and 
his interactions with his environment. Man's concepts as structures of his memory 
representations function as situation relevant and handy tools for thinking, planning, and 
decision-making. RA's concepts enable a natural explanation of the human mental. Concepts 
can be used to disclose the mental dimensions of cultures, which seem to be hidden in the 
values, norms, language, and action models adopted by the members of the culture. Thus, they 
serve also the conscious control of man's mental and materially manifesting actions and 
activities. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tämä tutkimus tarjoaa uuden näkemysen ihmisen mentaaliseen liittyviin ongelmiin. Tutki-
muksen lähtökotana on ajatus, että mentaalisen primitiivit, atomit, molekyylit ja rakenteet 
muodotuvat muistirepresentaatioista ja niistä mentaalisista tiloista, joita ne aiheuttavat. Uudet  
ihmisen käsitteiden ja mielen systeemiset mallit tarjoavat myös uuden näkökulman tiedon, 
arvojen, motivaation, kielen, toiminnan ja organisaatiokulttuurin ikuisuusongelmiin. Koke-
mamme maailma on aivojärjestelmämme emergenttisen muuntokyvyn tuotosta. Siinä affe-
renttien aktiopotentiaalien vuo muunnetaan elämyksellisesti koetuksi  kuvaukseksi aistitusta 
ympöristöstä ja sen merkityksistä. Muistin rakenteet ja funktiot nähdään metafoorina aivo-
jemme emergenttisistä kyvyistä prosessoida, tallentaa ja palauttaa koettavaksi muistiedustuk-
sia aistitusta, havaitusta, ajatellusta tai kuvitellusta olevasta. 
Aivojemme toista muunnosprosessia kutsun ohjausvaikutukseksi. Siinä ajatuksemme, suun-
nitelmamme ja päätöksemme muunnetaan tilannerelevantiksi efferenttien aktiopotentiaalien 
vuoksi, jolla on kausaalinen ohjausvaikutus puheeseemme ja muihin motorisiin suorituksiim-
me. Tässä tutkimusessa rakennettu RA-malli ihmisestä ja hänen mentaalisesta ohjaus-
järjestelmästään pyrkii löytämään lunonnollisia selityksiä eräille ihmistieteiden ja erityisesti 
psykologian, filosofian ja johtamisen ikuisuusongelmille. Nämä ongelmat liittyvät useim-
miten ihmisen psyyken ja ruumiin välisiin vuorovaikutuksiin.  
RA-mallissa nämä muunto-ongelmat on jätetty noiden kahden transformaation sisältöön. Ne 
tarjoavat haastellisen tutkimuskentän tulevaisuuden aivojen, neurobiologian, neuropsyko-
logian ja ihmistieteitten tutkijoille ja filosofeille. Vaikka tieteillä ei ole tarjolla pätevää 
selitystä sille miten keskushermosto tuottaa elämyksellisesti koetun, voimme kuitenkin 
rakentaa muistiperustaisia välineitä kuvaamaan ja selittämään ihmisen mentaalisen olemusta, 
rakenteita, funktioita ja siten myös hänen toimintaansa. 
RA-mallissa aivojen dorsaali- ja ventraali kanavat, peilineuronit ja testattavat muistirepresen-
taatiot nähdään faktoina, joille ihmisen ja hänen vuorovaikutustensa systeeminen malli voi-
daan rakentaa. Ihmisen käsitteet hänen muistinsa rakenteina tarjoavat tilannerelevantit ja 
kätevät ajattelun, suunnittelun ja päätännän välineet. RA:n käsitemalli mahdollistaa ihmisen 
mentaalisen luonnollisen selittämisen. Käsitteitä voidaan käyttää avaamaan kulttuurin mentaa-
lisia ulottuvuuksia, jotka näyttävät kätkeytyvän niihin arvoihin, normeihin, kieleen ja toimin-
tamalleihin, jotka sen jäsenet ovat omaksuneet. Näinollen käsitteet palvelevat ihmistä sekä 
mentaalisen että kehollisen toiminnan ja toimintojen tietoisen hallinnan välineinä. 
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PREFACE 
My interests to the human mental originate from my work as management consultant. 
Information, knowledge, values, motivation, and organisational culture were terms whose 
referents were central topics in the seminars connected with the developmental programs in 
organisations, which I have planned, led, and participated. Market share, productivity of time, 
material, and capital, etc. were often formed as a new set of controlling values and were used 
as measures in the new managerial incentive-systems. These systems formed one of the final 
parts of the implementations of these organisational developmental programs. My gradual 
gliding toward retirement during the last ten years offered me time to deepen my studies in 
human sciences and philosophy, and to write this work.  
The Laboratory of Work Psychology and Leadership in the Department of Industrial 
Management of Helsinki University of Technology offered me the environment to study for 
doctoral dissertation. Professor Veikko Teikari accepted my preliminary plans of a model of 
the human mental. I owe much to him and Matti Vartiainen for their encouragement to hold 
on and sharpen the total model of man's mental features in the different versions of the RA-
model of man. They noticed that students in Helsinki University of Technology had never 
presented such a total model of man's mental in a thesis so it is worth of trying. 
After almost 40 years in consulting work it was really refreshing to participate in seminars 
and workshops with the young and brilliantly intelligent students of the Department and 
Laboratory. They simply made their thesis and disappeared in the labour market while I was 
wondering how my total model is connected with philosophy, linguistics, semiotics, 
neuropsychology, and brain research. Some discussions with Academy Prof. Riitta Hari and 
professor Risto Näätänen showed the necessity of connecting my model with the recent 
results of the brain research and neuropsychology. 
I owe very much to my pre-surveyors professors Ilkka Niiniluoto and Göte Nyman. Their 
friendly remarks made me think once more what it means when your present a memory-based 
natural meta-model to view some central theories in human sciences and philosophy. How the 
problem and theories of emotion, learning, truth, and free will could be seen through the 
proposed model of man. These questions caused a new set of reasoning and inferring 
processes I needed for building the models of the human mental from its atoms and 
molecules.  
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The meetings and seminars arranged by Helsinki University of Technology, Helsinki 
University, Turku School of Economics and Business, Philosophical Society of Finland, 
Society of Natural Philosophy with its internet discussions, Finnish Society for Futures 
Studies, Helsingin Tietojenkäsittely-yhdistys ry, and of course, my seminars in the client 
organisations have offered forums to discuss the problems connected with the main items of 
this study.  
During the past years when meeting different audiences and individuals I have often had a 
teasing - may be a Socratic - habit to make laborious questions. For example, I asked my 
audience if they have lately seen concepts, or motivations, or where does their knowledge and 
values exist, or how do they see the differences between knowledge and information, or what 
action is. These questions seemed to function as fruitful mental teasers opening often very 
natural path to the actual discussion items at that time. Now these items form the problems of 
my study, and I see them as the central elements of the human mental.  
In discussions of the early plans of my study I have got understanding and encouraging 
feedbacks from professors Pentti Malaska, Olavi Borg, Lauri Rauhala, and Kullervo Rainio. 
Dipl.Eng. Jouko Seppänen from the Department of Computer Sciences in Helsinki University 
of Technology as a specialist and writer of the history of systems, sciences, and technology 
has functioned as a living encyclopaedia in many questions in my multidisciplinary work. 
Poet and writer Lassi Nummi helped me to find the book and author of a poem, which I 
remembered but whose author I had forgotten. This Uuno Kaila's poem, Sanoja, nicely 
exemplifies the genesis of values in child's mind. Many of my friends and tennis pals have 
devotedly participated to my worries of the theoretical and pragmatic problems around my 
work. I'm addressing my thanks to all of them and especially to the following three: MD, Phd. 
Jaakko Seiro, Dr. Johan Silén, and Prof. Veikko Pohjola. 
Academy Prof. Riitta Hari leading the brain research group in the Laboratory of Low 
temperatures in Helsinki University of Technology was the first brain researcher with whom I 
discussed of my system model of human concepts. Prof. Reza Nilipur, a neurolinguistics from 
Teheran University, during his visit in Finland gave the second impulse to take some of the 
results of brain research as the factual basis of my study of the human mental. The on-line and 
memory-line connections to one's environment solved some of the problems of the RA-
model. 
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During a lovely summer week at Mekrijärvi campus of Joensuu University 1998 was a 
seminar of Mind, Language, and Brain, where specialists on these research fields discussed 
about the connections between their areas. Though my paper was late and did not room to the 
program, I had during this week a pleasure to discuss my model's connections to linguistics 
with many of the participants of the seminar. Important and encouraching were the 
discussions with prof. Jussi Niemi from Joensuu University, and prof. Michel Paradis from 
McGill University, Montreal. They found my model of human concepts and the linguistic 
attributes as elements of concepts' sensory structures to open a new and interesting approach 
to some of the linguistic problems. 
 I have had the pleasure to have three English-speaking friends who have offered their time to 
grind my English expressions towards more proper ones. The late John Paul Talvensaari 
offered critical points of view to my model of man and his mental and a good linguistic 
adviser in the early phases of RA-model's development. Doctor Rita Le Vahr did the hardest 
job. Besides correcting my English, she could view the RA-model from the point of view of 
the human problems in the nursing sciences. Eero Ranta, a remigrant from Michigan and 
working on his own thesis, has helped to view the language of the changes in the latest 
version of my work.  
Finally I have to thank my lovely wife Tyyne for acting as a continuous discussing partner 
around the problems in my research work. She has often reminded me that the better is the 
enemy of the good, referring to the never-ending nature of my study. My granddaughters Sara 
and Camilla have been good living examples of how the human linguistic and intellectual 
development proceeds with the increasing age. They have proofed the proverb that:  'From 
children's and suckling's mouth you hear the truth'.  
At age of 3 Sara advised her grandmother when she was looking for her glasses: 'Grandma, 
put your glasses always in the same place so you know where they are'. This perfect sentence 
Sara used showed how a linguistic expression, which she presumably had heard earlier in 
similar situations, was stored in Sara's long-term memory as situation relevant linguistic 
attribute of the memory representation of the episode. It was recalled and was ready to be 
used when similar situation occurred once more.  
Just recently the same Sara - now 9 years of age - answered to my question of truth by an 
practical example: 'If I tell you that I was with father and Camilla in a bar yesterday and had 
big portions of ice-cream it would not be the truth, because we had Big-Hessburgers'. Sara's 
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explanation of truth was built on the relations between the linguistic expression describing the 
yesterday event and the reality, as Sara herself and the other participants of it lived it through. 
These small episodes show that many theories in human sciences could make good use of our 
everyday observations of life along with the research done in laboratories. 
This study has grown from the forty years of pragmatic developmental work in different kinds 
of private and public organisations. It can be seen as a trial to use the many-sided experiences 
I have had in searching for the invariant features of the human behaviour and cooperations in 
varying situations in organisations. This study has aimed at finding a scientific combination of 
these experiences in a model, which could serve other researcher in human sciences and 
philosophy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Four Intuitive Definitions as the Background of the Study  
1.1.1 Consulting work as the original playground 
Though this study is in its nature meta-theoretical, as will bee seen, its background is most 
pragmatic. I shall be searching the common nominator or implicit theory of some useful 
definitions found in my work as a management consultant. The ideas in those definitions have 
grown from the practical developmental work in many types of organisations in the private 
economy and public administration. In my consulting work and management training, I have 
been using these intuitive1 definitions connected with the developmental programs and 
processes of management systems and practices. The definitions were outcomes of work, 
studies, and hobbies in human sciences, management, and philosophy and from numerous 
discussions with the seminar groups and colleagues participating in the developmental 
programmes in different organisations.  
The common objects of consulting assignments were to improve the productivity of all of the 
input factors in organisational activities such as work, material, time, intellectual and 
monetary capital, etc. It meant also a thorough search of management systems and techniques 
responsible for the information and knowledge bases, wage and salary systems, the ways 
individuals, groups, departments, businesses, and companies were organised and motivated to 
strive toward the common goals, etc. These definitions concerned theoretical entities like 
action, knowledge, motivation and organisational culture. The definitions aimed at increasing 
the common understanding of some central mental factors, which were commonly found to be 
important in all the developmental interventions in the organisations I have participated as a 
consultant.    
 As a background of those definitions were also my studies in industrial economics and 
management, psychology, industrial psychology, and hobbies in other human sciences and 
philosophy. Especially I had been influenced by Eino Kaila's idea that human knowledge is 
formed and built through a continuous strive toward finding the invariant features of the 
entities of the being. If a researcher or a layman finds some rules of thumb or regularities in 
                                                 
1 Intuition is here seen as a conscious outcome of a set of unconscious mental processes in which the material 
from different sources are manipulated and melted together into a form of an 'aha-experience' or a new insight 
and mental vision of the problem which has annoyed and disturbed one's thinking and planning operations.    
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his areas of interest, it is a source of great joy. The found invariances usually solve some prob-
lems and sometimes they give you a possibility to forecast, what will happen in the future.  
Thus, the rules found serve also the human security needs (Kaila 1939). The often 
unconscious aiming at securing the well being of individual and survival of species may be on 
the background of most of our endeavours and motivations even in scientific efforts. 
One motive for striving to find working definitions for terms used in managerial 
circumstances has possibly been my participating in the lexical work of Rationalisointiliitto 
r.y. It aimed at the creation of the Finnish terminology of Work Study, Rationalization, and 
Ergonomics or Human Engineering (partly published in Martikainen & all. 1978). However, 
the main impact has been in the needs grown from my practical consulting work in different 
kinds of organisations. There has been also a common collegial slogan between consultants, 
which says: 'Define your terms'. This was seen important because all proper consulting work, 
aiming at permanent results, meant also changes in the organisation culture, its values, norms, 
and terminology applied in the managerial language. Each intervention in an organisation 
needs effective means of communication and it meant also that you had to explain thoroughly 
the terminology to be used.  It was necessary to have an agreement of the referential meanings 
of the words and theoretical terms, which were applied in the interactions with the people in 
the client organisations. Thus, the need to define one's terms, which were used in the 
managerial training seminars and in all communications, had practical grounds. 
 
1.1.2 An Intuitive Definition of Human Action   
Organisations are collections of individuals and groups aiming at some valued end state of 
affairs by planned, coordinated, organised, and controlled actions and activities. Actions and 
activities are seen as one set of the necessary means for achieving the goals, which 
organisations and individuals are aiming at. One of the intuitive definitions, with which I have 
been working and which is relevant in this study, has been the definition of action. I had seen 
the definition of action useful to reveal what were the material and mental elements of the 
developmental programs. It helped also to analyse the total structure and goal setting of the 
programs. It helped to see what were the goals, resources, planning and control system, and 
problems of the action and activities of the organisation. It co-ordinated the planning and 
executing the development programs, which were worked out with the people in the working 
and planning and control groups of the organisations in which I have had the pleasure to co-
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operate. The common aim was to advance their efforts toward higher total productivity and 
higher esteem of individuals' creativity, intellectual capital, and other mental powers.  
All the four definitions from action to knowledge, motivation, and organisational culture 
can be seen as explications of long lasting inductive and intuitive processes of pondering 
the basic invariant features of the organisational phenomena in and during various 
developmental programs. They can also be seen as results of a pragmatic collecting and 
fusing of the thoughts in managerial theories, philosophy and psychology published and 
presented in the territory and domain of management. I shall return to all of the intuitive 
definitions later in Chapters 5 to 7 when the tools to handle them are created in Chapters 2, 
3, and 4. -When seen as goal-oriented human activity action can be defined as follows: 
Definition 1:  ACTION is controlled use of resources to achieve a certain goal. 
There is an implicit agent or actor – an individual, a group, an organisation, or any 
organism – who has the ability to plan and control the use of the attainable resources to 
achieve a valued and purposeful goal, which is seen important for the well being and 
security of the actor and his interest groups. There are four main elements in this definition, 
which are contained in the referental meanings of the words: to achieve, goal, resources, 
and controlled use. In organisational development assignments the analysis of them can 
lead to corresponding object areas and processes of managerial work such as the processes 
of planning, decision making, controlling, feed-back, etc. The mental processes of planning 
and controlling are on the focus of this study and I shall return briefly to the concept of 
action and these subprocesses of the planning and controlling of actions in Chapter 7.  
The intuitive definition of action led then to intuitive, though in practice helpful and 
satisfactorily working, definitions of knowledge, motivation, and organisational culture. 
The main mental elements of organisational culture were assumed to be the values, norms, 
and language of the organisation. All these terms refer to theoretical entities, which are 
assumed to have their causal effects to the manifesting features of individuals' actions and 
behaviour. In this study I am assuming that these theoretical entities have their controlling 
power through their subjective existence or subsistence in subjects' minds. In what 
follows, I shall briefly list those three definitions, which I have seen to have central 
importance in managerial circumstances. I shall use the basic ideas in these intuitive 
definitions as ignitions to the research to find the ground on which one could begin to 
outline the universal basis of man's directability. I shall use them also in my trial to find 
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the common basis of the human mental hiding implicitly in these definitions. This 
problematic meta-model2 of man's mental forms then the goal of this study. I shall use the 
model also in building my hypothesis of the study in Chapter 2 where the basic facts and 
assumptions of man's substance and his material and mental dimensions will be explicated.  
 
1.1.3  An Intuitive Definition of Human Knowledge  
Human knowledge forms the essential tool of all controlling systems on all levels of 
organisational work. In order to have a certain goal one has to know what are the valued 
and accepted ideas or basic principles for choosing the proper goals. One needs to know 
also the feasible resources and the correct ways and methods of using the resources for 
executing activities needed to achieve the valued goals, etc.  
Definition 2: KNOWLEDGE is a description of an entity of the being documented by 
concepts and/or signs. 
The knowledge could be documented by intersubjectively understandable signs, symbols, 
and sentences, which were seen as the manifesting elements of some natural or formal 
language, spoken or written and in use in the community in question. The knowledge could 
be documented also by concepts, which were thought to be subjective and internal mental 
entities stored and experienced through individuals' memory functions. 
The idea here was to include under the definition of knowledge - besides the mentally 
experienced descriptions of the being - also all forms of materially manifested information 
such as written or spoken language and all the forms of storing and transfering information 
in electro magnetic structures and nets and also as traces in the neuron nets of our memory 
stores.   
Concept and its structures and functions –as postulated in chapter 3 - will be in central role 
when structuring the RA-model of man's conscious mental states like knowledge, 
emotions, motivations, etc. Concepts are also the elements and tools of man's planning and 
                                                 
2 Meta-model refers here to a model or theory, which can possibly function as a natural and universal explana-
tion ground for some of the existing theories in human sciences and philosophy. The RA-model as a meta-model 
of man and his mental may be findable behind the explications of my four intuitive definitions of action, knowl-
edge, motivation, and organisational culture. 
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control system. I shall postulate the system structure of concepts in Chapter 3 and use its 
different types in Chapter 4 as elements of RA's planning and control system.  
 
1.1.4 An Intuitive Definition of Motivation. 
The third intuitive definition is also connected with the definition of action. It is connected 
even with the Aristotelian way of seeing action as a result of choice (Aristotle 1980 
p.139). All choices are in turn depending on the desire and reason connected with the 
action itself, or its end goal. If knowledge of the goal can be seen as the basis of reasoning 
then even the desire must be based on the knowledge of it and of its meaning to the subject. 
The third intuitive definition of this study concerns motivation that was seen as what 
follows: 
Definition 3: MOTIVATION is a goal oriented MENTAL ENERGY that is sufficient 
to lead to the results the subject is aiming at. 
The intuition here was that the goal is so important and so meaningful for the individual 
that it creates and maintains the mental or the experienced control energy and power 
needed to initiate and lead the actions and performances necessary for achieving the aimed 
goal.  Besides being goal oriented, the mental energy had to be sufficient in intensity and 
duration to secure the driving forces until the aimed results were achieved. In chapter 5, I 
shall discuss how motivation is connected with the totality of the postulated mental entities 
of concepts and RA's mental planning and control system with its scene of 
experiencing and steering, which will be postulated in chapters three and four. 
 
1.1.5 An Intuitive Definition of Organisational Culture 
The fourth intuitive definition is connected with a popular managerial tool called 
organisational culture. It is one of the most fashionable and persistent issues in managerial 
literature, psychology, and leadership research of recent times. It was - and is still - seen as 
one of the most important tools of management. Culture is often said to be manifesting in 
the ways its members think, speak, behave, and act; a culture manifests also in the artefacts 
it produces and uses (Richman 1965, Perlmutter 1969, Weinshall 1973, Deal &Kennedy 
1982, Schein 1986). Here I shall limit my interest to the question, what are the mental 
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features and dimensions of an organisational culture. What directs and controls the 
behaviour and the formulations of the rites, rituals, actions, and products manifesting the 
mental features of cultures? I have presented some of the previous ideas of the mental 
features of organisational culture in a brief article dealing with salary and wage systems as 
tools of management (Martikainen 1986). In that article, managerial behaviour with its 
feedback-, salary-, and incentive systems were seen as important tools of change and tools 
of creating and maintaining the mental elements and features of an organisation culture.  
The article was and is based on experimental results from numerous organisational 
developmental processes, in which one could quite clearly see and measure changes in 
participants' values. When production factors, like the quality of products, productivity of 
work, material, and capital, were connected with wage-, salary-, or some other kind of 
positive feedback system, they were very soon converted into value bearing entities. Quite 
soon, after the implementation of a wage system in which of these productivity and quality 
factors were applied as measures, there was seen a clear change of attitudes toward these 
factors. It seemed quite evident that the measures and norms of productivity and quality 
were internalised. This meant that the referents of these terms and measures were 
transformed into values, which began to direct the everyday attitudes, thinking, goal and 
norm setting, and the practical ways and methods the activities were executed. Values 
carried by entities seemed to be functions of the positive feedbacks connected with these 
measures. 
The adopted values could then be seen as mental entities, which directed or controlled the 
goal setting processes. The installed norms were controlling the execution of actions and 
activities and the quality of performances. During the developmental process, the 
terminology was thoroughly discussed so everybody knew the meanings of terms and the 
meanings of used measures. Investing in the common language enabled the needed 
communication, interaction, and exchange processes. Values, norms and language can then 
be seen as elements also in Schein's analysis of organisational culture,  (Schein 1986). The 
definition of organisational culture - implicit in my article - could be explicated as follows: 
Definition 4: The core mental elements of organisational culture are formed by the 
values, norms, and language adopted by its members.  
These three elements are seen here as the main mental elements, which control the 
manifesting behaviour-models of its members. These main elements were often 
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materialised in different manifested rules and slogans telling that: 'we always do this way' 
or 'we never do that way'. These elements were also with in all programs in different forms 
of training seminars for members of working and controlling groups. One of the first tasks 
in developmental interventions was to start the process of learning a common language by 
discussions and definitions of the main terms and their referential and value meanings. It 
was seen important that everybody had a common understanding what profit and 
productivity of time, capital, material, and work really meant.  
The main values and norms were taken also as measures into the incentive systems 
installed as parts of the programs. They were planned and implemented on different levels 
of personnel as tools to secure the continuity of the advancement and maintenance of the 
results of the program. In what follows, I will return to these elements of organisational 
culture as well as the other intuitive definitions, because they are connected with the 
concept of knowledge and its dimensions that is one of the main subjects of this study. 
 
1.2 The Universals of Man's Mental as the Problem of the Study  
My ponderings around the practical usability of the intuitive definitions, which I have 
presented above, led to the conclusion, that the mental of man must have some universal 
basic structures, which are common to all human beings. Knowledge, values, motivation, 
language, and culture are all terms whose referents are theoretical entities. There are a large 
amount of explicated theoretical entities postulated by the researches to explain their 
theories connected with my intuitive definitions. The number of implicit theoretical entities 
in use in different human sciences is still larger. The different views or their substance, 
structures, functions, and forms of existence have formed a continuous fighting arena for 
philosophers and human scientists. When I formulated my intuitive definition of 
knowledge I got some new ideas and impressions, which are connected to the term of 
concept. These thoughts encouraged me seek the common substance of these terms 
through the structures of the human concepts. I have taken the uncovering of these 
structures and their functions as the main problem of this study.  
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The theoretical entities such as knowledge, motivation, values, norms, and language are 
commonly assumed to have different kinds of steering 3or directing and controlling 
effects on individuals' manifesting behaviour. Our thinking, planning, decision-making, 
and our will to achieve certain goals are not material entities though they evidently are 
directing our actions. If we accept that our values, norms, knowledge, motivation, and 
language are the main mental entities controlling our actions so we can ask, what is the 
common behind them? The main problem of this study is then the substance, structure, and 
functions of the human mental, which is assumed to control individuals’ behaviour and 
actions. The problem can be formed into following question: 
o What are the universal elements of man's mental and how their substance, structures 
and functions explain the mental directability or steerability of man?  
What directs man is an age-old question, but it is still valid in all organisations and in their 
problems on different levels of organisational hierarchy. The managerial language swarms 
with terms referring to entities which, when not being materially manifesting, evidently 
must be mental of their substance. What kind of entities are our values, norms, principles, 
motivations, our strategical and operational plans and decisions, etc.? How can the used 
language mediate the meanings of the terms and expressions? One of the problem areas of 
this study is the steering power of organisational culture and the real role of language as a 
central part of it.     
o What is our linguistic ability and what is its real role in the processes of controlling 
individual actors behaviour in organisations?  
There is an everyday understanding that our brain is a necessary device for our thinking, 
planning, decision-making, and other mental actions and processes. How does our brain 
produce these services and other mental phenomena to us, seems still to be an open 
question in cognitive neuropsychology and brain research. From the managerial 
environment, one could move to the common area of human sciences and ask what is 
human knowledge and what are man's concepts and his consciousness.  The main problem 
                                                 
3 Steering and steerability are terms, which sound mechanical but are also appropriate terms in this study be-
cause the processual elements in our mental directing and controlling operations are often performed by uncon-
scious brain processes. Our decisions range from reflexes to automatic, systematic, and creative. Thus, the verbs 
to steer, direct, and control and their derivatives will be in situation relevant use in this study. 
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of this study can be divided into elements with the following questions, which aim to make 
easier the later elaboration of it: 
1. What are the basic elements of Man's mental or his experiential world?  
2. How these elements are connected with human knowledge, values, motivation, 
needs, linguistic abilities, and other mental states of man? 
3. What are the roles these elements play in the conscious and/or processual 
planning and control of individual's manifesting speech and other motor actions? 
When handling these questions one needs a commitment to an acceptable solution of the 
ontological problem and a plausible set of other presuppositions connected with the subject 
of this study. I am presuming that man is mentally controlled biological, social, and 
rational actor. I shall briefly sketch these questions in Chapter 2 to outline a total picture of 
man. These questions will be elaborated more thoroughly in chapters 3 and 4 where the 
models of RA's concepts and RA's mind or his planning and control system will be 
described and explained.  
 
1.3 The Purpose and goals of this Study.  
The natural sciences are aiming at descriptions, explanations, and forecasts of the 
substance, structure, functions, and behaviour of their research objects. The human 
sciences are often trying to create an information and knowledge base, which aims to the 
understanding of the actions and behaviour of their research objects. The elements of the 
mental, which control the actions and interactions of human beings, are still so unexplained 
that you hardly can speak of explanations based on them. After the fifty years 'medieval 
darkness' of behaviourism in human sciences the reality of the human mental has slowly 
but surely been accepted. Introspection as a source of information has also been permitted 
the amnesty and mercy by human scientists.  
The purpose of this study is to try to find the common mental denominator hiding in the 
four intuitive but useful definitions above and the theories in philosophy, psychology and 
other human sciences. The common factor could be the human concept, which was taken 
as the mental element in the intuitive definition of knowledge. If the substance, structure, 
and functions of concepts can be explained in a plausible way, it could form a tool or a set 
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of tools to comprehend what human knowledge, values, motivations, understanding, etc. 
are. Then they could also solve the problems and to answer the questions set above. This 
trial to delineate the universal system models of man, his concepts, and mind - seen as the 
mental planning and control system of man - is a vast and problematic one, but worth of 
trying. However, if one finds the atoms and molecules of the human mental, the task of 
delineating of the basic features of the human mental might be reduced to a reasonable 
size. 
The model is aiming at a new conception of man's mental features. It will be based on the 
testable memory representations and concepts of man and on a new architecture of his4 
mind. The new model should be able to improve the level and quality of understanding 
human beings and their ways of acting in different kinds of organisational and other 
environments. As mentioned, the mental is here understood as the totality of the 
experienced descriptions of the being that individual actors - human and even animal - are 
and have been living through during their ontogenic histories. The mental is assumed to be 
an emergent product of our central and peripheral nervous systems. It can have a varying 
division between unconscious processes and conscious mental activities of sensing, 
perceiving, remembering, imagining, thinking, planning, decision-making etc., as will be 
seen later in Chapter 4. 
The goal of this study is then to enhance the realistic understanding of man's mental 
dirigibility and the roles of the external and internal elements of the human steerability by 
using the RA-model of man as a base for explaining human actions. Our brain system 
seems to supply us also with the ability of experiencing the meanings of entities by 
connecting the value attributes to their actions, reactions, and changes. I am trying to 
formulate a model of human mental structures and functions that enable a natural 
explanation of these abilities and base it on testable memory representations our brains 
processes us for these purposes. Thus, I am trying to make a humble contribution to the 
everlasting work of demystifying the conceptions of the human mental. As mentioned 
above, this system model of human mind is here called the planning and control system of 
man or the steering system of a rational actor. I am assuming that, in the everyday 
language usage, the terms such as mind, psyche, and soul are referring to the same 
                                                 
4 For the reasons of simplicity I shall use mostly only the masculine forms of the expressions referring to the 
third person. 
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theoretical entity. Steering system - as a new term in human sciences - may be less 
burdened by the old connotations of the traditional terms above. It would also be easier to 
say that individuals use their steering systems to create and maintain their plans and 
decisions, their self-image and identity, etc. than to say that it all just happens in subjects' 
minds.  
 
1.4 The Main Outlines of the Study 
This study is divided into eight chapters. In this first chapter, I have described the 
background, the problems, the goals, and the contents of the study. I will also briefly 
explain the nature, scope, method, and the focus of the research done. Each chapter has a 
certain task to aid this trial of solving the total problem of this study. It is a problem, which 
forms the challenge of finding the substance and role of human mental in search for means 
of the dirigibility or steerability of man and his actions in general and particularly in 
organisational circumstances. 
Chapter 2 aims at a brief delineation of a system model of man. The model presents man 
and his environment and the exchanges and interaction between them. The presentation is 
based on a collection of the problem related results and beliefs of natural and human 
sciences and philosophy. They are results, which are commonly taken for granted and so 
they form the basis of this study. For these purposes, man is outlined as a mentally 
controlled, biological, social, and rational actor. To form a preliminary total picture of the 
object of research, the postulated entities of man's concepts and steering system and their 
roles are briefly described. At the end I present the hypotheses of this research endeavour. 
In chapter 3, I shall postulate the system structure of the human concept.  Concepts will 
be seen as a situation relevantly recalled sets of attributes of the memory representation of 
an object of attention. They can be singular material particulars and their systems, 
happenings and changes in different types of situations, or linguistic expressions referring 
either material or mental entities. Thus, concepts are different sets or collections of 
memory representations of entities of the being as postulated in cognitive psychology. 
They are assumed to be stored in our long-term memory from where a situation relevant set 
of them and their attributes can be recalled into our working memory, where they function 
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as mental tools for conscious mental operations and reviewing to make the sensed 
understood.  
In chapter 4, I shall first describe the structure and functions of RA's mind or his planning 
and control system with its frame and its central part called SCES. There are four main 
types of RA's views, which form the framing elements of man's mental steering system. 
Views are collections of subject's concepts and conceptions of the world, his roles, 
resources, situations, and actions. They are processed during individual's ontogenic history 
as content of his long-term memory. The centre of RA's steering system is formed by the 
scene of experiencing and steering, SCES in short. The mental space of SCES subsists in 
RA's working memory. The capacity of working memory is limited but its content can be 
changed rapidly, which enables the conscious review of objects of attention and the 
processes of thinking and decision-making. The end product of chapters 3 and 4 form a 
new architecture of man's mind or the system model of RA's planning and control 
system with its mental tools for concept-based understanding and steering.  
In chapter 5, I have used the RA-model as a metatheory to review some basic theories of 
psychology connected with the intuitive definitions described above. They are connected 
with human perception, knowledge, motivation, values, norms, and language. How do the 
dichotomies like tacit – explicit, implicit - explicit, declarative - procedural, or know-that 
and know-how refer to the phenomenon, which in the RA-model are seen as the varying 
degrees and levels of conscious or concept-based and processual steering of actions on 
RA's scene of experiencing and steering.  
In chapter 6, I have reviewed some of the age-old problems of philosophy through the 
RA-model. I am claiming – like Wittgenstein - that many of the everlasting philosophical 
problems are based on misuse of language. Many of these problems can be approached 
from the psychological point of view, which might give more trustworthy results than the 
traditional argumentation procedures in philosophy. Cognitive neuropsychology and 
empirical brain and memory research offer some facts and theories, which can help to see 
some of the philosophical problems anew. 
In Chapter 7, I have reviewed briefly the first intuitive definition of human action. I shall 
limit my review to the term steered and its role and meaning as an element of vast totality 
of human actions. The analysis of the term steered - or planned and controlled - in the 
definition reveals the structure of human actions. It describes man as a strategic planner 
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who tries to optimise the way one is adapting into the changes in one's environment. The 
main phases of situation-oriented planning and execution of conscious human operations 
are seen as adaptations to the prevailing environmental conditions. The presented model of 
action collects the main elements of human actions framing some of the problems of a 
psychological theory of action. At the end of Chapter 7 I shall briefly review the special 
features of the RA-model of action. 
In Chapter 8 I have briefly discussed about RA-model's usability to some problems of 
psychology and philosophy, which fall out of my original scope of the study. I make some 
notes of how the behaviouristic and cognitivistic approaches can be seen through the RA-
model. Similarili I review the processes of emotion, qualia, learning, and free will via the 
meta-model.   
In Chapter 9, I have collected the results of the study by reviewing the ways the RA-
model solves the problems and questions of set in Chapter 1 and some other problems, 
which became actual during the process of this study. I am pondering the possible 
contributions of the RA-model and its universals could offer to human sciences, 
philosophy, and management. The RA-model could be used as a beginning of a new and 
openly mental approach to man as a biological, social, and mentally controlled rational 
actor. Further studies will be needed to show whether the RA-model and its atoms and 
molecules of the human mental can advance the understanding of man as research object of 
the human sciences, philosophy, and managerial studies and practices. 
 
1.5 About the Scope and Method of the Study 
The problem of finding the core-substance and the basic structures and functions of the 
mental of man has faced many reformulations during the long process of this study. It 
ended with this trial to sketch a picture of the main features of the human mental. I took a 
deliberate risk of sinking in the difficulties of being superficial when I decided to try to 
sketch a total picture of the human mental and its main structures and functions. The 
temptation to find a unified explanation ground for the gigantic richness of the human 
experienced world and its materially manifesting features led to this risky study project.  
As a part of my approach to the research problem, is the formulation of my ontological 
position, which will take place in Chapter 2. I have assumed that the being is all what 
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exists or subsists and the being is composed of material and mental entities. The material 
manifests in space, state, and phase dimensions as function of time. However, its existence 
does not depend on any actor's existence because actors can effect only on its form, not its 
substance that are fixed in the processes of stars of our Universe. Even the organic 
processes in the living animals and plants change only the manifesting combinations and 
forms of the elements of the material.  
The emergent processes of our brain systems, in turn form the mental, or the experienced 
world of ours. They can be on-line sensations - or imaginations - of the actors' objects of 
attention or mental states caused by the situation relevant concepts. The keys to solve the 
problems of the human mental will be found in the basic elements or in the 'atoms and 
molecules' of it. Our sensations and their interpretations by our concepts and views are our 
memory representations of entities of the being form the elements of our mental. Thus they 
are also objects of introspection, everyday thinking, and empirical memory research.  
The method of finding the structures of human concepts could possibly be called as 
conceptual analysis in its very basic meaning. The quarks, atoms, and molecules of the 
human mental can be seen as metaphors5 of the postulated elements of it. The idea being 
that analysis may reveal the basic substance and the functional abilities of an entity. If you 
know the elements of an entity and the forces and interactions between them you can 
understand the totality. In fact, it seems that all scientific approaches consist of phases of 
analysis, synthesis, inductions, deductions, and abductions in the process of the creation of 
new models for the entities of the material or mental worlds. So has happened also in the 
formation of the models of RA's concepts and mind. To see human concepts as dynamic 
and situation relevantly recalled sets of memory representations and their attributes enabled 
to find a realistic substance, structure, and functions for them. Concepts, conceptions, and 
views enabled to build a metaphorical description of the human mind and its centre as the 
scene of experiencing and steering. It is in the mental space where we live through the 
different qualities, levels, intensities, and durations of our experiences. The value 
attributes, processed into our concepts, seem to offer a natural base for the mental forces 
steering our actions. 
                                                 
5 Metaphors are in the RA-model seen as figurative descriptions of referents of theoretical terms without 
materially manifesting object. 
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2.  RATIONAL ACTOR, RA, AS A SYSTEM MODEL OF MAN 
2.1 The Basic Presumptions of the Study  
All research work - striving toward scientifically relevant results - needs invariable grounds 
and firm premises for its operations and argumentation. According to Aristotle, science is 
based on axioms or premises, which are intuitively and necessarily true. Theorems and 
consequences are then logical truths due the syllogistic deductions from the axioms or 
premises (Henrik v. Wright 1968). The foundations of the modern science are usually theories 
or beliefs, which are taken for granted by the researcher and the scientific community or 
communities, to which the researcher belongs as a member. After Thomas Kuhn’s The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), these collections of beliefs are often called 
paradigms. According to Kuhn, paradigms direct and guide researcher’s thinking, method-
ology, and the ways the practical research work is planned and performed. Paradigms, as sets 
of beliefs, have their own dynamics; they are born and formulated, live their normal phases, 
are faced with anomalies, are changed, and are sometimes changed revolutionary. 
This study is based in broad outline on the views of critical scientific realism and pragmatic 
common sense. I respect also the wisdom of our everyday thinking and language, because I 
recall often G.E. Moore's assumption that …"wherever philosophy comes into conflict with 
common sense it is almost certainly wrong". Our everyday language is full of theoretical 
terms, whose referents must exist somewhere or 'subsist'6 in the human mental. Their reality 
and causal effects to individuals’ behaviour is accepted in scientific realism. The other or the 
main feature in scientific realism is that besides individuals' inner - cognitive, emotional, 
volitive, etc. – experiences, there is an outer reality, the existence of which does not depend 
on the existence of human or any other observer. This is assumed also in the theory of 
evolution. Its physical phase is assumed to have obtained its origin or genesis with the Big 
Bang. The Big Bang is seen as one possible genesis or beginning of our universe and its 
evolutionary processes about 12 to 15 billion years ago. Its continuous processes has had 
advances or 'progressions' also in our Globe from physical and chemical to biological and 
                                                 
6 Subsistence is here seen as the form, in which our mentally experienced descriptions of the being - or the 
products of our brain's emergent processes - exist, privately only to us, though certain but varying degrees of 
intersubjetivity appears. Sensations, perceptions, memory representations, cognitions, emotions, and volitions 
are examples of the subsisting mental entities and mental states.  
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cultural phases to the present state of the history where Homo Sapience is wondering at his 
origin, present state, and the future, (Darwin 1859/1986, Durham 1991, Hawking 1988, 1998).  
I am not problematizing time or space in which our actions take place. In our normal 
conscious mental states we are situation and time oriented to the actual environment and the 
entities and their meanings. Physical time can be seen as a series or a continuum of intervals 
between the consecutive sequences of oscillating or otherwise cyclic phenomena in nature.  
Our Universe and its material elements hardly have time as an experienced entity, only a 
processually regulated and law-like continuum of sequences of different macro and micro 
series of happenings, which cause changes in the observable world. I believe also that the 
32768 consecutive oscillations in the quarts crystal of my wrist watch form together a step, 
whose approximate duration is one second in the continuum measuring time. If we take the 
sum of these steps 60x60x24=84600 times, we get the time of a mean solar day measured in 
seconds.  
In the RA-model of Man, I assume that the evolutionary processes has formed the human 
memory abilities and the time lines in man's memory representations and concepts, as 
explained in Chapter 3. The human memory structures - such as long-term memory and 
working memory (Baddeley, 1997) - have enabled man’s adaptation to the sequential 
metabolic processes of human body and the sequence-bound variations of light and dark 
hours, cold, warm, dry, or rainy seasons, weather and temperature changes, availability of 
food and shelter, etc. 
According to critical scientific realism, as presented by Niiniluoto (1980, 1983, 1999 a), 
Tuomela (1983), Bunge (1977,1979), the best explaining theories of sciences are approaching 
the true or truth-like explanation of their research objects and their relations with their 
environments. Thus, also the theoretical entities, postulated in these best explaining theories, 
are real entities and can have causal effects. In the RA-model I am assuming that the 
theoretical entities are 'subsisting' or subjectively existing, which means that they are mentally 
experienced entities. Consequently, the atoms, protons, quarks, electrons, and neutrinos have 
an existence - in time-, space-, state-, and phase dimensions. The elements of material entities 
are used as explanations of their reality, when the physicists are trying to explain the real 
substance of matter. Analogically our memory representations, concepts, roles, sensations, 
emotions, volitions, and motivational states are really subsisting entities when psychologists 
try to explain the real substance of the human mind and its phenomenal elements. Individuals 
use these entities to plan and control their mental states and overt behaviour.  
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According to a pragmatist's thinking - Peirce, James, Dewey - one could say, that the best 
explaining theories are approaching the situation-relevant and working descriptions and 
explanations of their objects. This reservation is based on the factual situation that there is not 
any universally accepted theory of truth, though the theories of truthlikeness, correspondence, 
and coherence are often referred. Sometimes the best explaining theories give even 
possibilities to forecast or predict the reactions, actions, or behaviour of their objects in certain 
situations.  
Often deduction is seen as truth preserving method to infer scientific conclusion. Sometimes 
our thinking actions and processes in a research work seem to fluctuate between induction and 
deduction, analysis and synthesis, between a total and detailed models in the trials to find a 
satisfactory fit between the elements of the final explanation of the research problem (Nagel 
1971).  
One could also say that observations and existing theories in human sciences could be used to 
abduct (ab = from, ducere = to lead) a meta-model of man. According to Niiniluoto (1999 b) 
abductions, though fallible, can be seen as truth conducive and inferential practices. The RA-
model of man is here seen as meta-model which possibly can ease the understanding of man 
and his different features, which often are implicitly in many theories of human sciences. The 
basic facts, ontology, structure, and functions of the material and mental features of man, 
postulated in this study, are briefly described along with the element of the RA-model of man 
in the next sections and in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.  
 
2.2 The main Features of the RA-model  
The main task of Chapter 2 is then to sketch a preliminary system model of the totality of 
man. According to Eino Kaila you can understand the elements of an entity better, if you have 
acquired a conception of the totality, a total picture, or a gestalt to which the elements belong 
(Kaila 1952, 29). Also Rauhala (1993) and Saariluoma (1996) assume, that we need a 'pre-
conception' of man to comprehend the roles of the researched details or features of man. The 
object of this study is to find the basic elements of the human mental, which create the 
structures and functions of the manifesting and mental features in man's actions. A brief 
delineation of man's totality might help to see the elements and vice versa.  
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The RA-model is presented in Figure 2.1 on the previous page. It is based on the results of the 
problems related natural and human sciences and my realistic philosophical position as 
presented above.  According to that position the being is formed of material or space-time 
oriented entities and mentally subsisting entities, see Figures 2.1 and 2.3. One prerequisite is 
our brain's ability to process the emergent and steering transformations between material 
messages and mental experiences and vice versa as will be explained later. The mental entities 
subsist through our brain's abilities to offer us the structures and functions of our long-term 
and working memory as postulated researched in cognitive psychology (Baddeley 1997).    
The name of this model of man is rational actor, RA. I assume that a great enough majority 
of man's actions and reactions are based on situation relevant planning and decision-making, 
which aim at securing actor's own, his relatives' and his communities' survival and well being. 
The RA-model of man tries to present a simplified but total picture of man. It describes 
briefly both man's material and mental features and the structures and functions, which 
connect him to his material and mental environments. Figure 2.1 presents man's basic 
substance as mentally controlled biological, social, and rational actor. These dimensions of 
man are here seen as products of the physical, chemical, biological, social, and cultural 
evolutions. These basic dimensions get their special features by each individual's experiences, 
which one has lived through during one's ontogenic history.  
Besides the truth-like results of sciences the RA-model is built on the two postulations, which 
I shall present in Chapters 3 and 4. They will delineate the memory based structures and 
functions of human concepts and human mind. I take it for granted that the testable and by 
introspection and everyday thinking reachable memory representations are these mental 
entities, which can hold - besides different beliefs - also truth-like descriptions of the entities 
of the being. Even though, the recalled parts of our memory representations describing the 
objects of attention can be erroneous, they usually are situation relevant ones. In this study 
concepts are seen as the situation relevantly recalled set of memory representations and 
their attributes to explain the sensed or imagined descriptions of the being. The structure 
and functions of man's concepts are postulated in Chapter 3.  
RA's mental head in figure 2.1 is framed with RA's memory representations or views of the 
world, of his roles, resources, situations and actions. They form the frames and basic elements 
of human mind, which is seen as the mental planning and control system or the steering 
system of man. Its role is to offer man the image of the world and of oneself, of environment 
and its changes, and the directing power of ones actions and reactions to happenings and 
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changes in his environment. The central element of man's mind is SCES or the scene of 
experiencing and steering. Its structure and functions will be explained in Chapter 4, where 
the structural frames of the human mind are built of our memory representations. They are 
built during our ontogenic histories and the experiences from the situations and actions we 
have lived through in our roles in the communities of which we have been members.  
I am assuming that the above-sketched descriptions of RA's concepts and experiencings are 
descriptions of mental universals. They are needed to build an understandable and holistic 
model of man and his mind as a system. This in turn is necessary for the rational planning and 
control of the manifesting speech and other motor actions. Though their detailed structures 
and functions will be described in Chapters 3 and 4, I am using these two brief sketches of the 
postulations as tools to formulate the RA-model and the formulation of the hypothesis of this 
study searching the common denominator implicitly in the four intuitive definitions presented 
in the introductory Chapter 1. The system model of Rational Actor, RA, in Figure 2.1 is 
composed of fife structural and functional elements. I shall describe them briefly in the next 
sections and begin it by RA's material environment. 
 
2.3 RA’s Material Environment 
2.3.1 RA's Manipulators as encoders and effectors 
A schematic presentation of the RA-model is in Figure 2.1. The structure of the RA-model of 
man collects different items, facts, aspects, and considerations, which are taken for granted, or 
postulated, or presented as hypothesis of this study. The RA-model presents human beings as 
dynamic and open systems having exchanges of material, energy, and information7 with their 
environment, Bertanlanffy 1968. The figure illustrates the three main areas and the double 
channel linking system between the mental and the material elements of man and his material 
environment.  
                                                 
7 Information is here seen as structured or in form set material or energy, which our senses can encode and 
our brain systems interpret 'directly' or by different types of help devices. Examples of them are written or 
spoken linguistic expressions, encoded electro-magnetic messages in intra-, extra-, or inter-nets or electro-
chemical afferent or efferent action potentials in the brain's neuronal nets, or the molecular structures on the 
receptor parts of the synaptic caps of neurons.  
 33
On the bottom of the figure 2.1 is a schematic description of RA's material environment 
formed of material entities, signs and linguistic expressions referring to them, and theoretical 
terms having no materially manifesting referents. RA's manipulators - in figure 2.1 - have 
connecting lines with these expressions referring to them. 
RA's manipulators represent both all of our senses - encoding the outer and inner energies we 
receive - and all our organs manifesting our speech and other motor actions, reactions, and 
overt behaviour as mentioned above. During the wakeful time, our manipulators are assumed 
to be in continuous state of readiness or on standby. They have to be able to collect all the 
energies delivered by the entities at the reach of them. They have to have similar preparedness 
also for actions and reactions if the situation makes them necessary, (Kolb & Wihshaw 1996). 
Thus, RA's Manipulators have two roles in the RA-model of man:  
o They are encoding the outer and inner energies into afferent action potentials, which our 
brains then interpret as situation descriptions of the world or our body. Thus, they initiate 
the transformation processes in which the material outer world and its change are 
conversed into mentally experienced descriptions of them. 
o The other task of manipulators is to perform all the speech and other motor actions, 
reactions and expressions decided and steered through the mental actions and processes 
(Kolb & Wihshaw 1996). This other task is the end result of the transformation process in 
which the mental is conversed into materially manifesting actions and gestural or mimic 
expressions etc.  
2.3.2 The Dimensions of Materially Manifesting Entities.  
Material entities form the first type of entities in RA’s environment. They are assumed to be 
singular particulars, their systems, or their physical or corporeal interactions with other 
entities of the being. Though sciences do not know what material is, we are justified to 
assume that all material entities with which we can interact manifest - at least partly - in 
space, state, or phase dimensions as function of time, see Figure 2.3.  
A singular material entity can vary in size from neutrinos, quarks, electrons, photons, protons, 
neutrons, atoms, and molecules to the organic and inorganic entities of the planet Earth and 
other material entities of our universe. The Earth in turn is a planet in our solar system, whose 
centre - or our Sun - is just one star of the Milky Way galaxy in our universe. This in turn is 
only one of billions of galaxies forming the archipelagos of galaxies formed of stars, gaseous 
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formations, and black holes and situated here and there in our universe. From most of the 
material entities - important for our everyday well-being - man can get sense based 
information 'directly' or with the aid of different kinds of equipment. If the delivered energy - 
carrying the information from the object - surpasses the threshold value of intensity needed 
for our senses, it may be receivable through some of our senses (Hawking 1988, Enquist 
1999, Kolb & Wihshaw 1996). 
One important group of information is carried by the electromagnetic waves or flow of 
photons and one another by the acoustic waves through air. Pheromones and other olfactory 
material floating in air are forming the third media importing information of remote objects. 
They all together offer encoding work for our visual, auditory, and olfactory senses also from 
temporally or locally distant entities. The encoded olfactory information from our nose goes 
directly to the cortex to be immediately interpreted into descriptions of the source, intensity, 
quality, freshness, edibility, and other meanings of the sensed smell. In the processes of 
evolution, the ability to interpret the meanings of the information received from remote 
objects of attention has evidently had important function for survival and well being of 
individuals and species. 
 
2.3.3 Signs and Symbols Referring to the Material 
The second type of material entities are signs, symbols, special terms, words, and sentences, 
which have materially manifesting entities as their reference. As will be seen in Chapters 3 
and 4, all signs in the RA-model are assumed to be material entities or their sensory 
perceptible qualities and features. Thus, they can be processed as sense based search attributes 
into subject's memory representation of the object entity in question. Thus, a visual, auditory, 
tactile, or olfactory feature of a person or any entity can function as a reminder or as a search 
attribute in the memory representation of the object entity.  Objects' names and other 
linguistic expressions connected to it form an important set of the sense-based search 
attributes in our memory representations and concepts. They enable the linguistic abilities and 
communicative actions of man. The search attributes are assumed to be able to recall the 
situation relevant memory representations of the object entities into subject's working memory 
for conscious review. So, the voice in telephone, or the scent of a familiar perfume, or the way 
one walks can remind us of a friend or a person we know. 
 35
2.3.4 Signs and Symbols Lacking the Materially Manifesting Referents 
Signs, terms and sentences having no materially manifesting referents form the third group of 
material entities. Terms like psyche, soul, spirit, mind, motivation, organisation, value, norm, 
concept, language, culture, etc., are so-called theoretical terms. They are referring to entities 
about which we cannot make any direct observations, though they are commonly used in our 
everyday communications. The referents of the theoretical terms in the RA-model are 
assumed to have their mental existence, or briefly, subsistence. According to my ontological 
position theoretical entities are subsisting and then individual and subjective memory 
representations of the entities to which the terms are referring. It is quite evident - one can 
assume - that these terms must have, at least partly, intersubjectively shared and understood 
mental referents.  
As will be explained in Chapter 3, the memory representations of theoretical entities are 
lacking other sense-based attributes apart from their name or other linguistic or otherwise 
symbolic attributes. The concepts of theoretical entities are then just collections of structural 
attributes to which their names refer. Thus theoretical entities can have only subsitence, 
whose degree of intersubjectivity varies though different kinds of conceptualations are used 
increase the conformity of them. In practice, the meanings of theoretical entities are just 
defined by using other, already known terms (Niiniluoto 1980). Conceptualations can now be 
seen as a trial to build a set of structural attributes describing the different features of the 
referents of terms referring to theoretical or material entities. 
The lacking sense based attributes of theoretical entities are often replaced by different kinds 
of metaphors. The participants of the labour market negotiations are sometimes sailing or 
rowing in the same boat. Another example of this is the use of our solar system as a model of 
an atom. In our solar system, the Sun represents atom’s nuclear and the planets its electrons. 
The use of theoretical terms in everyday language is clear evidence that there is a certain - 
though varying - degree of intersubjectivity in the ways the referents of these terms are 
interpreted between members of scientific and other communities, organisations, and cultures.  
 
2.3.5 Signs, Symbols, and Human Language 
Signs, symbols, and sentences form thus a special type or class of material entities, which are 
able - through our linguistic ability - to refer to other entities that can be:  
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o Materially existing singular entities like stones, houses, cars, people, animals, their 
actions, reactions, their systems, interactions, exchanges, or changes in some of their 
qualities or dimensions. 
o Mentally subsisting entities or mental states like sensations, perceptions, emotions, values, 
motivations, norms, memory representations of singular entities or their systems and 
interactions, and images describing the previous, etc. They have their space, phase, state, 
and meanings as function of time only in human mind in its experiencing processes. They 
in turn have their areas or qualities, levels, intensities, and durations as dimensions of 
man's scene of experiencing and steering as will be described in Chapter 4.  
At the same time, signs, symbols, words, and sentences are the manifesting elements of our 
natural or formal languages. They are expressions of our linguistic abilities that give us the 
mental freedom to move in our discussions and communications in time and space, state, and 
phase dimensions of the entities of our attention. It enables us to locate the actions, events, 
and changes on the proper point of the time line on which we have been living, or are just 
living, or will be living in the future. How this everyday experience of our linguistic abilities 
can be described and understood through the RA-model of man, will be briefly discussed in 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Utilising the hypothetical mental system structures of concepts and the 
scene of experiencing and steering will help to outline the process. RA's concepts and his 
planning and control system with its SCES are assumed to be our main mental tools for the 
conscious and even subconscious steering of our manifesting speech and other motor actions. 
 
2.4 RA’s Duplex Link between the Material and the Mental 
2.4.1 RA's Afferent Action Potentials and the Emergent Channel  
As explained above RA's manipulators and the symbolic arcs in figure 2.1 form one part of 
the duplex linking-system between the material and the mental in the RA-model. The arcs are 
referring to the message lines - formed by the peripheral nervous system - between RA’s 
sense organs and his central nervous system. Our senses and effectors - our executing organs - 
are depicted here as RA’s manipulators. There are two manipulators because we all – as 
products of evolutionary processes – have a symmetric structure and then we usually have 
two eyes, ears, and nostrils, two hands and feet, and there are sides also in our genitals. The 
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two manipulators of RA with their connections to RA’s central nervous system form thus the 
second area of RA-model. 
According to the cognitive neuropsychology man's only material connections to the outer 
world are the afferent and efferent action potentials. They are formed of the electro-chemical 
pulses mediating between the existing material and the experienced mental. The afferent 
action potentials - encoded by the manipulators (senses) - are transporting the flow of 
electrochemical pulses or signs. They carry the encoded information through the peripheral 
nervous system to the central nervous system. In the next phases of the process it will be 
interpreted into short-lived sensory memories, sensations, and perceptions of the entities in 
our environment (Neisser 1982, Kolb & Wihshaw 1996 pp 93-119, Uusitalo 1997). In the 
RA-model I am assuming that our sensory memories and sensations are determined primarily 
by the phylogenically formed neuronal structures. They seem to offer a continuous and on 
line connections to our environment and its changes. Our sensations and perceptions are then 
products of our brain's emergent transformation processes. In our experiencings we are at the 
mercy of our brain's abilities to process the encoded afferent action potentials into our mental 
experiences.  
According to Haffenden & al (1998), this transformation processing of our visual information 
needs the dorsal and ventral streams in our brains. The former is an on-line connection to 
our environment and the latter or the ventral stream is needed to explain the meanings of the 
sensed. The ventral stream uses the memory representations of the observed entity to explain 
its actual and situation relevant meanings. The memory representations are assumed to 
mediate and carry descriptions of entities of our environment and their changes and meanings 
to us in the actual situation. The interpretations of meanings are based on the memories from 
the past and on the speculations of the expected future. The actuality we experience can be 
seen as a mental state between the remembered past and expected future and having elements 
of both of them (Kolb & Whishaw 1996, Milner & al. 1995, Haffenden & al. 1998). 
In this study, I call this transformation process as the emergent effect or emergence. The 
emergent effect is the factual transforming process in which the afferent action potentials - 
coded by our senses or by RA's manipulators – are converted into our processes of 
experiencing sensations, perceptions etc. These experiencings are formed of different levels, 
intensities, and durations of cognitive, emotional, volitive, or motivational experiences. In the 
RA-model, they are lived through on the scene of experiencing and steering or on RA's SCES 
– see Chapter 4.  
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In the RA-model, I am assuming that an analogical double stream exist on all sensory areas. 
The on line interpretation stream needs the connections to the earlier experienced memory 
representations to be understood. Building on the results of Ungerleider & Mishkin (1982), 
Millner & al (1995), Haffenden & al (1998) and on the postulations in the RA-model, we 
evidently can state that the phylogenically steered formations of our sensations are interpreted 
by the ontogenically formed and dynamically maintained memory representations creating 
our perceptions. Perceptions are then memory based and situation relevant interpretations of 
the attended object of interest and its meanings to us.   
Basing on the results of cognitive neuropsychology we can now assume that the chain of 
interpreting processes of the afferent action potentials in our central nervous system has the 
following phases:  
o We possibly become pre-aware about the material entities whose energy is striking our 
senses and causing the momentary sensory memories.  
o We become aware about sensations, which our attention process has selected of the 
available sensory memories and leading to sensations of the situation relevant events and 
changes in our environment (compare with OE gewr and German gewahr = watchful). It 
happens by selecting the proper flow of afferent action potentials of which our sensations 
are then processed (Näätänen 1992).  
o We become conscious of the objects of attention of which the sensations manage to recall 
the situation relevant concepts to explain the meanings of the sensed, Chapter 3 and 4.   
o Thus, our sensory memories as mental pre-primitives function as initiators, which lead to 
the chain of consecutive mental processes of attention, sensation, perception, naming the 
object, understanding its meanings, etc. (Kolb & Whishaw 1996).  
In the RA-model I am assuming that we are aware of our sensations or of our mental 
primitives but become conscious of those attended entities of which we are forming a 
concept-based explanation in our working memory. The sensations are assumed to act as 
search attributes recalling a proper set of concepts and their attributes to create the mental 
state of perceiving and knowing, which makes the sensed understood, as will be explained in 
detail in Chapters 3 and 4, where the structures and functions of RA's mental will be 
postulated.  
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The above accords with the functions of the dorsal and ventral streams of Haffenden & al. In 
these processes, the dorsal stream of the visual information processing is used for the on line 
production of the sensed descriptions of the object of attention. The ventral stream is 
connecting the sensed with the remembered. Thereby, the ventral stream is creating the 
mental state of concept-based perception and the conscious reviewing of the object entity 
(Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982, Kolb & Whishaw 1996, Goodale & Milner 1995, Milner & al 
1997, Haffenden & Goodale 1998). From the evolutionary point of view, the both streams are 
and have been necessary for the survival of species.  
The above explanation has some analogy with the Hanson's (1959) claim that perceptions are 
theory laden. If we see full-grown concepts as theories, all perceptions are theory laden. We 
see what we understand and we understand entities about which we have or can build memory 
representations and concepts. It has some connections also with the time lack of 300 to 500 
ms, which is used to become conscious of the object of attention after the sensory signal has 
reached the relevant area of cortex in different tests (Hari 1992) 
Together the two streams are creating the basis of the emergent transformation process, in 
which the afferent action potentials are converted into experienced mental descriptions of the 
object of attention. These descriptions include its value attributes explaining its meanings in 
the actual situation as will be explained in Chapters 3 and 4. The phenomenal is then a 
product of this emergent transformation process of our brains. 
My forefingers 'know' that they are on the right keys by getting touch on the special marks on 
F and J keys. I am aware but hardly conscious of this. The checking of the positions of 
forefingers happens automatically when I am beginning my writing operations with my 
computer using the touch type system.  I become conscious of the position of my fingers first 
if the letters appearing on the monitor are not the correct ones. 
I have taken sensations as phylogenically determined mental atoms of which we become 
aware or preconscious. Sensations form our real time and situation relevant connections to our 
environment, which we need for all of our everyday activities. Mika Häkkinen's World 
Masterships with his Formula 1 would hardly be possible if there were long time lacks 
between the sensed and the interpreted visual information encoded by his eyes. The situation 
view of the nature and quality of the racetrack – recalled from his long-term memory - 
functions as the interpreting frame for the information encoded by his eyes and interpreted by 
his brain system. Obviously, we all need the quickly functioning and reality-bound 
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connections to our environment and situation related sets of interpreting memory 
representations in our SCES or on the scene of experiencing and steering having its mental 
space in our working memory as will be explained in Chapter 4. 
Thus, the second phase of the process producing our perceptions is assumed to be determined 
by the recalled set of attributes of our memory representations or our concepts connecting the 
sensed information with our past experiences. In the RA-model our concepts are assumed to 
be formed processually during individuals ontogenic histories.  RA’s situation models are 
assumed to form the dynamic frames of interpretations of the primary information encoded 
and delivered by our senses; RA seems to be a situation oriented being. I am assuming that 
our phylogenic and ontogenic histories have formed the steering system of monitoring or 
experiencing the processes of our sensations and perceptions as described above and as will 
be reviewed more detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. In the evolutionary processes, those who have 
been able to utilise one's earlier experiences to interpret the meanings of the sensed, have 
survived with higher probability.  
 
2.4.2 RA's Efferent Action Potentials and the Steering Effect 
The efferent action potentials in turn are transporting the commands or a proper flow of sets 
of electrochemical impulses from central nervous system through the peripheral nervous 
system to the manipulators. There they will be manifested as the wanted flow of speech or 
some other motor actions. We are not conscious of these processes happening in our nervous 
systems, but we are conscious about the outcomes they are causing.  We are conscious also of 
our values, intentions, goals, plans, and the decisions we are taking, which in turn cause the 
flows of efferent action potentials. Thus, the mental and the unconscious brain processes are 
producing the flows of efferent action potentials, which act as the causal steering effects that 
produce the wanted – sometimes also unwanted - speech or some other motor actions.  
 This process of our brain system performs the other transformation between the mental and 
material. I am calling it as the steering effect or re-emergence, because it produces the 
manifesting material expressions from the subjectively experienced mental thoughts and 
decisions. Though we don't in detail know how our brains produce the processes connected 
with the steering effect, we know it happens. In practice we become conscious of the actions 
and the other possible outcomes these processes of steering effect (Kolb & Wihshaw, 1996). 
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We can perceive our own speech and other motor actions and control their production 
according to the differences between the aimed model or goal and the achieved performance.  
 
2.5 The Three Dimensions of RA’s Manifesting Actions. 
2.5.1 RA's Ability to Situation Orientation 
The third area of RA-model is presented in Figure 2.2, which is the centre part of the figure 
2.1 presented more detailed. There are four capital letters in the middle of RA-model referring 
to the main dimensions of man's actions. The letter A in the middle refers to RA's substance 
and central feature, which is his agency. RA's agency has the three dimensions, which are 
describing the rational, social, and biological features of man. Already Aristotle discovered 
these main dimensions of man, when he was describing man as rational and social animal. 
The three areas of features of man are assumed to be manifesting in all of man's actions and 
reactions. Man’s central feature is his ability to adapt oneself into his environment and to its 
changes. This is assumed to happen through man's goal oriented, planned, and - at least partly 
- rational actions.  This competence can be seen as an utterly necessary ability for men's - and 
all actors' - survival.  
The main tool in this adaptation process is man's ability to situation and goal-oriented actions. 
With rational actions, actors are able to exploit some of the actual possibilities in their 
environment and avoid most of its threats. The common objects of human sciences are in one 
way or other connected with human actions. The central problem area in actions is formed by 
the question how they are planned and controlled. The general aim is often - at least implicitly 
- to reveal the invariant rules according which the mentally experienced planning and 
decision-making are steered and how the mental is then steering8 the materially manifesting 
executions of the planned actions and activities. Thus, this shared object stimulates the 
research among other things in economics, in political sciences, and in organisations where 
the aim is to improve the ways of managing the economical and human resources needed and 
used in them. Man is often seen as the ‘most important resource’ of the organisation. The 
                                                 
8 Steer and steering are terms, which sound mechanical but are used in this study as expressions, which refer to 
the mental control in which the processual and unconscious elements are in a considerable role. Reflexes are 
examples of this automaticity of production of efferent action potentials steering motor actions. 
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problem of guiding individuals to understand the goals of the organisation and to find them as 
valuable and situation related is then one of the primary tasks of any manager and leader. This 
is more probable in organisations in which the organisational values and norms are commonly 
adopted and a collective language enables fluent communication between individuals in 
different positions in the organisation. 
 
2.5.2 RA as a Biological Being 
The bodily dimensions of RA form the material base for his actions. The evolutionary 
processes have created these resources. I shall briefly list some of the main biological features 
of man as the basis of his activities, Figure 2.2.   
As a biological being, RA has the phylogenically based and ontogenically completed: 
o Central and peripheral nervous systems, CPNS in short, which form those parts of man’s 
biological and material substance that shape the basis of man's mental substance and his 
mental steering system as was assumed in the previous. The dorsal and ventral streams of 
visual information and the mirror neurons in our brains exemplify the ways our brain 
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system enables our 'direct' or on-line and memory-line interfaces with our environments 
and the explanation of our learning processes.    
o An anatomy and physiology, which form the physical resources for man's mental and 
mentally steered actions and activities. At the same time RA’s material and biological 
structure and functions form the bases for: 
o The necessity of metabolic balance which creates the needs manifesting in feelings of 
being hungry, thirsty, or having other experiences leading to changes in man’s behaviour 
and actions aiming at the satisfaction of one’s metabolic needs. 
o Sexual needs and sexually reproductive capacities as a creature of the biological 
evolutionary processes. This feature evidently is necessary in aiming at the survival of 
man as a species. 
 
2.5.3 RA as a Social Being 
The reproduction process is the biological feature, which in turn has led to many of the social 
features found in RA’s behaviour. I limit the list of them to the naming of the most common 
areas of social life relevant in this study: 
o RA builds and maintains linguistic signs and systems as tools for communicative actions. 
This has evidently increased man’s abilities to survive as an individual and species. In 
Chapters 3 and 5, the connections between RA’s concepts and his linguistic abilities will 
be postulated and briefly discussed. 
o RA builds and lives in communities organised often by hierarchies of social, economical, 
and political institutions and roles of individuals as members in them.  
o In accordance with their roles, individuals adopt the rules of interactions and exchanges 
between the members of the communities to which they belong. A pressure to adopt the 
values and norms, duties and rights often mediates the orienting rules for individuals. The 
rules often create in individuals a need of a balanced exchange of material and mental 
entities with the community and its members. These rules are guiding the majority of the 
members of the communities with which he/she is living, though dissidents exist always.  
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2.5.4 RA as a Rational Individual  
RA’s rationality as well as his sociality can be seen as features manifesting in individuals' 
interactions and exchanges with other members of the communities in which one is living. 
Rationality is often seen as those features of plans and actions, which promote the 
possibilities to achieve the goals set for the action or activities. These rational features are 
here seen as results of individual's mental capacities. They are performing and aiding the 
planning and control processes and actions connected with man’s goal oriented behaviour.  
These features are assumed to be grown from the phylogenic and ontogenic histories of 
individuals and species as mentioned above. Individuals are bound in some measure to the 
abilities their genomes have mediated but they can plan and direct their ontogenic curricula 
and achievements in the course of it. 
 
2.5.4.1  Some Phylogenic Features in RA's Rationality 
One can hardly maintain that the evolutionary processes have some goals or purposes. Even 
so, if the survival of human kind is seen as one of the results of the evolutionary processes of 
man, then the structures advancing this can be seen as entities enabling and serving rational 
thinking, planning, decision making, and acting. There can be found some rational features in 
the processual formations of RA’s concepts as will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Although an individual's rationality is mostly seen as a result of his ontogenic history and 
manifestation of his curriculum – education, work experiences, identity, personality, etc. - it 
has a strong phylogenic and processual background. Here just some features of the 'processual 
rationality' of RA created by phylogenically modified structures and processes connected with 
the information gathering, processing, storing, and utilising activities. They all are useful in 
increasing the possibilities of the survival and welfare of individuals and species: 
o The human central and peripheral nervous systems enable the emergent creation of RA’s 
mentally experienced steering operations, which can vary from unconditioned reflexes to 
refined conscious planning and decision-making procedures using the latest computer 
assisted systems. These mental control operations of individual's actions and reactions aim 
at accommodating oneself into the mental and the material environment in which one is 
living. 
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o The processual formation of memory representations and their sensory and structural 
attributes as elements into the memory representations of singular particulars (Lambert & 
Shanks 1997) see Chapter 3.  
o The rationality of classes, categories, stereotypes, and concepts is in their ability to lessen 
the mental burden of swapping between the long-term memories and working memory 
when aiming at recognising of the encountered entities, see Chapter 4. 
o The multi-purpose use of individual's memory representations of entities of the being 
enables the situation relevant action and reactions.  
o RA’s attention process selects those objects of observation and apprehension, which serve 
our goal-oriented actions or are changes of importance in our environment. 
o The dorsal and ventral streams in processing the visual information enabling the 
utilisation of the collected experiences in interpreting the visual sensations and forming 
the visual perception. The analogical double processing is assumed to happen on all 
sensory areas.  
o The processes of our mirror neurons enabling the learning linguistic expressions and other 
motor actions just by aping. 
The combination of the sensation and perception processes into one two-phase system of 
perceiving, in which the concept based explanations of the different meanings of the objects 
attended are brought into the conscious phase of reviewing and comprehension. According to 
the RA-model this happens in most cases automatically by using sensations or the mental 
primitives as a search attribute for recalling the situation relevant memory representations to 
explain the meanings connected with it. This evidently is a process, which is needed to enable 
man to utilise his experiences collected during one's ontogenic history. What is more rational 
than learning by experiencing, aping, and living through - feeling, reacting, thinking, 
planning, deciding, acting - different situations and then using the experienced again in 
similar or analogous situations. 
 
2.5.4.2  Some Ontogenic Features of RA's Rationality 
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The rational features in man's bodily and nervous structures are thus products of the 
phylogenic history of our species, but some of the rational features of individuals' behaviour 
and actions are results of their ontogenic histories. Features of the conscious ontogenic 
rationality built on the processual phylogenic basis of RA can be seen for instance in: 
o Man’s long-term memory system, which forms the phylogenic basis for most of the 
rational features of man. The long-term memory systems, both declarative and 
nondeclarative or explicit and tacit, empower the possibility of utilising individual's 
experiences collected during one’s ontogenic history. This enables individuals to build 
their personal features with its basic values, norms, and principles. These features form 
the structures of his moral and ethical backbone and his possibilities for independent use 
of intellect for contemplating and reasoning in ones thinking and decision making. 
According to Aristotle, thinking is the highest form of action, which resembles the Gods' 
way of being. 
o Man's working memory that is limited in capacity but quick in its ability to retrieve 
memory descriptions from subject's long-term memory. It enables man to concept based 
or conscious reviewing of the situation relevant entities and their values and meanings 
o One of the basic rational features of RA, that may be mentioned here, is the fact that man 
seems always to be striving to find invariances from the multitude of phenomena in 
one’s environment, (Kaila 1939 p 14). This is done as well by laymen as by the members 
of the business and scientific communities. The latter are doing it more systematically and 
by applying methodologies included in the paradigms of the business or scientific 
communities of which they are members. 
o Striving to find invariances can be seen also in layman’s instinctive search for rules of 
thumb enabling one to forecast the future. Working rules enable also the systematic 
formations of different possible options before making decisions. Thus, the rules can be 
seen as tools, which are developed during individual’s ontogenic history that are 
advancing one’s well being and the possibilities to survive as an individual and species. 
Striving toward invariant rules means also the advancing of the control of the relations 
between oneself and the changing environment. 
o The conscious and situation relevant control of one's actions and reactions, interactions 
and exchanges, thoughts, and imagining aiming at achieving the valued goal states of 
affairs. 
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o The situation relevant control of one's environment and the events and changes to 
provide oneself with a proper set of opportunities for goal-oriented actions. 
 
Examples of man’s rationality in modern organisations are the planning and decision making 
systems. They are often supported by the information or knowledge warehousing systems. 
This rationality is aiming at the optimum use of material, monetary, intellectual, social, and 
other types of material and mental capitals. Man is here seen as an actor, as a rational and 
social planner and decision maker; he is trying to maximise the use of possibilities found in 
the situations lived through and minimise the threats and negative consequences. On the floor 
level practice man’s conscious efforts toward rationality is seen in the systematicly planned 
development work of products, organisations, communications, decision making, production 
flows and processes, tools and methods, instructions and procedures, etc. 
 
2.5.5 RA's Agency as a Central Element of his Substance  
The above brief analysis of the three dimensions of RA's actions show clearly that man's 
phylogenically based and ontogenically accomplished peripheral and central nervous systems 
form the grounds for our mental substance. This is performed by our brain's ability to offer 
the systems of our long-term memory and working memory as mental tools and space for the 
mental steering of our actions. Seeing RA as an actor reveals the basic substance of man. 
This substantial feature of man can be explicated in one Finnish word ‘toimijuus’ which 
perhaps can be translated into English by the term agency. Agency is here used as a term 
referring to the descriptions of man’s substance, structure, and functions as an actor or a 
rational actor. Actors' well being and survival depends on their ability to goal oriented, 
planned, and also - often enough - effective and results yielding actions in varying situations.  
I have illustrated the main dimensions of man's substance as an agency in figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
I have completed the picture in the summary with the ontology of RA's world in figure 2.3. It 
presents the material and mental features of man and their internal connections. The mental of 
man is an emergent creation of man's central and peripheral nervous systems. The mental has 
the steering power to the manifesting features of man's speech and other motor actions. In this 
study, I will be concentrating to the basic structures and functions of man’s mental steering 
system. Man’s ability to control his existence and interactions by applying rational planning 
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and decision-making has been and will be one of the necessary conditions for man’s survival 
as a species. These rational features of man are often seen as matters of course, but they can 
also been seen as results of our processual and only partly conscious steering system directing 
our efforts toward the goals we see valuable. 
 
2.6 RA's Interfacing Neck with its Emergent and Steering Effects  
The two-channel linking 'neck' with its emergent and steering effects is functioning between 
RA's mental head and his central nervous system. It consists of the two transforming 
processes performed by our brains. These ontological transformations are assumed to be 
products of our peripheral and central nervous systems especially the neurone nets and their 
system effects in RA's brain:  
o The first transformation is the emergent effect, in which the sense-based and encoded 
information is conversed into our experiences.  
o The other transformation or the steering effect is assumed to convert our mentally 
experienced - for example, the accomplished plans and decisions - into a proper flow of 
efferent action potentials, which are then steering the executions of our situation relevant 
speech and other motor actions.  
Thus, these two postulated 'effects' are assumed to form the two necessary interfaces between 
man's mental and his material body and environment. The pulses and flows of afferent and 
efferent action potentials can be measured and the manifesting features of these effects can be 
observed and tested, but the human sciences do not have a detailed explanation of how these 
two transformation processes are produced in our brains' networks and their systems. Thus the 
genesis of the mental of man is still a somewhat unexplained phenomenon. Hopefully, the 
beginning new century of the brain research will little by little open the veils hiding the truth-
like explanations of the functions of our brains. Till then, we have to build and use different 
types of metaphors to make these processes more understandable. 
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2.7 RA's Mental Head forming the steering system of man 
RA's mental 'head' - on the top of figure 2.1 - is a sketch of RA's steering system with its 
views and SCES. With its frames of RA's world-view, role-view, resource-view, situation- 
and action-view it is modelling the human mind or psyche as explained in the beginning of 
this Chapter. RA's views are used in our everyday language and experiences. We all orient to 
our environment by applying our World-views, which describe the entities, as they are 
perceived and also how they ought to be according our values and norms. Analogically we are 
using our role-, resource-, and situation-and actions views. 
The more detailed descriptions of RA's views are in section 4.1 in Chapter 4. The 'head' is the 
material or brain-bound mental space for our memory representations of the entities of the 
being and for the mental actions and experiencings, with which are steering our manifesting 
actions and behaviour.  
 
At the same time, the 'head' is the mental space for the processes of living through different 
qualities, levels, intensities, and durations of our experiences on the scene of experiencing 
and steering or SCES. RA's SCES is the centre of RA's planning and control system finding 
its mental space in our working memory, as has been mentioned earlier and as will be 
explained later in Chapter 4. 
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2.8 Summing up The Basic Facts and Beliefs of Man 
In what follows, is a short list of the main facts, beliefs, presuppositions, and ideas on which 
the RA-model will be built:   
1. The being is all there are in our Universe. It is formed of material and mental entities; see 
Figure 2.3 in the previous page. The material exist and manifest in space, state, and phase 
dimensions as functions of time. There are material entities - like the gravitons - for which 
the physicists don’t have equipment to observe them. The mental entities only subsist as 
individuals' experiences, which can have and often have varying degrees of 
intersubjectivity between members of the same cultural groups.   
2. Man is assumed to be a mentally directed and controlled, and then, a rational, social, and 
biological actor created by the processes of the physical, chemical, biological, social, and 
cultural evolutions. 
3. Humans as individuals are dynamic products of their phylogenic and ontogenic histories. 
They build and process the basic features of their material and mental resources, abilities, 
and roles in their communities. Individuals can change and expand them by utilising their 
creative powers in thinking, planning, and acting while adapting to their cultural environ-
ments. 
4. The biological evolution has furnished our brains with an emergent process in which the 
sense-encoded afferent action potentials - our only channel to our physical environment - 
are transformed into experienceable descriptions of the sensed and observed entities and 
their different features. Our brains can also store the experienced as memory 
representations of the entities and often also the different elements of the situations in 
which they were observed.  
5. These situation-views are seen as dynamic collections of elements of the memory 
representations of what happened. Their elements are formed of actors and their roles 
and doings and other ingredients, which participate in them. The concatenated situation-
views form stories, which bind them into memorable sets of episodes, which are stored in 
our long-term memories. 
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6. This processing takes place during and even after individuals' actions, interactions, and 
exchanges with their environments by forming and manipulating the situation relevant 
memory representation in their working memory. During the REM-phases of our dreams 
we possibly reorganise the sets of our memory representations into a more controllable 
order.  Man's evolutionary history has formed also the systems of the neuronal nets in our 
brains for the structures and functions of our working memory in which we can 
consciously manipulate a limited set of simultaneously recalled memory representations 
of the entities of the being. Although the simultaneity of conscious content of our working 
memory is limited the speed of changing it is really fast, which offers tools for increasing 
the creativity and efficiency of our thinking and planning processes. 
7. Human brains seem to have also another problematic transformational ability to 
produce a situation relevant flow of efferent action potentials to control of our speech and 
other motor actions according to our thoughts, plans, and decisions. I have named this 
transformation the steering effect, for its ability to direct and control our speech and other 
motor performances. 
8. Sciences do not have any good explanation how these two transformations - from material 
into mental and vice versa - take place in our central nervous systems; the results of them 
we all can live through in all of our everyday activities. Some timing and location features 
of these processes can be measured by different brain imaging tools like PET, MEG, MRI, 
fMRI, etc. But they do not tell how the substance of the transformations happens.  
9. Nevertheless, the brain researchers have shown that the dorsal and ventral streams of 
the processing of the encoded visual information exemplify the way our on-line and 
memory-line connections are built in our central nervous system. We need the on-line 
connection to our environment to control our actions and we need the memory-line 
connections to understand the situation relevant meanings of the observed. The meanings 
of the seen and observed form the basis for the rational planning and execution of our 
actions in the situations we are living through.  
10. Man's ability to situation relevant, rational, and goal-oriented actions and interactions 
has been and will be a necessary condition for his survival and well being. This ability 
depends on the situation relevancy of our brain's transforming functions connected with 
the encoded information and the decisions we make. 
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11. Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) have found that apes' motor 'command' neurons in the ventral 
premotor area of the frontal lobes - so called mirror neurons - activate not only when 
apes are doing some operation but also when seeing other apes or the researcher to do the 
same operation. If the human mirror neurons function in the same way, they will play a 
central role in explaining the processes of the human learning. This means that they could 
explain how our brains function when they 'learn' to produce the efferent action potentials 
to control our speech and other motor actions (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998)  
12. According Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998, Ramachandran 2001, Motluk 2001 our linguistic 
abilities can be explained by the mirror neurons because their functions seem to give a 
natural explanation of our ability to imitate the seen and the heard, see Chapter 3. 
 
Thus, the results of brain research and neuropsychology seem to open slightly the secrecies of 
the two transformations between the material and mental and vice versa. The dorsal and 
ventral streams of visual information and the newly found functions of the mirror neurons 
may in the future explain how our learning processes are handled in our brain-system. The 
seen and heard prepares - besides the activization of the sensory areas of our brain - also the 
relevant motor neurons to control the movements and actions just seen or the speech acts just 
heard. Parts of the mysteries in our linguistic abilities seem to get a natural explanation 
through the functions of our mirror neurons. They open also a bit the secrecy of our brain's 
ability to produce the flows of efferent action potentials controlling our speech and other 
motor actions. 'Learning by aping' seems to be main strategy of evolution.  
 
2.9 The Hypotheses of this study 
The four intuitive and hypothetical definitions, which I presented in Chapter 1 as initiators of 
this study, contain statements about a set of theoretical terms and preliminary descriptions of 
their assumed referents. Action was seen as "an agent's steered use of resources, which are 
under his control and with which he is aiming at a valued goal state of affairs". Knowledge 
was seen as concept- and/or sign-based documentation of an entity of the being. Motivation 
was seen as an object oriented mental energy. Values, norms, and language were seen as the 
mental dimensions of an organizational culture. These mental entities were assumed to be in 
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central role in individuals' mental operations aiming at rational goal setting and control of 
planning, deciding, implementing, and communicating actions.  
The common content and substantial feature in these terms is that they all refer to theoretical 
entities, which - according to my monistic but two-dimensional ontological position - are 
mentally subsisting entities. They all play a central role in the steering and directing processes 
of man's actions and behaviour. The main ideas in the original questions of this study were: 
What are the mental meta-elements and structures, which are behind our mental states of 
cognition, emotion, volition, motivation, etc. and which have an effect on the planning and 
controlling processes and operations of individuals' actions and behaviour? 
The human pursuit of knowledge has advanced from different types of magical, religious, 
philosophical, and psychological, explanations of the sensed information of the objects of 
attention towards systematic theory building of different sciences. In the evolutionary 
processes man's ability to forecast the future increased his possibilities to survive. This in turn 
has depended on man's ability to find invariable features, regularities and rules, along which 
the entities in his environment acted and behaved. Thus the memory representations had to 
include kind of a time-line of entities to make this forecasting possible.  
As mentioned earlier, sciences can not yet exactly explain how the phenomenal world is 
created from the material and vice-versa; the two ontological transformations hold their 
unexplained features of being able to mediate or interface between the material and mental 
states in man's and other actor's central nervous system.  However, the testable memory 
representations - in our long-term memory - and their system structures with their sense-based 
and structural attributes can be used to describe and explain many features of the mental 
dimensions of man.  
Building on the above condensations of some truthlike beliefs concerning man's substance and 
actions and their multidimensional features I am stating as the working hypotheses of this 
study that human beings, are rational actors, RAs, and:  
1. A scientific explanation of the human mental can be built on rational interpretations of the 
results of the modern memory research as assumed in Chapter 2. 
2. RA's concepts are situation relevant sets of the sense-based and structural attributes of 
our memory representations of the attended entities. Their totalities and components are 
stored in our long-term memory from where they can be recalled to our working memory 
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and used as mental tools for conscious mental operations. The system model of human 
memory representations and concepts is presented in Chapter 3. 
3. RA's steering system or his planning and control system with its memory-based frames 
and the scene of experiencing and steering or SCES form the structures of human mind. 
These systems have their store in our long-term memory and their conscious mental 
space in our working memory, where we can live through different qualities, levels, 
intensities, and durations of our mental states. The postulation of the system model of 
human mind is presented in Chapter 4. 
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7 I shall explain how some of the psychological and philosophical 
theories and the controlling elements of the human action can be seen from a new point of 
view. These views explain at the same time how the postulated entities can be used to solve 
the problems and answer the questions I set for this study in Chapter 1. The structures and 
functions of the hypothetical entities of RA's concepts and his mind offer these new points of 
view. Remembering the wisdom of Occam's razor, I try to manage with these two theoretical 
entities and their system structures and functions when attempting to deepen the 
contemporary understanding the real substance of human mental dimensions and their role in 
our knowledge, values, motivation, language, and actions. The postulated structures and 
functions of concepts and mind reveal to a certain extent also the role of the mental in the 
steering and controlling processes of human actions in organisational and other environments. 
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Motto of Chapter three:  
If we realize what the human concepts are, we could possibly comprehend what the human 
knowledge, values, motivation, thinking, and consciousness are. 
 
3. CONCEPTS AS ATOMS AND MOLECULES OF RA'S MENTAL 
3.1 The Etymology of the Term Concept and some Features of its Use  
3.1.1 Concepts and the Etymology of the Related Terms. 
According to my ontological position and my hypotheses concepts are mental entities and 
situation relevantly recalled sets of our memory representations of the entities of the being. 
Before going into the detailed postulation of the types and structures of RA’s memory 
representations and concepts, I shall search for the basic substance and functions of concepts 
from the etymology of some terms connected with it. The structures and functions of 
theoretical entities can possibly be conceived by examining the etymological backgrounds of 
the terms, which are referring to them. The etymology of a term often reveals the concrete - 
though often just metaphorical - features of the original referent of the term. This can then 
help us to understand the nature of its present referential and perhaps also its other meanings.  
I shall begin to delineate the 'time line' of concept by studying the etymologies of the English 
term 'concept' and its Finnish translation 'käsite'. Concept refers to the theoretical entity, 
which is of central importance in understanding the structure and functions of the mental 
dimension of human beings. The Finnish word 'käsite' is a term, which is easily derived from 
the word 'käsi' = 'hand' and 'käsittää' = 'understand' or 'comprehend'. Thus, the term concept in 
Finnish has the word hand in its etymology. It is easy to conceive 'käsitteet' (concepts) as 
mental tools for getting the object items in the hold of one's 'hands'. A better expression might 
be to say that you get an object in your 'mental hands' and 'mental control', if you have a 
concept of it or a many-sided conception of it. When an object is in your biological hands, 
you get lots of sensory or 'concrete' information about its different features, as will be 
discussed later. 
When having the object in your 'mental hands' you can 'see, touch, and feel' the object in its 
totality, its structure and functions, and understand its different meanings for you. This 
happens if you have a proper collection of sensory and other descriptions in your long-term 
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memory of the object in question. By recalling the memory representations of the object you 
are able to interpret the sense based information you are getting of its present state and bring 
to your mind its history, and speculating its possible future states. These all are areas of 
descriptions we usually remember about important objects or singular particulars in our 
environment.  
The English nouns concept, conception, and comprehension and the verbs to conceive and 
comprehend have also concrete backgrounds in their Latin etymology. The backgrounds are 
found in the Latin verbs concipere = to take in or receive, and capere = to grasp, to take, 
(Niiniluoto 1988). These pragmatic connective metaphors are analogical with that of the 
Finnish term 'käsite' and 'käsi' above. Even the German term Begriff has greifen = grasp in its 
etymology. All these suggest that through concepts one can get the representations of the 
objects into one's mind or into one's mental grasping, viewing, and observation. During this 
mental viewing, its different meanings are interpreted by the different features of the object of 
attention.  
Another Finnish word 'käsitys' = 'conception' can be derived also from the word 'käsi' = 'hand’ 
and the verb 'käsittää' = 'understand'. One day, the managing director of an exporting 
company asks the marketing manager what is his conception (käsitys) of Matti and his 
possibilities to take the open position of the export chef in a certain new foreign market area. 
The term conception refers here to a whole set of descriptions of Matti's education, 
experiences, linguistic abilities, knowledge of the culture of the planned countries, his ethical 
and moral standard, his ability to control his behaviour under impact of wine and booze, etc. 
Conception in everyday language refers thus to many-sided, even value based and moral 
descriptions of the attended object or person.  
The English verb comprehend is derived from the Latin verb comprehendere. It is equivalent 
to com = together + prehendere = grasp. Again, this term refers to the process of getting the 
object into one’s mental grip or control by having mental ‘hands’ to grasp the object so that 
one can mentally handle and control it. Thus, grasping seems to be an important metaphor in 
describing the meaning also of this word. It is describing a mental event in which one is 
getting mental hold of the object of attention.  
The Finnish verb 'ymmärtää' = to understand or comprehend in English, has 'ympyrä' = a 
circle, in its etymology. 'Ymmärtää' can be seen as a verb describing understanding or 
comprehending by referring to a concrete situation where you can go around an object or 
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touch it with hands to see and feel it from different sides and that way get a good touch, 
contact, vision, familiarity, and thus also a good conception of it. This describes quite well the 
way our concepts - with their name and other sensory attributes - are formed or processed as 
by-products of the contacts, interactions, and exchanges with the object entities. It describes 
also the way how concepts serve human beings in their strive to get control of their 
environments and their changes as will be discussed later in this chapter.  In addition, also the 
English saying – 'I cannot get my head around it' - refers to the mental going around the 
object.  According to Piaget and Vygotsky our concepts of entities - though they seem to have 
seen concepts as a set of classifying attributes - are formed during our interactions and 
exchanges with them, see section 3.1.5.  
One can ask whether going around a thing - or standing under it – gives a better hold or 
conception of it. By 'standing under' an entity you could possibly see its roots and grounds 
and thus comprehend better its 'genesis and history'. Studying the etymology of words is 
equivalent of going to the genesis of words referential meanings. This can form in many cases 
a concrete though metaphorical ground for the understanding of the meanings of them. The 
etymological approach in conceptual analysis seems anyway to help in catching the original 
pragmatic meanings of theoretical terms and through them a better understanding of the 
modern referential and other meanings of them. 
3.1.2 Concepts as Meanings of Terms in Philosophy  
Concepts have been a common issue in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, semiotics, and 
artificial intelligence. In the classical semiotic triangle, concepts are seen as the meanings of 
terms, which have some objects as their referents. Sentences are formed of terms and functors 
by following the grammatical rules of the used language. While concepts are meanings of 
terms, the meanings of sentences are seen as propositions, (Niiniluoto 1980).  
Sir Quinton (1990 p. 159) maintains that: "…possessing a concept means the ability to 
recognise instances of the concept in question. It means also the ability to draw inferences 
from sentences in which words referring to the corresponding concepts occur. The analysis of 
concepts could possibly be seen as the chief or even the whole 'businesses' of philosophy".  
In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein argued that the world is ultimately composed 
of simple facts. The purpose of language is to illustrate these facts and the only meaningful 
and scientific propositions are those, which do it. According to Russell, complex propositions 
can be resolved into their simplest components, which he called atomic propositions. These 
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propositions refer to atomic facts, the ultimate constituents of the universe. All meaningful 
propositions must correspond to facts. This idea Russell called logical atomism.  
For G. E. Moore philosophy was primarily analysis. Philosophical task involves clarifying 
puzzling propositions or concepts by indicating less puzzling propositions or concepts to 
which the originals are held to be logically equivalent. Once this task has been completed, the 
truth or falsity of problematic philosophical assertions can be determined more adequately. 
Morris Weitz (1988) examined in his history of concepts how the major philosophers from 
Plato to G.E. Moore, Ryle, and Geach used concepts. According to Morris Weitz the history 
of the theories of concepts in philosophy is necessary because: '...the philosopher's theory of 
concepts is not simply incidental to his work but fundamental in his philosophy in that it 
determines the overall condition or criterion of what he takes to be the correct statements and 
solutions of his problems...' (Weitz 1988, xv).  
The same could possibly be said about all researchers, scientists, and laymen because - if we 
see concepts as the tools of thinking and other mental operations - their concepts determine 
the ways they are thinking and solving their problems even they never have explicated their 
conception or their theory of concepts. Weitz sees concepts as man's dispositions to use words 
and language correctly. Palomäki (1994) follows Weitz’s ideas of concepts' dispositional 
nature and their definitionally closed structure. He sees in the theory of concepts analogical 
features with the theory of sets. In this study, I am assuming that human concepts are our 
mental tools enabled by our memory representations. They are related to sets of our memory 
representations of singular particulars and their systems, which can be either material or 
mental entities. We can meaningfully discuss about the values and motivations of a certain 
person or about the features of the culture of a certain country or organisation. To be more 
precise, concepts will be assumed to be sets of the recalled and situation relevant attributes of 
the memory representations of the entities of our attention. This basic substance of concept 
and its psychological structure and functions can possibly explain also the dispositional 
features of concepts to which Weitz is referring. 
 
3.1.3 Some Comments of Concepts in linguistics  
According to Ferdinant de Saussure (1857 - 1913) concepts are: '...facts of consciousness 
associated with linguistic signs or sound pattern by means of which they may be expressed…' 
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(Saussure 1916/1990, pp. 11 - 12). Saussure was the European structuralist who made the 
distinction between 'langue' and 'parole'. Langue refers to subject's mental competence of 
language (grammar, lexicon, and semantics) and parole to the practical manifestations of 
speech acts.  
Noam Chomsky (1928-) has claimed that human linguistic ability goes beyond the structures 
of languages. His universal generative grammar or the theory of the human linguistic 
competence refers to man's mental ability to produce and understand sentences and it will not 
be explained by just analysing the structures of words and sentences. One can, of course, 
doubt if our genes can mediate the thousands of different types of grammars in the languages 
of our Globe. It is much easier to see our linguistic abilities as functions of our interactions 
with the communities in which we have acted during our ontogenic histories. 
Jackendoff (1996, 2002), in his theory of conceptual semantics, gives concepts the role of:  
'...a mental representation that can serve as the meaning of a linguistic expression…' (Jaccen-
doff 1983. 11). Jaccendoff's idea is analogical with the idea in the classical semiotic triangel 
aiming at the referential and mental meanings of terms (Niiniluoto 1980, 118). 
Forrester  (1996) in his book Psychology of Language refers to conceptual structures when 
explaining the meanings of words and sentences of language but does not go into details of 
these structures.  
Paivio does not use the term concept in his Psychology of Language (1981) but in his theory 
of dual coding he refers to the image- and verbal-systems, which he uses to explain the human 
linguistic behaviour (Paivio 1981, 67-74). His image system:  ‘…combines visual, auditory, 
kinestetic, and other sensory components of nonverbal information into integrated wholes’. 
Thus the representational unit contains information from the various sensory modalities about 
objects and events. Paivio's verbal system is dealing with linguistic information of the entities 
in our long-term memory. 
Karlsson (1994, 29, 184) sees concepts as mental representations from the point of view of 
the emergent materialism. According to this view, the mental can be accepted as a feature of 
human substance emerging from the growing complexity of our central nervous system 
created by the phylogenic evolution of our biological and material structure. Referring to 
Poppers ontology of the three worlds, Karlsson sees language as a linking interface between 
man's mental world M2 and his cultural, scientific, and artistic products, which exist in 
Popper's world M3.  
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3.1.4 Concepts as categories and classes in psychology 
Concepts in cognitive psychology are seen as memory representations of classes or categories 
of entities. This has been the common way to interpret the meaning as the referent of the term 
concept since Vygotski (1931>1982), and Piaget (1936>1983). According to Piaget cognitive 
development occurs in four stages from sensor-motor intelligence to preoperational thought, 
concrete operational thought, and formal operational thought at age of 12. The approximate 
borderlines between the stages are at 2, 7, and 12 years of age. First at the fourth stage, 
children were able to develop hypotheses and deduce new concepts in their thinking 
operations.  
The mental representations of categories are typically formed of a number of shared features, 
attributes, or components, (Rosch 1983, Gleitman & all. 1983, Saariluoma 1992, Smith et al. 
1997).  Categories can form hierarchies; a terrier is a dog, is a mammal, is an animal (Murphy 
& Lasalin 1997, 94). Categories are often also formed on the basis of similarities manifesting 
as prototypes or exemplars of similar entities, (Hahn & Charter 1997).  
Categories can be seen also in the Aristotelian way as any of the fundamental modes of 
existence, such as substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, action, and 
affection. Kant had in his philosophy four groups of a priori concepts, which he called 
categories. In his quantity group are unity, plurality, and totality; the quality group consists of 
reality, negation, and limitation; the relation group is formed of substance-and-accident, 
cause-and-effect, and reciprocity; and in the modality group are possibility, existence, and 
necessity. According to Kant, categories and intuitions can be used to interpret experiences 
and perceptions. As will be explained later, concepts' main functions in the RA-model are just 
built on their ability to situation relevant interpretation of the sensed and its different 
meanings. This often happens by using the classifying attribute as the first and quick 
interpretation of the meaning of the sensed object. The Aristotelian and Kantian categories 
could possibly be seen also as classes of classes. There are plenty of instantiations of classes 
in any of the above categories.  
Anderson (1995 352 -366) sees concepts as categories, which can have many features. 
Baddeley (1997, 229-255), when discussing about semantic memory, sees concepts also as 
sets of descriptions forming the features characteristic or prototypical for a class or a category. 
However, he refers to concept types such as Bartlett's (1932/1954) concept of schema, 
Schank’s (1975) concept of scripts, and Minsky's (1975) schema-like concept of frame. 
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Baddeley sees scripts and frames as examples of modern schema theories. Bartlett assumed 
that schemas are the means of remembering and learning new material. For Schanks scripts 
represent commonly experienced social situations and events enabling subject to behave 
appropriately. Minsky maintains that frames are '...structures we have acquired in the course 
of previous experiences.' We all remember millions of frames, each representing some 
stereotyped situation such as meeting a certain kind of person, being in a certain kind of room, 
or attending a certain kind of party....’, (Minsky 1988, 244). 
Schank and Abelson (1977) have suggested scripts, with their elements like scenes, plans, 
MOPs or memory organisation packets, and TOPs or thematic organisation points as memory 
representations of social events. A typical case is formed by the totality and the phases of a 
restaurant visit. From our everyday experience, we all know how lively our scripts are storing 
the events and happenings. It can be heard even in children's discussions about their 
experiences. They are full of detailed descriptions of what happened and what people said and 
how they behaved. Evidently, scripts are our ways to store the events in our personal history 
with the situation relevant linguistic expressions connected with them. As will be explained 
later, sentences and other linguistic expressions are stored as situation relevant sensory 
attributes in RA's views describing events, happenings, participants, their roles etc. (see 
section 3.6.2 and Chapter 4  
 
3.1.5 Some Basic Functions of Concepts  
In the RA-model concepts and memory representations form the central elements of human 
mental. Concepts are assumed to be sets of the recalled elements or attributes of the memory 
representation of the object of attention. These sets ought then be situation relevant and thus 
explain the meanings of the sensed and attended parts of subject’s environment. Using the 
cues derived from the concept’s etymology and the ideas of concepts in de Saussure and 
Jaccendoff had in their definitions, we can infer that one of the basic functions of concepts is 
to make the sensed understood. This means that the sensed is connected with the remembered 
descriptions of the object entity of the being. From the evolutionary point of view, concepts 
should enable subjects to utilise their earlier experiences when interpreting the meanings of 
the sensed. This would mean among other things the ability to fast classify the object of 
attention as an opportunity or threat, friend or enemy, prey or preyer, edible or inedible, etc. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, the dorsal- and ventral streams of visual information processing 
in our brain system are an example of these two-phase processes.   
Besides the above interpreting functions our concepts have the storing functions of those 
repeating features of entities or individual objects, events, situations, habits, ways and 
methods to act in certain situations, etc. Experts like medical doctors, lawyers, and consultants 
are examples of professionals who store ready-to-use models and their modifications for often 
repeating cases and situations. These models consist often rules of a proper set of medicine 
and behaviour to treat the illness or remedy the problems of an organisation. Better part of 
experts' specialty consists of the different forms of explisit and implicit knowledge, which are 
systematicly stored for future use.  
In our everyday activities, models are used though the degree of systemacticness is less 
developed. The models are often situation-oriented and recalled when certain performing 
skills are needed.  Skills are not concepts but they are comprised of 'stores' of analogical sets 
of efferent action potentials to steer the needed and situation relevant sets of speech or other 
motor action. These 'stores' are end-results of a great number of exercises and corrective 
repetitions using the audible and muscular feedback links in our peripheral and central 
nervous system. These stores of skills are sometimes called tacit knowledge. Children's 
linguistic abilities and their amazingly fast development are possibly based on their ability to 
'ape' the heard words and situation relevant sentences and other expressions and correct their 
own expressions and pronunciation through this feedback system (Karlsson 1994, Korhonen 
1994, Forrester 1996). The ‘mirror neurons’ may in future explain this human ability to learn 
by ‘aping’ the seen or heard (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998, Ramachandran 2001, Motluk 2001). 
The third group of the functions of our concepts and memory representations are formed by 
their use as mental tools for thinking, planning, imagining, creative problem solving, 
decision-making, communicative actions, etc.   
 According to the facts, basic beliefs and the ontology of the RA-model presented in Chapter 
2, the common feature of all the functions of concepts is to act as an interface between the 
outer material and the inner mental systems of human beings. Man's mental life is totally 
depending on the interpreting power of his memory representations, as is seen in the system 
model of Man depicted in Figure 2.1. On the bases of neuropsychological facts and the 
etymology of the term, a preliminary list of the necessary functions of human concepts is as 
follows:  
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1. Concepts act as interpreting tools connecting our on-line sensory information of our actual 
environment with our earlier experiences created during our ontogenic histories. The 
dorsal and ventral streams when our brains are processing the visual information - in 
chapter 2 - exemplify the material indications of the brain-level reality of these mental 
explanations (Kolb & Whishaw 1996). 
2. As explained in Chapter 2 this interpreting means in fact that there always is a double-
phase process functioning in the way that:  
o   The mental primitives or our continuous flow of sensations is formed of the flow of 
afferent action potentials encoded by our senses and then  
o    Our sensations are given concept-based and conscious explanations, through 
which we usually experience the sensed as perceptions of the known and 
understood objects of attention. 
3. The phylogenically steered and emergent processes of these experiences form the 
foundations for a rational and situation oriented perception and understanding by utilising 
the memory representations stored in subject's long-term memory. The degree and 
deepness of understanding depends on the situation relevancy of the recalled memory 
representations in subject's working memory.  
4. Concepts enable man's cognitive, emotional, volitive, and motivational mental states, in 
which the attended object entities are named and their meanings are explained and 
understood based on the situation relevant interpretations based on the subject's earlier 
experiences stored in his memory representations and concepts. This means in fact that 
our concepts: 
5. Concepts provide the subject with the descriptions of the value and meaning attributes 
connected with the attended object entity.  
6. As will be explained later in this chapter, in everyday life we often connect the value and 
meaning descriptions with the resource features of the object. The resource features are 
seen from the point of view of our actual or potential actions now or in the future. This is 
made possible by the value- and time-lines in our concepts leading to the value- and time 
orientations of actors, which will be explained later in this chapter. 
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7. Concepts provide man with the ability to name and describe entities by the processually 
and/or consciously formed name and other linguistic attributes. These attributes are 
assumed to function as one set of the search attributes in subjects' concepts and thus 
forming the basis of the human symbol function and thus also the basis of our linguistic 
abilities. 
8. Concepts provide man also with the abilities of communicative actions by enabling the 
processual and even conscious forming and storing the intersubjetive names and linguistic 
expressions as elements of our subjective concepts, views, and conceptions of the entities 
of the being and their systems. 
9. Concepts provide man with the mental tools, which are needed in the rational cognitive 
activities of thinking, imagining, planning, and decision-making, by proper set of 
descriptions of entities of the being.  
10. Concepts provide man with an ability of grouping entities into classes, types, or 
stereotypes, which enables the rational mental handling of the attended and sensed world. 
This is assumed to happen by the processual forming of the classifying attributes to our 
concepts. They form often the only descriptions, which are needed to deal with the 
observed entity.  
As mentioned earlier, our conscious and even unconscious mental is based on the recalled and 
active elements of our memory representations. The above list describes only some of the vast 
number of functions of our concepts. These functions of concepts are taken here as the base 
on which a preliminary draft of the structure of concepts can be shaped. What are the 
plausible structures and functions of our concepts and brain-processes, which enable all the 
phenomenal we experience? The hypothetical answer to this question will be sketched in the 
following sections and in Chapter 4. Concepts will be seen as the recalled collections of 
situation relevant attributes of subject's memory representations of singular particulars and 
their systems, classes, relations, interactions, etc.  
In Kant's Copernican Revolution human knowledge was not about the outer entities but was 
created in man's mind and 'Das Ding an sich' in the outer world was seen as totally 
inaccessible for man.  In the RA-model the outer world is assumed to be accessible through 
the on-line sensory information and its interpretations as sensations. Thus Kant was right in a 
way; we need our brain's emergent transformations to form sensations from the encoded 
afferent action potentials and a second part of the interpretation to form an understood 
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perception of the object of attention. In these transformations RA's concepts play a central 
role.  
Classes in the RA-model are not concepts. They are seen just as a set of attributes describing 
the common features of a group of entities having certain degree of similarities in their 
sensory or other properties. I chose this strategy because we do not interact and have 
exchanges with classes but with individual particulars, which, of course, carry with them the 
features of belonging to one or more classes. In the RA-model of concepts, classes and 
categories are groups of the sensory and/or structural attributes describing the common 
features of certain types or groups of entities.  
This approach means a kind of a 'Copernican revolution' in the theory of concepts. The class 
is taken from its central position in our conception of concept and put aside just as a group of 
classifying attributes in the total structure of concepts. The name of the entity or the linguistic 
expression, which is used to describe the object or situation under our attention process, is 
now given the central position in concepts. This is motivated for the factual status of the 
linguistic expressions in our concepts, which is formed with their role as the main search-
attribute in the human communicative interactions recalling the other situation relevant 
attributes to explain the meanings of the objects of attention.  
We are interacting and having exchanges with particulars and individuals, not with classes 
and universals. Usually, we also want to be treated as individuals and not just as 
representative of a class or as a stereotype. However, it is useful and rational to know to 
which class or category the object of our attention belongs, because it simplifies the mental 
operations, which are needed in the situation. A car or a man on a city street does not need 
many detailed attributes to be confronted and understood. Our friends' cars instead have many 
important features about which we can sometimes discuss with them as well as about the 
weather, which can have innumerable features from wonderful to harmful and awful. 
 
3.2 The Situation Relevancy of RA's Concepts and their Attributes  
3.2.1 Conquering the Mental with the Weapons of the Natural Sciences 
In physics, the understanding and explaining of the world is thought to be found through anal-
ysis. Since Democritus, (ca. 460 - 370 B.C.) the human thinking has strived towards the 
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undividable elements or atoms of the material world. To day, atoms - like H, O, N, C, etc. – 
have asserted to have internal core structures of protons and neutrons, electrons, and hundreds 
of other elementary particles. Protons and neutrons in turn are formed of the quarks, which are 
bound together by the strong nuclear power mediated by gluons. Atoms are surrounded by 
electrons, which enable the formations of molecules when aided by electromagnetic powers 
mediated by photons. These are the main structures and powers, which regulate the 
connections and interactions between atoms when forming molecules like H2O, CO2, DNA, 
RNA, etc.  
Protons and neutrons are built of the six types of quarks. There are speculations that even 
quarks may be built of still smaller elements, though the standard theory does not need them. 
Quarks are assumed to form the main elements of protons and neutrons forming the material 
world manifesting to the human observer in space, phase, and state dimensions as functions of 
the actual collection of present forces and time as mentioned earlier. The empirical proofs of 
the postulated elements of the material and the forces steering their interactions has enabled 
the rational and understandable descriptions, explanations, and predictions of the behaviour of 
material entities and their systems.  Based on this analytical and empirical approach in natural 
sciences and technology our nuclear power plants and nuclear bombs are built, the Moon 
visited, and the conquering of the planet Mars has began. Nevertheless, the physicists are 
aiming at a unified field theory, which could explain all the material interactions and all the 
four forces from strong and weak nuclear forces to electromagnetic and gravitational forces, 
which are now in use.  
Now, it might be the proper time to begin to discuss about the empirically testable elements 
and powers of the mental of man. Their internal structures and their interactional energy- and 
power-relations may play a central role in our experienced or phenomenal world. According 
to the basic neuropsychological facts in Chapter 2, the material base of our mental is in 
structures and functions of our peripheral and central nervous systems. As explained in 
Chapter 2, I am assuming that the mental is never manifested without its neurophysiological 
base in man's central nervous system. On the other hand, already small disturbances in the 
structures of our central nervous system such as the plaques - dead brain neurons - or lack of 
proper quality or concentration of neurotransmitters in the limbic system or hippocampean 
area – can cause memory loss and then severe mental problems which can appear, for 
example, in the far proceeded cases of Alzheimer disease.  
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The substance and ontology of the microcosm of the material has been and is a continuous 
problem for physicists. The substance, structure, and functions of the mental have also formed 
and are continuously forming problems for human sciences and philosophy. Here I am 
suggesting the use an analogous strategy of the physicists. This means a trial to find the 
smallest plausible and testable elements of the mental and then use them to construct the other 
elements, which could possibly enable us to build a better understanding of the richness of the 
phenomena we live through in our experiential life.  
John R. Searle, in his book of intentionality (1994, ix), states, that: "It is an objective fact 
about the world that it contains certain systems, viz., brains, with subjective mental states, and 
it is a physical fact about such systems that they have mental features". As mentioned earlier, 
it is a neuropsychological fact that our mental experiencing of the outer world needs the 
material afferent action potentials - encoded by our senses of the energies from the object of 
our attention - and the material - normally functioning - central nervous system to interpret it 
before the mental experiensings can be lived through. We need the unexplained emergent 
transformations from material into mental and vice versa, as presented in my ontological 
presumptions in Chapter 2 and Figure 2.3.  
As maintained in Chapter 2, we are justified to believe that our mental life is bound to our 
brains abilities to transform the sense encoded afferent action potentials through emergent 
processes first into sensory memories which function as mental pre-primaries. From these the 
situation relevant ones our attention process selects to be processed into mental states of 
sensations. Sensations are assumed to function as mental primitives and search attributes 
which can recall a set of situation relevant concepts into our working memory, which enable 
the concept-based mental states of recalling, perceiving, knowing, understanding, and imag-
ining.  
The emergent brain processes are needed as well in producing all the other qualities of 
cognitive, emotional, volitive, and motivational mental states we experience. In all these cases 
the material base is in the memory traces in our neuronal nets and the experienced is the 
product of our brains' ability to transform them into situation relevant descriptions of the 
objects of attention. Analogically our actions are bound to another miracle of our brains, 
namely to its ability to produce situation relevant sets or flows of efferent action potentials - 
or the steering effects - for manifestations of our goal oriented speech and other motor 
actions.  
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In the ontology of this study, I have assumed that the primitives of the human mental of which 
we become aware are our sensations. They are processually formed of the sense encoded 
information flow mediated by the afferent action potentials. The attention process seems to 
select the situation relevant flow by using the triggering initials formed by our sensory 
memories. They in turn are activated by the continuous flow of the sense encoded afferent 
action potentials. Thus, our sensory memories form a real time or on line store of the afforded 
and available pre-mental initials to be interpreted into sensations and later into concept-based 
and then conscious perceptions.  
Thus, based on the above-mentioned facts of neuropsychology, I am assuming that the core of 
our concepts of material entities is formed by our sensations. They are here seen as the 
phylogenically determined on-line connection to the selected and attended objects of our 
environment and its changes. They form the first mentally experienced descriptions of the 
objects of our attention. Here I am calling them mental primitives. The term mental primitive 
as a synonym of sensation is here assumed to be justified because our sensory memories as 
pre-primitives form then a real time set of channels to our environment and our body. Our 
sensory memory is holding the flows of the afferent action potentials in the nascent state or in 
the state of readiness to become transformed into sensations. We possibly are pre-aware of 
these sensory memories. I am assuming that our attentional process selects the situation 
relevant sensory memory channel and its flow of afferent action potentials and interprets it 
into the on-line flow of our sensations, of which we first become aware. These functions of 
our sensory memories seem to form their natural roles for the attention process in the RA-
model of human mental. A sudden change in the environment may activate the attention 
process and we get a new flow of afferent action potentials creating a new set of sensations, 
which is possibly more relevant in the changing situation. 
Sensations are then mental primitives because they form the first phase of the mentally 
experienced interpretations of the attended flow of afferent action potentials. By using the 
physical metaphor, sensations can be seen also as mental protons and neutrons of which our 
memory representations or our mental atoms, molecules, and concepts will be built. Some of 
the sensations – 'protons' - are mediating different types of values and meanings and some – 
'neutrons' - are just describing the object of our attention in a neutral way. In this metaphorical 
description sensations can be seen as mental primitives because they are processually formed 
by our phylogenically shaped but ontogenically completed and continuously dynamic 
neuronal structures. According to the neuropsychology and brain research our sensations form 
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the on-line or the reality testing line to our environment. In the visual perception this line is 
the dorsal stream of information processing – (Goodale & Millner 1995, Kolb & Whishaw 
1996).   
In the RA-model of man and his mind, the mental primitives form the primary interface or the 
linking element between the inner mental and the outer material. These primitives can be 
described by conventional linguistic expressions and thereby inform the others of the 
experienced.  As will be explained sensations are assumed to function as sensory attributes or 
search attributes; thus, they have the ability to recall a situation relevant set of other attributes 
and concepts to explain the sensed. Concepts form the ontogenic or the learned and 
remembered basis of the perception process. This corresponds to the ventral stream in 
processing the visual information (Goodale & Millner 1995).    
 
Concepts as the atoms and molecules of our mental are formed just of the recalled and 
situation relevant sets of attributes of our memory representations enabling the classifying, 
naming, and understanding the sensed object of attention. They explain the different meanings 
of the object - and later on - its connection with the other entities participating in the situation 
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observed. They often have the testable and on-line sensory connection to the objects of 
attention and the memory-based explanation-line to the earlier experienced descriptions of 
them.  
In the following sections, I shall describe and explain the hypothetical structure of our mental 
atoms and molecules and discuss the ways they are assumed to be connected with our 
everyday phenomenal life and its views of the world, of our roles, resources, situations, 
actions, and interactions, etc. 
 
3.2.2 The Structures of Memory Representations enabling RA's Concepts 
Figure 3.1 above presents the system model of a memory representation and concept of a 
singular material entity. We can form a system-model of our memory representations by 
asking: what do we usually remember about the objects we know very well? I am assuming 
that the total list of all the different features we can recall about a singular particular is our 
knowledge of it. The recalled set of features we use in a certain situation is here seen as our 
situation relevant concept of the object entity. Thus, our concept - not our total knowledge of 
an entity - defines our understanding the meanings of the object. Thus, concepts define also 
our interpretations of its situation relevance and then also our reactions and actions. Often the 
classifying or stereotyping attributes are all we need to confront an entity. 
There is a considerable variety in the features or attributes individuals have in their long-term 
memory of the entities in their everyday environments. The sets of situation relevant attributes 
recalled to explain the sensed is varying still more. A specialist on a certain area can recall the 
detailed theory of the object entity, while a layman may recall just a few classifying or 
stereotyping features of it. Thus, the contents of our concepts explaining the sensed varies, but 
I am assuming that the system model of our memory representations can be used as a 
universal base for describing human memory representations, concepts, theories, and 
knowledge. 
Figure 3.1 is formed of inner and outer circles. The inner circle - around the entity's name or 
some other linguistic expression referring to it - consists of eight squares describing entity's 
sensory attributes and observable descriptions of actions and reactions. The outer circle of the 
concept model is formed of eight squares describing entity's structural attributes that serve 
often as background explanations of entity's manifesting actions and reactions. I am calling 
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these attributes structural, because they often are verbal descriptions, which are built by using 
other, already known concepts.  
This system model of human memory representations and concepts can be seen also as a 
formation of three columns, which are here called lines. These 'universal' lines of human 
memory representations and concepts can be briefly characterised as follows: 
o The base and value line - in the middle column of Figure 3.1 – consists of the sensory-, 
value-, and classifying attributes of our memory representations and concepts describing 
the sensory, resource, and classifying or stereotyping features of the object entity.  
o The time line of our memory representations and concepts consists of the descriptions of 
the history, the present state, and the believed or hoped-for future state of the entity to form 
the time-oriented total description of the object entity.  
o The theory line of memory representations and concepts is formed by the descriptions of 
the basic substance, structure, and functions of the entity. 
The structure of the recalled set of our memory representations, which are interpreting our 
sensations of the attended entities, is varying as a function of the situation we are living 
through. Thus, our understanding and our actions and reactions are functions of these recalled 
and situation oriented sets of descriptions of the object entities, not on the total collection of 
the descriptions we have acquired of them during our ontogenic history.  As mentioned earlier 
this latter could be seen as our knowledge or knowledge base of the entity. Aren't we quite 
often asking ourselves that, why didn't I remember that and that happenings in the past when 
doing my decision? How thoughtlessly I have behaved!   
Our ability to understand and control the situations we encounter depends then totally on our 
concepts. The sets of the memory representations recalled are not always the optimal ones. 
May be that - when understanding and realizing this human weakness - many political and 
business decision makers want to sleep overnight before deciding about new and complicated 
affairs. 
The main parts of the structures and functions of concepts are testable features and 
manifestations of our long-term memory and our working memory postulated in cognitive 
psychology, (Baddeley 1997).  You can always test your own and others memory represen-
tations and concepts just by asking what you or the others are recalling in a certain situation 
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about the situation relevant entities, objects, or events. In addition, you can ask, what features 
of the remembered situation or its details made the sensed understood. I am assuming that the 
universal in the human mental will be found in the different types and structures of our 
memory representations on which our experiencings are built. The sets of attributes collected 
in them are individual though certain degree of intersubjetivity is necessary to enable our 
communicative and other interactions and exchanges. 
 
3.3 The Base- and Value-line of Concepts  
3.3.1 The Sensory Primitives Forming the Core of the Base- and Value-Line 
As mentioned above and seen in picture 3.1 the base-line of human memory representations 
and concepts' is formed of three sets of attributes: the central square is built of sensory 
attributes, which are briefly analysed in Figure 3.2.  
 
 73
The upper square presents the resource or value features of the object entity; the lower square 
presents the qualities defining the class or group of entities to which it belongs. The centre-
square presents the collection of the sensory descriptions, which one can get from the entities 
in his environment. In the right column are those descriptions of the object entity we get via 
those senses, which can encode information from remote located objects. 
On the left column are those sensory descriptions in which the sensing organ and encoder of 
information is inside subject's skin and body as in gustatory and motor senses or in physical 
touch with the object as the information via tactile sense. In the centre of the central column 
of the Figure 3.1 and 3.2 are the name and other linguistic attributes of the object entity. They 
can be expressed in spoken or written words or in some special sign system like the letter-
signs of blinds.  
All these sense-specific primitives or sensory attributes – except the linguistic attributes, 
which can describe also thought or imagined attributes - are here assumed to present us the 
materially manifesting, situation relevant, and real features of the objects of attention. We can 
get different types of sense specific descriptions through each of our six senses. We can 'see' 
the size, form, colour, actions and reactions as well as the changes in the linguistic 
descriptions of the visual sense modality of the object entity. We can get also many types of 
auditory descriptions and related linguistic expressions of the objects of our attention 
processes depending on the situation and events, which are going on. Through tactile senses 
we can sense and feel how even, rugged, smooth, firm, dry, wet, hot, cold, etc. the object is. 
Touching an entity provides us with this multitude of features, a set of 'concrete' descriptions 
of it. The valuation of this concreteness manifests in an often-heard expression when old 
friends meet after a long time: 'Let me hug you to feel and know that it is really you'.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, our sensations are assumed to act as search attributes, which 
initiate the interpreting process in our brain. All sensory and so also all linguistic attributes of 
entities can have the same role. This ability is based on the fact that linguistic expressions are 
often connected either observed ore thought structural or functional features of the object of 
attention. Thus all linguistic expressions can be used as search attributes even in concepts of 
theoretical entities such as value, motivation, soul, mind, concepts etc. Our actions are often 
connected with verbal expressions describing either the objects of actions or the acts and 
methods applied. This means that repeatedly we are performing ostensive definitions, which 
enables the learning processes of others following the episodes happening. The verbs used 
give the names to the seen actions and nouns the names of the entities encountered. This 
 74
hypothesis of the processual formation of our concepts sensory, linguistic, and structural 
attributes explains also the natural easiness with which children learn the languages their 
communities speak. Linguistic expressions get their meanings through the situations in which 
they are used. The finding of the mirror neurons gives a natural or brain-based explanation of 
our abilities to learn by aping, Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998)   
Besides the processual formations of our memory representations and concepts also the 
interpreting phase of our sensations is a process, which handles the sensory recalls as search 
attributes. They in turn recall a set of situation relevant other attributes to form a concept-
based perception. The experience of perceiving comes so fast after the primary sensation, that 
it is still discussed whether sensations and perceptions are distinct phases in the information 
processing or just one unified process made by our brains' nervous nets. Here they are seen as 
distinct processes, which accord with the dorsal and ventral streams of our visual perceptions. 
The sensory-streams function as search attributes, which enable the use of the earlier 
experiences by recalling the situation relevant memory representations. Our concepts are then 
connecting the collections of our experiences during our ontogenic histories with the object 
entity to interpret the sensed descriptions of the object and its meanings to us in the present 
situation.  
Our sensations are thus assumed to function as interfacing links between our memory 
representations of entities and the actual moment just passing by in our outer - and also in our 
imagined inner - world. By comparing the sensed with the remembered, we can interconnect 
the outer happenings and understand their meanings to us. This processual connection 
between sensation and perception seems to have been one of the necessary conditions for the 
survival of individuals and species. Actors being able to learn or to use their memory 
representations to interpret the meaning of the sensed correctly - or in a situation relevant way 
- have been able to find food, shelter, sex partner, their ways and paths in the forests or other 
terrains, discern friends from enemies, and threats from opportunities, avoid threats and utilise 
possibilities, etc. 
 
3.3.2 The Sensed Actions and Changes as Episodes, Scripts, or Views 
In the central square in figure 3.1, page 68, there are two special areas of sensory descriptions 
of the actions and behaviour of the object of attention in varying situations. The upper square 
consists of observed situations and actions and the lower square of changes, process, and 
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reactions. Their contents can refer to individuals, groups, and their actions and interactions as 
the objects of attention. Usually these are formed of a set of consecutive events and deeds, 
which are stored in our long-term memory as episodes, stories, or scripts describing the views 
one has lived through. Some individuals have the ability to store the seen and experienced 
almost as detailed as a photographic presentation of the happened. These eidetic views of the 
happened enable them to 'see' and recall quite exact descriptions of the events. These memory 
representations of episodes can consist also the speculated roles, plans, and motivations of the 
other participants of the events on the recalled scene of experiencings (Paivio 1986 and 1991; 
Anderson 1995; Baddeley 1997).   
The above concerns the cases in which the object is an actor or an entity that can act, react, or 
change during the interactions and exchange operations with the subject. Actions and 
reactions of an entity are important because they describe also its ability to be or act as a 
resource or anti-resource factor in some of subject's own or his communities' activities now or 
in the future. Thus, they define a considerable part of the object's real value and meaning for 
the subject, as will be explained later. This can be understood when we remember that all 
humans are actors and then in continuous need of and search for resources for their own 
present or future actions and metabolic and mental processes. 
Thus, the sensory information of actors and their actions needs always explanations of 
different types. As mentioned above, the structural attributes are processed to serve this 
function. We often want to know why or for what reasons the seen actions and reactions were 
done. Thus, we need explanations of the actor's aims, goals, motivations, norms, values, and 
other reasons to understand the way they are acting or have been acting. The outer circle in 
Figure 3.1 is a collection of the most usual sets of explanations we use when trying to 
understand the actions and reactions of people and other actors.  
Actions, reactions, and different manifesting changes form the main features of object's 
behaviour. Their representations form the core of the base-line of an object's concept in our 
long-term memory. They create also the need to find the reasons for the observed behaviour 
and the need to ponder their meanings seen from the point of view of subject's own plans and 
actions at the present moment and in the future. This is the reason why human concepts have 
in their base-lines squares for the value- and classifying attributes, whose structures will be 
discussed in the next two sections. The need to understand the behaviour of entities creates 
also the need to build or process the time- and theory-lines to their memory representation or 
concept as will be explained later in this chapter. The top square consists of a collection of 
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objects resource features explaining its values and meanings to the subject. The lower square 
on the value- and base-line consists of a collection of the classification attributes of the object.  
3.3.3 Name and other Linguistic Attributes of Entities  
In the centre of Figures 3.1 and 3.2 is the place for the object's name or other linguistic 
expressions referring to it or its qualities or behaviour. The term, name, has here a very 
common meaning; it can refer as well to nouns, which are naming the entities, as to verbs, 
which are naming the actions or changes we observe. The square can consist of linguistic 
descriptions of events, happenings, or of a sequence of happenings. Words are collections of 
phonemes or graphemes, which are experienced as structures of auditory or visual elements of 
morphemes, of which the meanings of words are built (Karlsson, 1994). The actual structure 
of the linguistic attribute can vary depending on the state, actions, changes, or other dynamics 
of the object entity or its relations with its environment.   
Names and other linguistic descriptions of entities have the same ability - as all the other 
sense based attributes - to recall a whole set of situation relevant memory representations of 
the object entity into the subject's working memory for conscious review. When names and 
situation relevant sentences and other linguistic expressions are conventions, they are handy 
tools for linguistic interactions between members of the community that has created these 
conventions. This function of names, words, sentences, other linguistic expressions, and their 
different inflexions, forms the natural basis of our linguistic abilities. The observed or thought 
views or happenings recall also the situation relevant linguistic expressions.  
In the evolutionary processes of human kind, the situation relevant linguistic expressions have 
had analogical processual forming as search attributes of the object entity as all other sensory 
attributes (Korhonen 1993). The situational image of entities and their actions and related 
expressions has been stored as elements of situation and action views. This is analogical with 
Paivio's dual encoding theory (Paivio 1991). Words and sentences can now function as search 
attributes and recall the situation view to working memory to explain the meaning of them. 
RA's views and Paivio’s images have some degree of analogy with the early Wittgenstein’s 
picture theory of language and Fodor's (1975) conception of the language of thought. RA 
thinks with memory representations of entities and speaks with the situation relevant 
linguistic expressions, which are stored in the same memory universe.   
In linguistics, the smallest elements of word carrying meaning are called morphemes.  Finnish 
language is rich in endings that are changing the referential meaning of the word. All nouns 
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have 16 cases. From any verb, one can derive thousands of meaningful expressions just by 
adding different types of meaning building morphemes (Karlsson 1994). A name is a symbol 
or symbolic sign, which is built of meaningful combinations of morphemes whose elements 
are formed of phonemes or graphemes. A name refers to the whole set of memory 
representations or descriptions individuals have collected about the object during their 
ontogenic histories. These collections of individuals' memory representations of entities form 
their knowledge bases, which is stored in their long-term memories. As said above, the 
situation relevant set of attributes of an entity is here called concept. They are subjective 
representations of objects with which they have been interacting and having exchanges. 
Individuals living in same communities have certain degree of intersubjective features in their 
concepts.  
Through our senses, we can get the written or spoken names of the object entities as 
mentioned above. Blind people use signs formed by elements accessible by their tactile sense 
when reading texts. From the everyday experience we know, that children learn the first 
spoken names of the entities at home already under one year of age. We all have seen that 
children - long before they can speak - can show with hand the named thing and they bring it 
to you after they learned to walk. This phase in a child's mental and linguistic development is 
called symbol function. Through the everyday ostensive practice, the spoken words and their 
inflexions have become symbols of entities. This process gets its natural explanation by the 
structure of RA's concept's base- and value-line, where names form one set of the sensory 
attributes.     
Thus, symbol function is then the phase of concept’s processual formation, in which the name 
attribute is connected as one of the sensory attributes of the memory representation of the 
object entity. This means that a repetitious set of morphemes is processed as a linguistic 
attribute or name of the entity with which it is used. The set of morphemes forming the 
pronounced ore written name has thus become a symbolic sign representing entities that need 
not to be present here and now. Morphemes can then be seen as the materially manifesting 
primitives of the word's referential meaning. Words and their different inflective forms are 
then built of sets of morphemes. The meanings of them are learned from the situation-oriented 
use of them. The referential and other meanings of written words - or sets of graphemes - are 
learned much later, often first in school or pre-school when children learn to read and write.  
In the RA-model of concepts words, sentences, other linguistic expressions, and symbols are 
assumed to have the same function as all other signs. They serve as search attributes recalling 
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into subjects working memory the memory representation of the object, in which they are 
processed as sensory search attributes.  To be more precise, the search attributes are assumed 
to recall the situation relevant features of the object, which have been processed during the 
interactions between the subject and the object. It seems that words as linguistic symbols - 
formed of graphemes or morphemes - are able to recall just the situations and changes that are 
described in their structures, for example, by some endings of words.  
The cases of nouns and tenses of verbs can be seen as symbols referring to situation 
descriptions or descriptions of events or changes. This fits well with the picture theory of 
language of the early Wittgenstein (1953 > 1971). Human Beings seem to be situation 
oriented as well in learning the meanings of words as using them in analogous situations. The 
ability to use words in their different inflexions is created in interactional situations with the 
objects in question. Thus, the interpretations of words' referential and other meanings is also 
situation oriented mental episode. The sensed words with their endings in Finnish language or 
with prepositions in many other languages are utilised just as any other signs. They are used 
for recalling the due and situation relevant set of concepts and their features into subject's 
working memory as tools of interpreting their meanings. This can be seen as a natural 
explanation of our linguistic ability.  
 
3.3.4 The Value and Meaning Attributes of Entities  
The value attributes in the upper square on the base- and value-line consists of descriptions of 
object's resource features. They are seen from the point of view of subject's actual or potential 
actions at present or in the future. RA's values are then assumed to be based on the objects' 
abilities to act or be as a resource factor in his actions at the present or in the future time. 
Objects are carrying these abilities and resource features but the subjects who think and 
believe to need them are in fact creating them. Thus, values subsist only in the minds those 
subjects, who are actual or potential users of these resource features of the object entity. 
According to Greek mythology, king Midas of Phrygia, soon learned that the real value was 
not in gold, but in things he could use to satisfy his daily needs such as food and wine, which 
all changed to gold when he touched them.  
RA's values are real or imagined resource features of the valued entities. Values can be 
described as creators of the mental forces, which furnish the entities with their value-
meanings. Linguistic expressions have their referential meanings, but the entities to which 
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they refer can have, and often have, value-meanings. The resource features of groups and 
communities function as the mental powers to collect individuals to form tribes, clans, 
organisations, nations, states, and unions of states and nations. The speculations of increased 
national security, offered with the membership of European Union, was perhaps the main 
motivation for many Finns when they were deciding about their votes.  
Money and power over other people are very handy and multi-usable resources. This explains, 
why they are so commonly valued and so eagerly looked-for. All of RA's values, even the 
moral, ethical, esthetical, and religious values, can be understood and explained by the 
resource features of the value carrying objects. Resource features make entities valuable and 
useful in the corresponding actions and activities of the valuing subject. As actors, we all are 
observing entities ‘with an eye’ to its possibilities of being or acting as a resource factor in 
some of our actual or potential actions now or in the future.  
The value attributes of an entity are located in the upper square of the value- and base-line of 
RA's concepts. It is the collection of attributes, which make the entity useful, desired, or 
esteemed, which usually is a due function of its - real or imagined, actual or future - resource 
features. This line could be called also as action, value, and meaning line, because these 
features of entities are often based on the attributes on this line. The value attributes are 
structural attributes because they built up processually but sometimes by the subject's 
conscious logical or speculative thoughts and expressed by linguistic means using other 
already known concepts. Man in this study is seen as a rational and social actor whose well 
being depends on his possibilities to adapt to his environment through situation relevant 
actions and reactions. The possibilities to adapt depend on the resources one gets hold of. 
Actions are here seen as goal oriented and steered uses of resources to achieve a valued end 
situation. In actions, one needs always both mental and material resources as mentioned 
above. Resources are forming the necessary conditions for any action. That is the reason why 
I am assuming that RA's values of entities are always in one way or another bound to the 
resource features of entities. If an entity does not have - now or do not seem to have even in 
the foreseeable future - any use for you, your friends, or your community, it hardly has any 
value; it can then be thrown away. Entities can have also negative value attributes or anti-
resource features, which describe the difficulties, problems, and hindrances of actions caused 
by the entity; it's better to try to avoid them. 
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Value attributes are answering to the everyday questions: What purposes can a certain entity 
serve or to be used for?  What is its value and meaning to us? These questions are often 
repeated ones, when one is faced with something new and unfamiliar.  If the answer to this 
question is as plain as above stated, it means that from the psychological point of view, values 
are always mentally subsisting attributes in individuals' concepts describing the real or 
imagined resource features of entities.  
The genesis of value attributes is described nicely in Uuno Kailas' poem, Sanoja, in which he 
puts in a child's mouth a sentence: 'Äiti on hyvä sana, se maistuu suukkoselta'. In English 
roughly: 'Mother is a good word, it tastes like a kiss' (Kailas 1963, Nummi 199?). Here the 
formation of value attributes to a child's concept of her mother is explained by the positive 
experiences of motherly love in which kisses and warmth of being in mother's lap and arms 
are the value and meaning creating features of mother.    
The above statements of RA's values imply that we accept RA's aiming at survival and well 
being as a necessary endeavour in human and all other actors life. These efforts are always 
resource-bound and then connected with the values of entities. Are actions serving survival 
and well being good actions, can be asked. One can of course always ask - as G. E. Moore 
does - whether these can be accepted as the basic good things in our world. When adopting 
the evolutionary orienting, as I have done in this study, it is just natural to see the survival and 
well being as the basic values, because without survival you do not exist here and without 
well being the necessary conditions for the worthy life of a human being are lacking. The 
aiming at goals, which satisfy these values, seems to be one of the common features of all 
actors in the normal situations of life.  
 
3.3.5 The Classifying Attributes of RA's Concepts 
In the lowest square of the action and value line are those descriptions of the object, which are 
defining its class or category. They are structural attributes formed of a set of common 
attributes of the members of a group, class, or category of entities. The base-line of our 
concepts consists of attributes, which are either sensory or inferred from the sense-recorded 
behaviour features of the object of attention. The above value attributes were derived from 
entities' resource features. The basic evaluation of entities seems to happen through 
classifying them into resources and antiresources. The classification attributes serve us in fast 
decisions. They enable subjects to decide the basic meanings of the observed entity in the 
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situation one is living through. Thus, the classification attributes have been important in the 
course of evolutionary processes, in which the fast definition of whether the object is a threat 
or opportunity, an enemy or a friend, eatable or uneatable has had crucial consequences.  The 
classification attributes are of importance even in to day's life. I have already referred to the 
natural rationality of actors basing on the use of classes. The mental load is light and its 
handling goes fast when you need just the class defining features instead of the detailed 
descriptions of all the features, of which an individual's memory representation can be 
formed. 
The classifying process seems to use as criteria a set of features varying in number and 
quality. The use of just a few classifying attributes is rational and saves lots of mental work, 
though it may lead to faulty interpretations. It may lead also to insulting and stereotyping 
generalisations though people want to be treated as individuals. For successful interactions 
with a car on the street or a man on the sidewalk does not need many descriptions, only the 
rules how to pass by or come across. These rules are often all we need to take into account 
when meeting or confronting an entity: 'It is just a car on the street, that makes the noise, do 
not cross the street now'. The classifying descriptions form the set of attributes, which 
determine objects membership of some class or category. Class is here assumed to be formed 
by a set of entities having a common set of similar but not necessarily identical features. Often 
Wittgenstein's family-resemblance might be enough to form a class of entities. They have to 
manifest repeatedly enough to be formed as the criteria of the membership of the class in 
question.  
For Piaget and Vygotsky the classifying attributes seem to have formed the totality of their 
appropriate conception of concept. The common features of a class or a universal were the 
key to conceptual thinking while singular particulars were objects of concrete thinking. 
According to Piaget, conceptual thinking was adopted first by teenagers while the thinking 
before that stage was based on the concrete, (Piaget 1936 >1983). Using the RA-model of 
concepts, we could say that first teenagers have had time and experiences enough to collect 
the classifying attributes into their concepts from the occurrences of classifying features of 
different familiar entities. In fact, the classifying process is one of the many features of the 
continuous dynamics of concept formation. 
According to the above outlined RA-model, concepts are our memory representations of 
singular particulars with sets of attributes from its time-, base-, and theory lines. Often the 
valuing and classifying attributes of the object entities are in main role when confronting a 
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materially manifestin entity. All thinking needs and uses concepts, which are seen as the 
primary tools of all mental operations and so also used in thinking. Thoughts of concrete 
entities can get sense based mental primitives to give support to the mental operations, but the 
entities, which our mental processes and actions are handling, are evidently our memory 
representations.  We do not meet universals but we can use classifying attributes of the 
encountered singular particulars. This happens in case the other attributes are not available or 
are not needed in that particular situation. This type of automaticity of our mental processes is 
part of our natural rationality, I am assuming. 
The first classifying operation seems to happen unconsciously and with a mental reflexlike 
process describing the objects basic meaning for the subject. From the evolutionary point of 
view, one can understand that this has been one of the necessary conditions of survival. The 
resource features must have been connected to the sense based features of the entities. Objects 
visual appearance, voice, or its outer manifesting behaviour have been and still are the signs 
recalling the resource or hindrance features or the basic value-meanings of the object into 
one's working memory for conscious review. Must I flee or fight, has been the question and 
challenge for our ancestors; sometimes even for ourselves also to day. 
When perceiving an singular object entity, we can usually recognise its belonging to a class or 
category of entities which we can name and about which we may recall some basic features. 
Unrecognisable and unclassifiable entities evoke curiosity and often fear because no 
explaining attributes are recalled. As stated above, perceptions are functions of individuals' 
ontogenic histories during which they have formed the interpreting, valuing, and classifying 
structures into their concepts of entities. Perceptions seem also to be functions of the 
situations. The cues contained in the sensory information of the object are furnishing them 
with their meanings by recalling the situation relevant attributes to explain the sensed. The 
experienced resource features of entities may vary along with the situations and their internal 
changes. RA's values are then subjective and situation related and so are RA's ways of 
classifying objects, though certain degree of intersubjectivity always exists.  
An example of this situation relativity is implicitly in the following exclamation of a teenager: 
'Now, the devils came! Put the noise down and the booze in bags'. The devils were his parents 
whose coming back home he heard when his father's car was parking in front of the house. 
The window towards the street was open that late April night when a group of juveniles were 
having their spring party at the teenager's home. The loving and caring parents had a new, 
situation relevant, attribute because their coming meant the end of the hilarious party. The 
 83
parent had now the role of an anti-resource factor stopping or at least changing the nature of 
the laughter and delight of the cheerful night.  
3.4 The Time-Line of Concepts  
3.4.1 Does Time Exist or Subsist  
What is our time orientation based on?  It easy to find that about all important entities - family 
members, relatives, friends, people we know well, our homes, cars, computers, etc. - we 
usually know their origin or something about their history, present state or situation, and 
something about the future states or plans concerning them. In the RA-model of concepts, the 
sets of time-oriented descriptions form the time line of our memory representations and 
concepts. Without history, we do not understand the present and cannot adapt ourselves to the 
future. The time-line of concepts is part of our pursuit to find causality and reason in the 
behaviour of people, our selves, and other entities. Already Augustine said in his Meditations 
that we have the history and future in our present thoughts. This is one of the natural facts 
about our memory functions as our everyday experiences are repeatedly proving us.  
In the left column of Figure 3.1, is a set of the structural attributes forming the time-line. Its 
attributes are formed of descriptions of object's history, its present state, and its speculated, 
hoped-for, planned, or norm defined future states. In understanding the world and its 
happenings, we seem to need the time lines of its entities. From our everyday experience, we 
have these time line features of all entities, which we see important for us. We have the 
descriptions of the personal histories of all of our relatives and good friends. Most of the 
membership lists of different organisations have brief descriptions of family relations, studies, 
and work histories as elements of the curriculum vitae of their members.  
Already Aristotle needed the Genus for his concepts. Similarly, Väinämöinen - the wise man 
and soothsayer in Kalevala that is the collection of Finnish national epics - was searching for 
the magic words to solve the problem of the genesis of entities. Understanding individuals 
and particulars seem to need the time line especially the historical backgrounds as one area of 
their basic features.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, nature has hardly any humanly experienced time only more or 
less regular processes and changes, which are functions of the forces affecting them. The 
structures in our Universe have their internal cyclical processes and mutual interactions, 
which are steered by the four basic physical macro and micro forces. Organisms have their 
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time-spans and time-cycles steered by different kinds of metabolic and other biological 
processes. Their time-lines are possibly present already in their genomes. According to the 
RA-model, humans have their time-lines also in their concepts. Thus, time seems to subsist 
also in our concepts of entities. In Figure 3.1, the time line is in the left column, which is 
formed by three sets of structural attributes describing object's history, present, and future.  
Thus, our time-lines have their origin in cyclical – annual, monthly, daily - changes of natural 
environment. Those who learned to plan and make time- and change-oriented schedules 
survived, others not. Thus, the evolutionary processes seem to have built the human calendar 
structure in our memory representations of entities. All entities, which are important to us, 
have their genesis, history, present, and future descriptions in their memory representations in 
our long-term memory. One of the main functions of our concepts is to make entities 
understood. Understanding seems to need the processing of time-lines into our conceptions of 
the world. To keep track of our daily routines we need the time-lines in our calendars and 
computer schedules. 
 
3.4.2 The History of Entities as a Base for Understanding  
The genesis and history of entities seems to be important to really understand its present 
situation and its future. Individuals and nations are searching their roots, physicists are trying 
to solve the problem of the genesis of our Universe, anthropologists try to track down the 
origin of human kind, etc. Professional registers hold information about members' background 
and ontogenic history. History evidently is important, it lays the base for all other features of 
an entity. 
For understanding the present and orientating to the future, we need the history. Thus, it 
seems unavoidable that our memory representations and concepts have their time lines. The 
time-lines with their attributes describing the history, present and future states of entities seem 
to form the only realistic explanation for our conception of time. In the RA-model of man's 
concepts as memory representations of singular entities and their systems can most rationally 
consist also of the time factors of entities. We are living between the history that we 
remember and the future that we can create by our plans and imagining abilities. Both of these 
dimensions are connected with the memory representations of the singular particulars in our 
environment with which we are interacting and having mental and material exchanges. 
Universals do not have time, as we all know. Our ability to control the time seems to be 
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bound on the time-line attributes of our concepts. Naturally, our watches and calendars with 
their detailed schedules and agendas are also helping us in that task. In fact, I am assuming 
that whole structure of our conception of the experienced time is somehow bound to these 
time line structures of our concepts. 
Since our concepts are formed processually, they follow in their basic structure the 
phylogenic rules we - or our brains - got as members of the species Homo Sapience. The 
contents of the structural elements of our concepts are here in turn assumed to be dynamic 
functions of our ontogenic histories. According to cognitive psychology, the descriptions of 
episodes and individual histories are memory representations called scripts stored in our long-
term memory. They tell us the structures of often repeating situations or the ontogenic stories 
of the individuals we know well enough. We know our children's history, the present 
situation, and are planning or at least following their future plans. We are interested about the 
birth, present state, and the future of our Universe, our solar system, and of the fate of our 
planet Earth and its inhabitants. From our everyday experience we all know that the past 
enables us to understand the present and the past and the present situation together enable and 
motivate us to the creative imagining to set the goal states of our future plans. We simply 
need the time lines of our memory representations to manage the relations with our fast 
changing environment.  
 
3.4.3 Sensations and their Interpretations as the Continuum of our Present  
Our present seems to be a continuum of experiences recalled by our sensations. We reason 
and understand their meaning by using our historical wisdom and our speculations concerning 
the future. In the previous, I have assumed that our sensations form our on-line sensory 
interface to our present environment and its changes as they happen. This interface is real and 
on-line connection to the material world around us. The meanings of the sensed entities are 
interpreted by our concepts of the objects of attention and by the situation view, which we 
have recalled and are using as the base for interpretations. Thus, we are experiencing the 
present through our history, which has formed our concepts, conceptions, and views of the 
entities of the world and situations. Our present moments seem to be just a set of concatenated 
experiencings, the meanings of which we understand by using our historical wisdom and our 
speculations concerning the future. 
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Our experienced present can consist also of our plans, imaginations, and dreams as well as our 
illusions, hallucinations in certain cases. The functioning reality control is totally lacking 
usually only in the cases of pathological hallucinations. If the sensed does not conform to the 
experienced, we usually repeat the sensory operations to secure its authenticity.  
On the brain level this two-phase interpretations and their internal connections are 
exemplified by the dorsal and ventral streams in the processing of visual information as 
mentioned in Chapter 2 (Kolb & Whishaw 1996, Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982, Millner & 
Goodale 1995). From the evolutionary point of view, it is fully understandable that we need 
these on-line and memory-line interpretations for all of our interactions with entities in our 
environments. These double channels are needed on the areas of all sense modalities, though 
the visual and audible channels may be the most important ones.  
 
3.4.4 The Hoped-for or Planned Futures of Entities  
In the RA-model of concepts, I am assuming that our experienced present is just a moment 
between the past and the future. The mood of our experiencings depends on the past 
experiences and on the believed future. Humans seem to be situation and future-oriented 
beings. The histories of entities help us to understand their present. Our need to take care and 
worry of our own, relative's, and even our neighbour's affairs processes or builds to our 
concepts the attributes describing the planned or speculated futures of entities. Thus our 
intentionality - seen as the future steered goal-orientation in planning and decision-making - is 
just a natural feature of human beings; we are - in our mental - always aiming at a varying set 
of valued goals somewhere in the future. Some of them form our actual goals. 
The thought or speculated positive future states of affairs forms - almost always - the 
motivation ground for our plans and activities. The natural curiosity of human beings is often 
aiming at better knowledge and control. If we find rules or other types of invariant features of 
entities and their behaviour, we can forecast what will happen in the future. This means an 
increase of the controlling abilities for the individuals who know it. That is what a scientist 
and every individual are aiming at; the ability to control what happens to us serves all our 
needs and especially our security needs.  
 Our ability to imagine things, which do not exist yet anywhere, forms the basis of our 
creativity. The human cultures and their dynamics are based on this ability. Al inventions 
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from the stone axe to the modern computer-steered production lines, atomic power plants, and 
www-nets through satellites and light-cable-based Internet connections are manifestations of 
this human creative intellectual capital and future orientation. They all need also the time-line 
in our concepts. 
 
3.5 The Theory Line of Concepts 
3.5.1 The Basic Substance of Entities  
The human desire for knowledge and the final explanation of the substance of the entities of 
the being has motivated scientists as well as everyman to research the world and its 
fundamentals. As seen above the time-line of RA's concepts offered some explanations of the 
manifesting action or other sensory features of the objects of our attention. The history or 
future of an entity or both of them made also the observed understood. Analogically all 
structural attributes surrounding the central sensory attributes serve as explanations of the 
seen or other ways observed or imagined features of the object as do the attributes of object's 
resource and classifying features. The structure of entities, their functions, and their basic 
substance form the elements of the theory-line of RA's concepts. These elements are often 
used to explain the sensed or otherwise experienced features of the object of attention.  
The lower square on the theory line is reserved for the ontological explications and 
explanations of the presumed basic substance of the research object. Concepts as recalled sets 
of the different types of our memory representations are assumed to have their material 
existence in the 'memory-traces' of the molecular structures of synapses in our the neuronal 
net-systems. The emergent system processes of our brains' neuronal nets create concepts' 
mental subsistence. From the results of neuropsychology and brain research, we know that 
there are no memory representations, no concepts and knowledge without functioning 
memory systems. This is proved also by many cases of Alzheimer disease, which give often 
very dramatic evidence what can happen without functioning memory processes. The 
materially manifesting causes of the disease may be just a relatively small amount of plaques 
or dead neurons in the prefrontal area of cortex or in hippocampus or changes in the chemical 
concentration of some neurotransmitters.  
In physics, the substance problem is thought to be solved by finding the smallest elements of 
material entities. However, just physicists had found the empirical proofs of the existence of 
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the sixth and last quark, there appeared thoughts about the elements of quarks, though they are 
not necessary for the standard theory. Thus, the analytical approach seems not to be able to 
solve the problem of substance, but it offers a better way to control the object and its 
behaviour. The behaviour of electromagnetic radiation can be controlled and calculated quite 
well, though its quanta or photons have features of both an elementary particle and a wave-
motion. 
In this study, I have thought that the elements of the experienced or the human mental have 
their primitives in the sensory descriptions of entities. The primitives or the sensory attributes 
together with the structural descriptions of the objects of attention form our concepts or the 
atoms of our mental worlds. They in turn are formed of the recalled and situation relevant 
parts of our memory representations of the entities of the being. They make the sensed an 
understood and then controlled and situation relevant part of our world view.  
How well these mental elements can explain the phenomenal world of humans will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, where the scene of experiencing and steering will be postulated as the 
playground for our experiencings. Our lives are formed of the concatenated moments we live 
through of the rich, dynamic, and varying spectrum of our experiences. According to my 
ontological position, the substance of our mental is just in our ability to have this richness of 
experiencings. The phenomenal or experiential substance of our mental is an emergent 
product of our central and peripheral nervous structures and their system effects. As 
postulated in Chapter 2 the emergent and steering transformations form the links between the 
material and mental dimensions of human beings and possibly all actors in our Globe.   
I see it important to explicate the ontological status of all research objects in human sciences. 
Material entities have existence that manifests in various forms in space, phase, and state 
dimensions having different functions of time as assumed in chapter 2. Mental entities have 
their subsistence as memory representations and concepts and conceptual structures in our 
minds. Theoretical terms like concept, knowledge, motivation, language, culture, 
organisation, economy etc. refer to theoretical entities. As will be seen later, the concepts of 
theoretical entities are formed of structural attributes, because the only sensory attribute in 
their concepts are their names or other linguistic expressions such as definitions. The 
definition is a way to condense the descriptions of the structural attributes of it. Thus, the 
mental representations of theoretical entities can have their name, definition, or a 
metaphorical expression as the only sensory attributes. Theoretical entities have their 
subsistence based on the system effects of our brain's neuronal nets. They are often created 
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and communicated with the help of definitions, through which one can create and use some 
intersubjectively understood terms and concepts as mentioned earlier. The degree of 
intersubjectivity depends on the intensity of the communicative and other practical 
interactions between the members of the community using them. Sometimes a good metaphor 
can increase the intersubjectivity of the theoretical terms and concepts.  
 
3.5.2 The Structure of an Entity as an Evidence of its Existence 
Knowing an entity means usually that one knows besides its overt and manifesting features 
also something about its internal structure and its main functions or actions and processes it 
can perform or participate. The more detailed one knows structures of the mechanical, 
electrical, hydraulic, gasoline, steering, brake, etc. systems of one's car, the better one 
understands its functions and performances in different situations. The need to know the 
structures of entities seems to be typical to our species. This is seen in children's devotion to 
build and take apart their toyblocks. It can be seen in the enthusiasm with which physicists are 
hunting for the smallest primitives and the largest totality of our micro- and macro cosmoses. 
It can be seen also in the furious eager of brain researchers and cognitive neuropsychologists 
to find the brain structures, which are storing our memory representations and performing or 
participating in the interpreting processes in which the afferent action potentials are 
transformed into our experiensings, which we live through in our phenomenal worlds.   
The nervous structures in our retina are able to transform the varying energies of light quanta 
or photons into a continuous flow of afferent action potentials of which our visual brain 
system builds us the colourful and living world we perceive. The phenomenal is created of the 
on-line sensations and their explanations performed by our earlier experiences, or by the 
situation relevantly recalled concepts and their attributes. As mentioned earlier, the dorsal and 
ventral streams in the processing of the visual information seem to be the material 
manifestations of this miracle. Thus, the structure may help to understand the phenomenon we 
experience. However, the question of the transformation from the material afferent action 
potentials into mentally experienced descriptions of the objects of attention seems to prevail 
as an unexplained problem without a satisfactory explanation. Some philosophers - like Lauri 
Rauhala - think that this ontological transformation may stay interminably a question without 
a good answer.  
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The structure of RA's concepts in Figure 3.1 is a trial to illustrate a natural and somewhat 
plausible structure of our memory representations and concepts; we use concepts to make the 
sensed, understood and structures and models of concepts to understand what concepts are. 
The inputs to our memory representation are assumed to be in the form of sensory 
descriptions or the mental primitives of the observed entities. The inputs can be also structural 
attributes, which are descriptions, in which other, already known, concepts are used. Any 
entity - even an imagined one - can have an endless chain of structural attributes to describe 
and explain its substance, structures and functions. Associations can be seen as situation 
relevant and recallable structural attributes of an entity. Our everyday knowledge is formed of 
these chains of sensory and structural attributes of entities with which we have been or are 
living.  
In structuralism, the manifesting phenomena are often explained by the postulated structures 
of the assumed theoretical entities. The observed facts are explained by theoretical structures. 
The RA-model is a trial to explain the main features of the human mental by testable memory 
representations and by the theoretical structures and functions of RA's concepts and RA's 
steering system, which are built on them.   
 
3.5.3 The Functions of an Entity as an Evidence of its Existence  
The functions of entities form an important part of their concepts and of our understandings of 
them. The function of a car is to move us reliably, comfortably, and perhaps in a valued way 
to places we want to go. The function of a house is to offer a comfortable and cosy place to 
live. We seldom know the details of a modern car's electronically steered brake system but we 
can feel and experience how nicely they function. Our understanding is based on the brake's 
functions. The functions of the theoretical entities, such as memory, mind, and motivation, are 
often used as a proof of their existence or to describe and explain their substance. 
In this study, the postulated theoretical entity called concept will be described both by its 
structure and by its functions to explain their role in directing the human mental actions and 
overt behaviour. RA's concept's structure and some of its basic functions have been described 
in this chapter and its role in directing the behaviour of human beings will be studied more 
detailed in Chapter 4. RA's concepts and mind or the planning and control system are 
postulated theoretical entities, whose structure and functions should be able to describe and 
explain some of the common conceptions connected with the human mind.  The postulations 
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of the structures and functions of theoretical entities are justified, if they offer a testable, 
simpler, easier to understand explanations, and better forecasts of the manifesting features of 
the actions and reactions of the research object.   
 
3.6 Concepts, Theories, Conceptions, and Views,  
3.6.1 Concepts, Theories, and the Theory of Concept 
According to a dictionary definition (Random House, 1998), 'Concept is a general notion, 
idea, or construct of something formed by mentally combining all its characteristics or 
particulars forming a conceived or intuited object of thought'. According to the same source, 
'Theory is a coherent group of general propositions used as principles of explanation for a 
class of phenomena; Einstein's theory of relativity.  It can be also a proposed explanation 
whose status is still conjectural, in contrast to well-established propositions that are regarded 
as reporting matters of fact.' 
Concepts have here been thought to be the atoms and molecules of the human mental. They 
are - in most cases - formed processually of the mental primitives or sensations and structural 
attributes. They are used to form the conceptions, views, and other structures of our memory 
representations. They all consist of collections of descriptions of singular particulars and their 
systems. The simplest level of describing an entity is the use of classifying or stereotyping 
attributes and forgetting all of the other descriptions. As noticed earlier, Piaget and Vygotsky 
seem to have used the term concept for referring to an entity, which seems to remind a set of 
classifying attributes in the RA-model of concepts. The same concerns most writers of 
concepts in cognitive psychology (Baddeley, Anderson). Even Murphy in his Big Book of 
Concepts (2002) sees concepts as classes and/or categories.  Concepts for them seem to be 
something universal and untouchable while material entities are concrete things and they 
could be handled in the human mental as such with their sensed dimensions.  
The complete description of the RA-model of memory representations and then also of 
concepts is formed of their base-, time-, and theory lines with all of their attributes and their 
connections and links with other entities.  The contents of memory representations and 
concepts of different individuals vary in a large scale depending mostly on their ontogenic 
histories. Anyhow, concepts are the only tools individuals have to understand oneself, the 
entities in the world around them, and the relations between the two. Thus, concepts provide 
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individuals with situation relevant abilities to understand and cope with the entities of one's 
environment. They are dynamic entities developing along with the exchanges and interactions 
individuals have with their environments during the whole span of their ontogenic histories.  
In the RA-model theories of entities can be formed by a conscious use of the system model of 
human concepts in Figure 3.1 by emphasising the descriptions of concepts' theory lines. This 
means that besides the descriptions on the base and time-line one is focusing on descriptions 
and explanations of entities' real substance, their material and/or mental structures, the 
functions they are or will be performing. Good theories provide us with explanations and 
forecasts of entities' actions and reactions, and their reasons and motives if the objects are 
rational actors. Memory representations and concepts are formed mostly processually, but 
theories are built by systematic and conscious use of all available resources of information 
and planned tests and experimentations. 
 
Theories can be explicated in a set of rules or laws that the properties, characters, behaviours, 
or actions, which the class of object entities in question are obeying. The difference between 
concepts and theories is evidently just in that the former are concerned about a singular 
particulars, whose common features are described with the classifying attributes; theories are 
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built by systematic search for the laws or rules the classes of entities obey. Layman's theories 
are just rules of thumb, which have been seen to hold true in certain types of cases. The 
system model of man in figure 2.1 can be seen as a simplified theory of man's basic features. 
It is a simple delineation of a universal model of man's substance, structure, and functions 
formed by the phylogenic history of man's evolution. Correspondingly the system model of 
RA's concepts in Figure 3.3 on page 90 can be seen as a repetition of a theory of concept, 
because it is describing the assumed universal structure and functions of man's concepts and 
its mental substance and its subjective nature having nevertheless a certain degree of 
intersubjetivity.   
Theories can be formulated either as rules of thumb for everyday use or as common rules or 
laws for scientific purposes. Theories can have varying degree of exactness with which its 
rules and their attributes are describing, explaining, and forecasting the behaviour of the 
object of the theory. The best explaining theories approach the true or at least satisfactorily 
functioning description of the objects of research. 
Our concepts are in fact here seen as systematicly, though often unconsciously, formed 
collections of sense based and structural attributes describing a certain object entity. These 
attributes can describe the object's genesis, present, and future states, its structure and 
functions, its values and meanings, its actions and reactions in different situations. Theories 
can then be seen as systematicly and consciously built concepts having a thorough set of 
attributes on all the base-, time-, and theory-lines describing all the different features, actions, 
reactions, substance, structures, and functions of the object entity.   
 
3.6.2 Concepts, Conceptions, and Views 
As mentioned above, one way to see the referent of the term conception is to see it as the 
collection of all the situation relevant attributes of a singular object entity. Its function is to 
form a wider and many-sided view of the object and its relations and exchanges with its 
environment. The attributes describing the object's relations with other entities recall also the 
concepts of those entities with which the relations are built. The conceptions of actors are 
often related with their ways of acting and reacting and their relations with the other actors 
and members of the community in question. As mentioned earlier, our conceptions of people 
include often also some descriptions of the moral and ethical quality of their ways of 
planning and controlling their actions and reactions. This is important, because the moral 
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qualities of people form often an important set of criteria when selecting friends, companions, 
and members of an organisation or a group. 
Views in the RA-model are the combined sums of the subject's concepts and conceptions 
concerning the entities in the actual situation and its environment. Views are conceptual 
structures, which are we use in our mental operations. They are 'visualized' stories or scripts 
of a set of concatenated happenings, actions and reactions of a group of people in a certain 
situation. This 'visualization' is perhaps some kind of 'memory-based imagining' in which 
even the situation relevant linguistic expressions form one set of attributes. In chapter 2, 
figure 2.1 the RA's mental head is framed with a world-view, role-view, resource-view, 
situation, and action view. I briefly outlined them in Chapter 2 and they are described in more 
detail in section 4.1 in the next chapter. In fact, I am assuming that all of our concepts of 
entities are formed in different types of situations. Thus, the role and other meanings of 
entities are natural attributes of our concepts and conceptual structures we use. 
These four views are the main items used in planning and executing of RA's actions and 
interactions with the environment. In views, the time and value lines of concepts have an 
important role. They are steering our intentions or our interest and goal setting processes. 
Views can be seen as the total frame of concepts and conceptions explaining the object entity 
in a certain situation. As views are formed of concepts and conceptions, they consist also of 
the expected, hoped-for, and norm controlled future states of entities. Thus, they are assumed 
to be able to direct our actions toward the goals connected with the valued futures states of 
affairs. I am assuming that human goal orientation and intentionality of actors get their natural 
explanations through the functions of the value attributes in our concepts and views. In 
chapter 4, I am going to discuss RA's views as elements of the total framework of RA's 
steering system seen as the system model of human mind.  
With concepts, conceptions, and views we can have the hold of the entities and their situations 
in the world. With the words and sentences, we can recall the concepts, conceptions and 
views and then manifest our meanings to the other members of our communities. The 
common concepts of the members of a community form the bases for communicative actions 
and interactions by enabling the mutual understanding of the members of the community. 
Having now framed or sketched the structure of RA's concepts, I am going to postulate the 
structure of RA's steering system. I see it as a system model of the human mind. Its centre 
SCES or the scene of experiencing and steering is the mental space where individuals use 
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their concepts, conceptions, and views as tools of mental actions like thinking, planning, 
deciding, etc. With concepts, individuals can manipulate all the entities of the being of which 
they have processed a proper set of memory representations. They can be recalled as situation 
relevant sets of attributes for conscious reviewing and interpreting the meanings of the sensed, 
imagined, remembered, or thought. To compress the above, we could say that concepts are the 
individuals' mental tools to plan, decide, implement, and control their actions and interactions 
with their environments and the other members of their communities. 
 96
 
4. RA'S MIND STRUCTURED BY HIS CONCEPTS 
Motto of Chapter 4:   
HUMAN LIFE is a continuum of moments and events of experiencings to which a peaceful 
sleep brings a refreshing pause and the sleep of death its final end.  
 
4.1 RA's Views as Frames of his Mind or his Steering System 
According to my ontological position the being is formed of material and mental entities. The 
latter are our memory representations of the entities of the being and the mental states caused 
by the encountered entities and their meanings. As mentioned earlier, the human mental is 
always an emergent product of our central nervous system. We do not exactly know how the 
experienced is transformed form the material or the electro-chemically encoded information 
hidden in the flow of afferent action potentials our central nervous system receives from our 
senses. All descriptions of the mental entities, such as memory representations, concepts, 
mind, and steering system, can be taken as metaphors aiming at easing the understanding of 
man's phenomenal experiences, thinking, and actions.  
A model of RA's steering9system or his planning, decision-making, and control system is 
presented in figure 4.1 on page 98. It is assumed to be an emergent creation of the human 
peripheral and central nervous systems. Our brains' emergent abilities create and maintain the 
interpretation system for the outer or sense encoded information. The experienced 
interpretations are based on the concepts recalled in our working memory for conscious 
review. Our long-term memory and working memory provide us with the tools for our mental 
life. The emergent processes of our brain system produce all the phenomena we experience. I 
assume that the centre of the steering system is formed by RA's scene of experiencing and 
steering or SCES is situated in our working memory, as mentioned earlier. Our working 
memory has its physical space probably in our prefrontal cortex, which has many on-line 
                                                 
9 As explained earlier, the term steering is used because it is short and because all of our planning, decision-
making and control operations contain both concept-based or conscious and processual or unconscious structures 
and functions to which the term refers.    
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connections both to other cortical and subcortical areas and centres. I assume also that the 
four concept based views of RA - which were briefly described in chapters 2 and 3 - form the 
explaining and empowering dynamic ground and frame for our understanding, planning, and 
control endeavours.  
RA’s steering system forms the centre for our phenomenal life. RA’s concepts, conceptions, 
and views are formed of the recalled elements of the real and testable memory 
representations. Thus, they function as the basis for the phenomenal scenery described in this 
chapter. The four framing elements of RA’s steering system are: RA's world-view, role-view, 
resource-view, and situation- and action-view. I am assuming that individuals' situation 
orientation is based on the knowledge of their own and all other participants' views of the 
world, of their own resources, and of their roles, which are situation relevantly recalled into 
their working memory to form the frames in any new situation. In the next four sections, I 
shall briefly illuminate their role in the totality of RA's mind or his steering system. 
 
4.1.1 The Structure and functions of RA's World-view 
RA's picture of the world  - or his world-view - gives him the answers to the following 
questions: What is there in the world? What kind of singular entities and their systems, 
relations, actions, and interactions are there? In the history of human kind, primitive magical 
explanations, ancient legends and myths, and different religions have tried to answer to these 
questions. The magical still seem to form parts of the dynamic conception of the world of 
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modern man. The scientific picture of the world is formed by the best explaining theories as 
results of all the different sciences. Individuals' pictures of the world are functions of their 
ontogenic histories.  
RA's world-view has the answers also to the second question: How should the things out 
there be? This concerns at least those entities about which individuals are interested and 
which are of importance to them. We could say that the bloodshed in Kosovo or Eastern-
Timor should have been stopped much sooner or, all wars should be criminalised by global 
laws based on global ethics. These 'should-be-states' are attributes of RA's concepts as 
assumed in chapter 3. They seem to be processed by our basic values and principles according 
to which we are orienting in the world. RA's world-view, WOV in short, is consequently a 
collection of RA's memory representations of the entities of the being known to him/her. RA’s 
WOV consists thus of memory representations of singular particulars and their systems, 
classes, relations, interactions, and exchanges of information, material, and energy with each 
other and with their environments. The representations describe the situation as they are 
perceived now and descriptions of the hoped-for or believed future states according to the 
values and principles of the subject in question. 
In the RA-model, the term view refers thus to the conceptual structures of the object entities. 
According to the model of concept in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3, this means that the descriptions 
of entities’ time-, theory-, and value-lines, are under a dynamic, continuous, and partly 
conscious structuring process. Thus the description of a singular entity in our world-view 
audits not only of its present situation as it is now, but in addition, it is reviewing its history 
and the situation that is planned, hoped-for, or for moral reasons to be achieved at some point 
of time in the future. These future states are often based on the one hand on the knowledge of 
the present situation and the history, and on the other hand on the values, norms, principles, 
hopes, and plans we are connecting with the entity in question.  
RA's world-view is thus a collection of concepts and conceptions of all the entities, their 
systems, and relations the subject has encountered often enough during his ontogenic history. 
The situation relevant memory representations can then be recalled, if the needed memory 
traces are formed and refreshed often enough. The function of subject's world-view is to 
enable the forming detailed descriptions of the entities present in the situations one is living 
through. This is made possible by the structures and functions of our situation relevant 
concepts as presented in chapter 3. The attributes of the value and meaning line are especially 
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important, because many of the quick reactions are based on the classifying or stereotyping 
attributes of the encountered entity.  
The evolutionary background of our emotional reactions, for example, are here assumed to be 
based on the stereotypical class division of entities into threats and possibilities, friends and 
enemies, or resources and anti-resources. In the evolutionary processes those individuals, 
whose memory representations could interpret correctly the remote information of an object 
of attention encoded and mediated by the visual, auditory, or olfactory senses, had the best 
possibilities to provide oneself with food and shelter. They had also the possibilities to avoid 
the different kinds of threats and even the danger of becoming eaten having time enough to 
prepare for flight or fight. The ability to interpret the information mediated and encoded by 
our 'remote-senses' can be explained just by seeing concepts as collections of memory 
representations as means for understanding. Thus, any sensation can act as a search attribute 
recalling the situation relevant concepts into subject's working memory for conscious review. 
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4.1.2 RA's Resource-view and Its Functions  
RA’s resource-view, REV in short, plays an important role in the formation of individual’s 
personality and identity. RA's view of his or her mental and material resources - their history, 
present state, and the hopes and plans of their future development - gives him/her the 
knowledge and feelings of the possibilities to act and control the happenings in different 
situations and different areas of life. In Figure 4.2 on page 101 is a schematic description of 
RA's main areas of his internal steering and outer material resources. The picture can of 
course not describe the enormous richness of our mental and physical resources but it should 
be seen as a preliminary outlining of this large issue. The preliminary draft of the resource-
view is formed of factors on four areas and on two main parts:  
The upper main part of the figure presents RA's mental steering and material execution 
resources aiming at the control of his actions.  It is divided into three sublevels from reflex-
like and model adoptions to model applications and model creations. The fourth level of 
steering resources is formed by our core self with its basic values, norms, rules, and 
principles. This fourth level will be briefly discussed also in section 4.3.4, but here it is seen 
as a resource, which is used when a decision needs a deeper acquaintance with the object and 
when so called 'sleeping over night' commonly happens in preparations of complicated and 
important, economical, political, and other decisions.  
The lower part presents the area of resource types leading often into disturbed control in 
which, according to Freud (1904, 1998), the main aim is to repress the reality and its possible 
threats against one's personality. On its topmost sublevel, the control aims at the protection of 
the individual's self image. It may lead to many models of behaviour, which can be met in all 
people. The gradually deepening degree of disturbance in the mental control system can lead 
to uncontrolled actions and finally into fully pathological manifestations of behaviour only on 
the lowest repressing levels of the control of actions and activities. The severely disturbed and 
pathological levels may often have neurobiological causes.  
The columns in figure 4.2 present the four areas of resources. The two first columns describe 
the mental resources and the two latter ones the bodily and outer material resources of an 
individual actor.  The columns are briefly characterized as follows: 
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o RA's knowledge and his rational abilities to plan and make decisions can be seen as 
elements of RA's intellectual capital. 
o RA’s roles in different communities and his communicative abilities can be seen as 
elements of RA's social capital. 
o RA's anatomy and physiology, his central and peripheral nervous systems, and the 
collection of tacitly steered abilities to skilful performances can be seen as elements of 
RA's bodily capital. 
o The outer material resources - necessary for the planned action - are formed of the 
possessed and/or controlled allotment of land, buildings, houses, cars, machines, tools, 
shares, deposits, money, etc. They can be purchased or borrowed from different suppliers 
in the technological, economical, political, and social environment. 
These areas correspond with the main dimensions of RA’s actions discussed briefly in chapter 
2. According to the presumptions of this study man is rational, social, and biological actor 
who also needs the material resources and their control systems on all these areas. Actions 
and acting were stated as the necessary preconditions for man's survival and well being.  In all 
actions, one needs both material and mental resources. The resources one has in one's disposal 
and control defines one's options to act and achieve the valued goals. The hoped-for quantities 
and qualities of the material and mental resources are often the main motivators for the 
individuals’ attitudes, intentions, and actions. Resource-view is one of the tools of future 
planning for individuals as well as for organisations. Psychotherapists and psychiatrists are 
often working to reduce the gap between the experienced and the real resources of their 
clients and that way to improve their abilities to control their personal lives.  
I am not going into more details of RA's resources here, because the control of resources are 
more connected with the main purposes of this study and they will be discussed in section 4.5. 
I just mention that besides the classification into material and mental areas our resources can 
also be classified by the degree of conscious and processual control. This division can be seen 
in most of our actions and activities while they are used as a means to achieve the valued and 
intended goals. The consecutive automaticity of our sensations and perceptions is an example 
of the processual control of our mental activities resulting in concept-based observation of the 
object of attention as mentioned above.  
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4.1.3 RA's Role-view and Its Functions  
RA's role-view, ROV in short, is illustrated in figure 4.3 on page 104. It is a brief draft of 
what are the main items our roles usually cover. A role is a theoretical term referring to a 
theoretical entity postulated in social psychology. Role's only materially manifesting attribute 
is its name but its existence as a mental entity can be seen through its effects to our behaviour. 
In figure 4.3, I am using linguistic descriptions when filling in the descriptions of role's time-, 
value-, and theory-lines. RA's ROV is assumed to be a collection of RA's roles – achieved 
and/or given - in the different communities in which he has been or is living.  
According to the postulations in social psychology, roles can be seen as formations of a 
variety of values and norms, rights and obligations, duties and liberties valid in the 
community in which individuals have been or are living. They are processed during the 
individuals’ interactions with other members of communities. Roles are expected to guide the 
behaviour of the members of the communities that are giving or granting the roles to its 
members.  RA's role-views are here assumed to consist of - besides the descriptions of the 
past and present situation - also descriptions of the hoped-for and valued future states of his 
roles, which are control his goal settings and actions in different social situations.   
As social actors, we usually try to form our conceptions also of the roles of the other actors in 
the situations we are living through together with them. This is an important part of the social 
orientation to the situation. In business organisations, the learning and adopting of roles are 
often promoted by letting individuals compose their own job descriptions. This is done with 
all people or at least with people in leading positions. In modern team organisations, this 
process is intensified by group tasks in analysing the problems, planning options, setting 
goals, making decisions, and executing the activities needed to achieve the goals. Working 
through the process of one's own job description is often one of the first phases in the process 
of learning and adopting one's role in the organisation. One element of the individuals' 
personality development is formed through the 'fight' between the wanted and the given roles 
in different communities, (Lazarus 1982, Mischel 1981, Helkama & al 1998). 
In many cases this ‘fight’ of roles happens unconsciously instead of being conscious and 
planned ways of conquering the wanted role. All interactions between individuals of 
communities involve elements of this role-play. Possibly people who have got the will to lead 
and manage other people do this in accordance with their consciously planned strategies and 
tactics. The value of leading roles in political life on all levels of communities is clearly 
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manifested through the election campaigns and the amounts of money used in them.  The 
status and power connected with roles are evidently one of the main values and motivations 
for this fight of roles in organisations. An additional and possibly an unconscious incitement 
may sometimes be in the possibilities of gathering some corruption money moving around the 
political decision makers in councils, governments, and parliaments. 
 
 
 
4.1.4 RA as A Strategic Actor Using his Situation and Action View 
RA's basic substance is here seen in RA's agency. The agency is the individual’s ability to 
cope with the environment by planned and situation-relevant speech and other motor actions 
and performances, as mentioned earlier. The degree of rationality varies and is assumed to 
depend on the level of the individual's situation relevant descriptions of the world, roles, and 
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other resources available. The main area of rational mental operations is formed of the 
processes and conscious actions when the planning and decision-making concerning future 
actions are performed.  
RA's strategic situations and actions view, SSAV in short, is assumed to be a situation 
relevant collection of descriptions of the previous three areas of subject's memory 
representations of world-view, role-view, and resource-view. Figure 4.4 on page 106 presents 
a chart of the elements of RA’s situation and action view. I have used some modifications of 
this representation in my consulting practice as a model of strategic thinking and planning.. 
The model of SSAV was originally built to describe the elements and phases of organisational 
planning. However, I see that its elements are present in every individual's action planning, 
though not clearly explicated. The planner with his SCES and views is thought to situate in 
the centre of the figure. We can imagine ourselves surveying the situation through our world-
views, role-views, resource-views, and our situation and action views which all are easily 
obtainable from our long term memory. The elements of the situation and action view are 
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often descriptions that are called scripts in cognitive psychology. In social psychology, the 
term schema is often used (Helkama & al. 1998). The terms can vary but the referents of them 
are here seen as memory representation of situation relevant descriptions of the entities and 
their actions and reactions, which are influencing on the present state of affairs.  
In organisations, the computer based information and knowledge systems are used as handy 
aids in forming the situation models. In spite of these modern tools, the mental SAVS are 
needed even when using computers in the processes of planning and decision-making.  If the 
situation reminds us of some event we have lived through earlier, we can just select the proper 
situation and action view from the store of SAVS as the bases for our planning and actions. I 
am assuming that better parts of our experiencings are built on 'ready-to-use' situation models. 
The manifesting cues, sensed from the actual environment, recall the situation relevant 
models to explain the meanings of the sensed.  
The SAV that is selected as the base for explanation consists of the situation relevant 
representations of subject's WOV, ROV, and REV. These are analysed by using SWOT-
system thinking in which the actors Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and the Threats 
connected with the actual views are considered. The necessary information is assumed to be 
available in actor's memory representations or in different kinds of planning aids varying 
greatly depending on the planner's role in his community or organisational environment. The 
first four views lead to situation relevant planning and deciding of the goal or the goals for the 
action. The ordinary action planning also has four phases consisting of goal and goal oriented 
resource planning, the working plans for execution, and plans for control and feed back 
systems. All this is based on a thought of how the planned results should be divided between 
the interest groups and the individuals taking part in the operations. In new situations one 
often has to 'sleep over night' to solve all the problems, but a better part of our everyday 
actions and activities are performed by using the 'old good model’ endowed with all the 
facilities we have stored in our conscious and/or tacit memories.  
RA’s view of the situation and action is an important type of RA’s collections of concepts and 
conceptions. We can remember descriptions of singular entities, their different features, 
relations, systems, meanings, etc. However, we can remember also stories or descriptions of 
events, happenings, and programs; we have scripts and schemas of different occasions. They 
are descriptions of what was done, by whom, and what were the speculated motives of the 
actors (Baddeley 1997 244-255, Schank & Abelson 1977, Helkama & al. 1998). This type of 
memory representations serves RA in his situation orientation, which is here seen as one of 
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the main tools of control RA’s actions and behaviour. Our SAV is often a ready and many 
times used model of our actions and behaviour in certain situations. I shall return to the issue 
of situation and action view in Chapter 7. 
 
4.1.5 The Five Dimensional SCES in the centre of RA's steering system  
The centre of RA's steering system is formed of SCES or the scene of experiencing and 
steering. In the next sections I shall describe and explain the postulated structures and 
functions of RA's SCES, which has fife main dimensions.  
 
I am assuming that all of them get their 'raw-material' from the structures of our memory 
representations and the recalled concepts and their different attributes. The five dimensions of 
experiencing of the SCES in figure 4.5 on page 105 are formed by:  
o The five areas or qualities of experiencings from cognitive to emotional, volitive, 
motivational, and erroneous areas of experiences. 
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o The four levels of steering from the processual level to the level of model application and 
further from the model creation level to the formation of values, norms, and basic 
principles which happens on the level of the core self and personality. 
o The intensity or the power of experiencing.  
o The duration or the stay of the mood of experiencing.  
o The division between the conscious and the processual in the experiencings and steering 
activities and processes. 
The areas of experiencing form the columns or the first dimension of the scene of 
experiencing and steering as illustrated in figure 4.5 on page 105.  The second dimension of 
the SCES is formed by the varying levels of steering presented on the rows of the figure.  The 
third dimension of intensity or power of experiencing is not illustrated in the figure. The same 
concerns the fourth dimension of duration or time that the mood of mind stays.  We all know 
that the grief work after the death of a close friend or a near relative may take years. In 
addition, sometimes we can experience just a brief flicker of happiness when remembering 
some events in the past. 
The fifth dimension of SCES is figured by the diagonal borderline between the conscious and 
processual steering in figure 4.5. This fifth dimension shows the degree of consciousness, 
which is here thought to express the degree of concept based thinking, reasoning, and 
explaining in the planning and decision making operations when directing and monitoring the 
manifested actions and performances. The degree of consciousness is assumed to increase 
when ascending from the reflex level to the second level of model use, to the third level of 
model creation, and to the fourth level, on which the formations of the basic values, norms, 
and principles are taking place. The borderline shows that our unconditioned reflexes are 
totally processual but even on the level of forming the basic values and norms it is assumed 
that we are occasionally strongly steered by the processes of our mental world.  
 
4.2 The Qualities or Areas of Experiencing  
I am grouping the Qualities of the mental experiencing here by using the classical division 
into cognitive, emotional, and volitive experiencing. I have enlarged this trinity by adding the 
motivational and erroneous areas experiencing. Motivational experiencing has been seen 
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important in cognitive psychology and managerial research. The first three qualities of 
experiencing refer to the classical ones having been in use since Aristotle. Aristotle thought 
that knowing and understanding something requires the knowledge of its constitution and 
functions. The RA-model of concepts – figure 3.1 - consists of the time-, value-, and theory-
lines as areas of its structure. Concepts' main functions are to make the sensed - or imagined - 
world and its changes understood. This is assumed to happen through enabling the processes 
of experiencing the meanings of the elements and the totality of the situations one is 
encountering.  
What are the elements of the different qualities of experiencing? What are their constitutions 
and structures?  In the RA-model of the human mind concepts, conceptions, and views are 
seen as atoms and molecules of the mental representations of the entities of the being. The 
qualities of experiencing are serving individual subjects by processing solutions to the 
following questions: 
o What is the object of my attention in this situation I am presently going through?  
o What is its meaning to me as a rule and especially in this situation?  
o What are my options to act or react and how to select the good one? 
o Why and for what reasons am I motivated to decide and act in a planned way? 
In the next sections I am going to describe how these questions are processed and answered 
on the different levels of steering in RA's scene of experiencing and steering.  We can ask also 
that are there any functions of our erroneous experiences.  
The order in which the qualities of experiencing come up in our minds varies but in most 
cases the cognitive and emotional meaning interpretations begin the flow. They are followed 
with the volitive experiencing leading to a conclusion and choice of a situation relevant option 
of the possible actions or reactions. The targeting power of the motivational experiencing is 
strongly connected with the value and meaning experiences. Though the qualities of 
experiencing form a simultaneous totality I will briefly characterise the above named areas of 
experiencing and come back to them when presenting the levels of steering in section 4.3. 
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4.2.1 Cognitive Experiencing  
The term cognition pertains to the mental processes of perception, memory, judgement, and 
reasoning, as contrasted with emotional, volitional, motivational and other conscious 
processes. The etymology of the term cognition is found from the Latin verbs cognoscere and 
gnoscere meaning to learn or to know. RA’s cognitive experiencing is primarily aiming at 
identification of the object or objects selected by the attention process. The causal 
environmental input is assumed to be the sense encoded afferent action potentials, which are 
continuously feeding the short-lived sensory memories. As explained in Chapter 2, our 
attention process selects the situation relevant sensory memory and its flow of afferent action 
potentials to be first interpreted into the mental primitives or sensations. They in turn are 
assumed to function as search attributes, which then recall the interpreting concepts into our 
working memory for conscious review. We are aware of our sensations and become conscious 
of our perceptions. The purpose of perception-based cognition can be found, for example, in 
the answers to the following questions:  
o What or who is the object of attention? 
o Where is its spatial location compared with that of mine and the other important entities 
having an effect on the situation?  
o What are its or their roles, aims, actions, and reactions?  
o What are the meanings of it or them and its or their actions and reactions to the subject in 
the situation?  
If we get the answers to these questions, we can much better understand the object or objects 
of our attention. The last question leads to the second or emotional and meaning qualities of 
experiencing. In a new and strange situation, the first conscious question is often the question 
of meaning. This means that the sensed is interpreted by the earlier experienced or by our 
concepts, which sounds quite understandable from the evolutionary point of view; those have 
survived who have been able to collect experiences and utilise them in new situations. This in 
fact refers implicitly to the old definition of intelligence according to which it is the ability to 
use one's 'knowledge base' to interpret the meanings of the objects of attention in new 
situations. This is also one of the reasons why man and most animals can be called as Rational 
Actors; they survive and have survived by using their experiences when interpreting the 
encountered.   
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As mentioned in chapter 2 the visual cognition with its phases of sensation and perception can 
be connected with the brain research by the results of Goodale & Millner (1998). In the RA-
model, the ventral stream can be interpreted as the process in which a proper concept is 
connected to the sensory on-line information for the naming and recognising of the object. 
The dorsal stream is concerned with the on-line eye movements for the repeated checking 
glances or for the renewed sense-based primitives, which are needed in the perception 
process. The repetition cycles in Neisser's theory or perception can be understood by these 
two streams of visual information processing in our brain system (Neisser 1982).  
 
4.2.2 Emotional Experiencing  
The Latin etymology of emotion is based on the verb emovere, which is revealing its early 
referential meanings to set in motion, move, disturb, or move the feelings of the subject. 
According to a dictionary definition emotion can be seen as: "…an affective state of 
consciousness in which joy, sorrow, fear, hate, or the like, is experienced, and distinguished 
from cognitive and volitional states of consciousness". Secretions of certain endocrine glands 
often accompany emotions; they can cause physiological changes, increased heartbeat, 
respiration, and overt manifestations such as crying or shaking. 
In connections with RA’s scene of experiencing and steering emotion is a term used for 
referring to the area and quality of experiencing that is dealing with the values and meanings 
of the object of attention. The value attribute in entity's concept manifests the object's 
resource features to the subject as explained in chapter 3. Value attributes are thus assumed to 
be the elements that convey the emotional elements into the subjects SCES and 
consciousness.  When individuals on the cognitive area of experiencing are striving to find 
answers to the questions who or what, the emotional process is seeking a solution to the 
problem of object’s value and meaning to the subject at the actual situation one is living 
through.  
The primary answer is assumed to be an emotional and reflex-like feeling of the objects 
quality and meaning experienced in dichotomies like good - bad, opportunity - threat, friend - 
enemy, prey - preyer, etc. These features of the object are stored in the value attributes of its 
concept. From the evolutionary point of view we can see the rationality of this kind of 
reflexive and emotional response: the decision of fleeing or staying must be done fast if you 
want to utilise the opportunities of the situation or avoid its threats. Those who have been able 
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to include in their memory representations of entities their resource features and the 
classifications of them have had greater probability to survive. Emotion can thus be seen as 
the mental steering energy and power that initiates the actions and reactions relevant to the 
situation as the Latin etymology explains.  
Emotions in the RA-model of man can be seen as the first phase of valuing the meanings of 
entities encountered in different situations. The following phases are increasingly based on the 
cognitive descriptions of the object entities though even then the resource features have their 
central importance. This order of the phases of experiencings is natural because man is a 
Rational Actor and he always needs resources in his actions. For RA values and meanings of 
the entities of his environment are always based on the resource features of them as explained 
in chapter 3.   
 
4.2.3 Volitive Experiencing 
According to a dictionary, definition volition is the power of forming an intention or the 
incentive for using the will, or a choice or decision made by the will. Will and volition refer to 
a conscious choice and to deliberate action of thought. Will denotes fixed and persistent intent 
or purpose; "Where there’s a will there’s a way".  In the RA-model the volitive process and 
conscious action is seeking answers to the questions of finding criteria for the decision 
making and choosing the actions and reaction to the events and changes in subject’s 
environment.  Volition is the third phase on the scene of experiencing and steering and it 
belongs to that totality in which the cognition and emotion have formed the ground. Volition, 
a want, a will, or a planned and measured decision is always an outcome of the main criteria 
chosen as models to be used in the actual situations. The advancement from volition to a 
systematic formation of decision criteria matrixes for different areas of decisions is one of the 
main challenges in the individual's personal growth plans and even in the processes of 
developing the managerial systems in organisations. 
 
4.2.4 Motivational Experiencing  
The discussion of motivation and its connections with needs, actions, and achievements has 
been one of the prevailing topics in psychology (Masslow 1943, 1954, and 1962; Alderfer 
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1972; McClelland 1985; Pinder 1998; Logie et al. 1998; Roe 1999). The three first areas of 
experiencing in RA’s SCES-model can be seen as phases of RA’s mental actions. They are 
needed to prepare and execute a proper reaction to the challenges in the encountered situation 
or its changes an individual is living through. In the RA-model of experiencing the fourth area 
or the motivational area of experiencing has the function of initiating, targeting, producing, 
and maintaining the mental steering energy needed for all these mental operations to process 
the situation relevant steering effects. They in turn are controlling the manifesting speech and 
other motor actions by processing a situation relevant flow of efferent action potentials for the 
purposes and goals of the acting individual. 
The different qualities and areas of experiencing are in fact connected with each other, which 
is made understandable through the RA-model of SCES. They all have a base in the subject's 
concepts, which are conveying all the attributes built during the previous interactions and 
exchanges with them. All our concepts have their time lines, which include the hoped-for, 
wished, and possible future states of all those entities that are of importance to us.  Motivation 
in the RA-model can thus be seen and the continuous or enduring want and will to achieve the 
valued state of affairs or situation in the future.  The spontaneous want inspired by an object 
of attention may lead to a speech or motor action to carry through the idea of the wished 
results stored in the future states of our concepts time-lines.  Our needs, wishes, wants, 
desires, lusts, intentions and motivations can be seen as mental energies which are provoked 
or tuned up by the values and meanings of the possible future state of affairs or situation or 
our relations to them.  
The psychologists working on business advertising have long known this and so for instance, 
all the drinkers of a certain beverage are young, beautiful, and happy people. Similarly, all 
who use the same model of tennis racket, as the winner of Wimbledon or some other Grand 
Slam tournament, will be happy winners in their own games, sets, and matches. As 
maintained earlier our concepts with their different attributes are the by-products of our 
actions and interactions. Thus, the possible future states implemented into the subject's 
memory representations by repeated advertisements are forming an unconscious incentive to 
buy the product fulfilling the hopes. Often a better part of these implementations into our 
memory representations happens outside of our conscious thinking. On the consumer market, 
the brands and trademarks are regularly created by an impressive amount of repetitive 
advertising. The Romans knew that: “Repetitio est mater studiorum”.  According to the 
modern brain research, the receptor molecules in the synaptic clefs need repeated firings 
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before they are changed and formed as the basic elements of a new memory trace. This 
memory trace will then possibly function as a store and active element for the information 
they are processing (Kolb & Wihshaw 1996).  
4.2.5 The Erroneous Qualities of Experiencing 
Our everyday experience is that what we see and hear about our environment is usually 
correct and situation relevant or true descriptions of it. It means that the interpreting process 
our central nervous system is offering in our scene of experiencing and steering is performed 
in a truth preserving way. Thus, the emergent transformations of the sense encoded afferent 
action potentials into sensations, and to the mental states of perceiving and knowing create us 
a reliable base for our actions and interactions with our environment. This reliability of our 
mental processes is implicitly subsumed also when we believe in the theory of evolution. 
However, there are some types of experiences, which can lead to wrong decisions. The 
column 5 in Figure 4.5 presents some examples of the most typical cases of erroneous 
experiences. 
An illusion is often seen as a false mental image, which is caused by the misinterpretation of 
the sense-based information of the attended entities. As explained earlier, our sensations act as 
search attributes recalling the situation relevant concepts into our working memory for 
conscious review. This recalling process may cause illusions. The cues in our sensations are 
often selected according our expectations and not according to the plain facts in the situation. 
The reality control by repeating the sense-based observations may sometimes become 
forgotten.  
Hallucinations are perceptions of entities not existing in the material world. The green 
Martians and red elephants seen by an alcoholic are caused by some pathological changes in 
subject’s central nervous system. The paranoiac delusions of some mental patients and the 
Napoleons in the mental hospitals are examples of the human creativeness without reality 
control. 
 
4.3 The levels of experiencing and steering 
The levels of steering form the second dimension of the scene of experiencing and steering. 
These levels are depicted in the figure 4.5. They vary from unconditioned reflexes on the 
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lowest level to different types of model applications on the second level. The third level is 
formed of different degrees of creative model structuring. The highest level of steering in this 
model is formed by the main factors and the growth areas of the individual’s personality and 
the core self. This level consists of among other things of the individual’s basic values and 
principles of life. In what follows, I shall briefly describe these levels of steering to give an 
idea of the totality of RA's SCES. Its detailed processing needs another research addressing 
the theory of action as its main issue. Here I am just drawing the frames of RA's steering 
system.  
4.3.1 Processual or reflexive level of steering  
On this lowest level, the steering is strongly process-like. It is divided in unconditional, and 
conditioned reflexes, and reflex-like reactions. On this level, the processual control of 
experiencing and steering is domineering. This variation of dominance between processual 
and conscious forms in the RA-model the third dimension of the scene of experiencing and 
steering and shown in the figure 4.5 As previously mentioned processual refers here to that 
part of the steering, which is controlled by the nervous structures individuals have acquired 
with their genome and during their ontogenic histories. This means that the phylogenic 
steering - as in reflexes - is strongly dominant though individuals' ontogenic history has had 
its effects. Even in today's environment we need the functions of the reflex-arch to save us 
from many accidents, like burning our fingers or falling when the stepping on a banana skin.  
As mentioned earlier, on the cognitive area of experiencing our sensations are processually 
steered and reflex-like mental phenomena.  Sensations are mental primitives interpreting our 
afferent action potentials and they are formed by the guidance of our peripheral and central 
nervous systems without conscious steering. Even the next phase of cognition or our 
perception is reflex-like interpretation of the sensed though using the situation relevant 
concepts as interpreters what the attended entity is. Through this step we become conscious or 
get a concept based explanation of the object of attention. We are conscious of the perceived 
but only aware of the sensed. We can name the perceived and understand its meanings in the 
situation we are living through, if we have a proper set of concepts and their attributes to 
explain the sensed. 
On the area of emotional experiencing the reflex-level provides us with the very basic 
interpretation of the object of attention. This happens often with the help of the classifying 
attributes of the object in our concept of it. In our evolutionary history, the ability to fast state 
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the quality and meaning of the attended object was the method of surviving. The messages 
mediated by the remote senses - like visual, auditory, or olfactory information - had to be 
connected to the other features of the object. The decision of staying or fleeing had to be done 
fast.  Even today's situations our emotional reactions are processed automatically; we become 
happy when suddenly meeting a good friend, we get frightened when meeting something 
unknown or threatening in our environment.   
The volitions on the reflexive level are just reflexes as the name of the level describes. We do 
not plan and decide our responses they are steered by our phylogenic structures. Our 
motivational states are often connected with our volitions. Successes in our endeavours create 
motivational powers by processing the value attributes to the concepts of these actions as 
explained in Chapter 3. On the area of erroneous experiencing the mental state of 
hallucination is on the processual level of steering. It lacks totally the reality control by using 
the on line connections to ones material environment. 
 
4.3.2 The Application Level of Steering 
The second level of steering is called model application level consisting of three different 
grades, which can be described and explained in following ways:  
Automatic model application refers to performances, which are based on our brain's ability to 
process a situation relevant flow of efferent action potentials to steer the needed motor 
actions. This level can be achieved by intensive, repeated, and long lasting exercises. Actions 
are performed on the lowest possible level of conscious steering. It can be seen and part of the 
rationality of our nervous system. We walk, swim, cycle, play tennis at the net, speak, etc. 
without knowing how the steering of the performing muscle groups and their co-ordination 
happens.  
Direct application refers to performances in which the model can be used as such but 
conscious follow-up using the help of memory representations must be applied.  
Situation oriented applications. When ascending the steps upwards the levels of steering, the 
processual elements of steering are decreasing and the conscious part increasing. This grade 
of conscious steering refers to performances in which the model must be modified according 
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to the grievances of the situation. There may occur some smaller problems, which must be 
solved, but no deeper creative processes are taken into use. 
Skill, know-how, and tacit knowledge are terms in everyday language and psychology, which 
are used to refer to these phenomena of automatic or half-automatic steering of our speech 
and other motor performances. 
4.3.3 The Model Creation level of steering 
On the third level of the scene of experiencing and steering are situated man’s creative 
activities.  In the RA-model, I am using different grades of creativity. These grades can 
sometimes be found in practical discussions of creativity and its applications in organisations:   
On its lowest grade of creativity the individual solves his problems by using his old or 
adopted concepts and conceptions of the entities connected to the problem in question. The 
individual's creativity is limited to the new composition of old structures and functions of 
entities and their memory representations.  
The second grade of creativity is assumed to consist of forming conceptual tools new for 
handling the being and its entities. The real creative work begins on this level. It enables the 
individual to disengage from the old ways of thinking, from the old methods and rules, or 
getting rid of the entire paradigm or culture, one has been bound in ones previous history. On 
this level, the conscious part of steering is considerably higher than on the first level. The 
steering is concentrated on seeking or searching the solution or the possible options of 
solutions. Even in this level, the creative mental processes take their time. 
The third grade of creativity could possibly be reached if one learns to systematise one's 
creative approach. This would mean also the systematising of the mental processes, and 
actions, which are needed when aiming at new solutions and trying to open new ways of 
thinking. There are hundreds of books teaching creative thinking and problem solving 
techniques. There are also increasing number of computer programmes aim at the 
advancement of the creative powers of the individuals and groups. The core seems to be to 
learn how to utilise the so-called incubation process, during which our brains are handling the 
problem and after which you may experience that a new comprehension and a new idea has 
been born in your mind. The processual outcome may bring in an intuition or an ah-ah-
experience. As we see from the previous, so the processual is an important part even on the 
highest level of creative thinking. 
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4.3.4 The Core Self and the Growth Areas of RA's Personality 
In the RA-model individuals' self, identity, and personality get their contents through their 
world-, resource-, role-, and situation- and action-views, of which one becomes conscious 
through the human ability to self-reflections. Individuals' resources and his roles are important 
elements for his identity. Similarly the earlier experiences collected as situation- and actions 
views form an important set of ready-to-use-models for actions in new situations  
The fourth level of the scene of experiencing and steering is formed by the core self of the 
individual. It can also be described as the growth level of individual's identity and personality 
in which the basic values are present. One important group of criteria on this level consists of 
the principles, which individuals have adopted during their ontogenic histories and which they 
use as their guidance when planning and choosing their criteria-matrix for their decision-
making activities. These are the items, which cause the need of sleeping over night before 
deciding. 
Our scene of experiencing and steering is also the mental space where we live through besides 
our cognitive experiences also our emotional, volitive, and motivational experiences.  In fact, 
the qualities and levels of experiencing are often mixed together and lived through as a 
totality without clear-cut borders. Man is said to be an emotionally orientating being. This 
means that many decisions are taken and actions performed more on the bases of emotions 
than on the bases of rationally considered and detailed knowledge. According to the RA-
model of concepts, this is natural because there are no isolated memory representations for 
cognitive experiencing. The value and meaning attributes are also always with our concepts 
and so are the value evoked emotions parts in the primary moments in all of our cognitive 
experiencings. Thus, the emotional intelligence is our standard way of reacting to the events 
and changes in our environment as Daniel Goleman has described (Goleman 1996).  
As mentioned above our emotions are often instantaneous or reflexlike expressions of the 
value and meaning experiences caused by the encountered entity and its manifesting 
behaviour.  Emotions are evoked also when the object's behaviour diverge from our 
expectations which often are based on our basic values and principles which are forming our 
core self. One of the main areas of our individual development could be the conscious 
pondering of our basic values, norms, and principles according to which we are encountering 
the people and events in our environments.  
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4.4 The Other Dimensions of the SCES  
4.4.1 The Varying Degrees of Conscious and Processual in Steering 
The terms like conscious and unconscious are common in all texts concerning human 
sciences, psychology, and philosophy. I assume that the term unconscious often refers to 
those operations and processes, which are steered by the structures of our central nervous 
system.  In figure 4.5, I am using the term processual instead of unconscious. The degree of 
conscious and processual in the process of steering is shown with a diagonal line on the left 
side of it. The line is indicating the assumed structure of the steering process of human actors; 
it is usually a combination of conscious and processual steering elements as explained earlier. 
The processual steering is here seen as a steering, which happens on the basis of phylogenic 
structures, formed during individual's ontogenic history and which is triggered into action by 
a proper set of environmental cues. The processual steering is in the main role in most of 
every-day performances. Tacit know-how-processes perform most of the routine-like 
activities. As mentioned earlier, better part of our speech and other motor actions are steered 
at least half-automatically. This automaticity is here seen just as a part of RA's rationality in 
man's mental structures and functions; the steering of decided performances will be completed 
on the lowest possible level and that way to free the intellectual capacity for monitoring and 
controlling the happenings and changes in the environment.  
As I have mentioned earlier, we are aware of the sensed. Consciousness is here used as a term 
referring to that area of subjects' mental states, which are based on his concepts and their 
attributes explaining the different meanings of the object entity. We are then conscious about 
those entities of which the memory representations are present in our working memory for 
'reviewing processes'. Of course, we are also conscious of our emotions, volitions, 
motivations, and even of our erroneous experiences.  
The capacity of our working memory is limited and according to Saariluoma, the number of 
items is often limited to 4 instead of 7±2, as G. A. Miller's (1956) 'magical number' had 
suggested. In the above model of RA's steering system, there are four main items, of which he 
is assumed to be conscious at the same time. They are seen as the main situation factors - 
formed by the situation relevant worldview, role-view, resource-view, and the planned and 
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decided actions - which are actual at moment. RA's actions are aiming at a certain goal or end 
situation, which satisfies the values, norms, and principles one has adopted.  
If we see the conscious as explained above, we could name the rest of the store of our 
memory representations as the metaconscious part of our memory resources. Somehow, we 
seem to be aware of what we know or about what we have reliable memory representations. 
The cues in the situation view are possibly recalling into our preconsciousness the situation 
relevant items of memory representations from our long-term memory. It is possibly justified 
to say that we are aware of those entities in our environment of which we are getting energy 
impulses to our senses and for our sensory memories. Our attention process selects then the 
situation relevant objects under sensation and perception processes, which are forming the 
concept-based and then more detailed and conscious descriptions of the attended objects.   
 
4.4.2 The Power, Intensity, and Duration of Experiencing  
As stated above the dimensions of power and duration of experiencing is not presented in the 
Figure 4.5. The time period of experiencing can vary from brief flicker of happiness when 
remembering some events in the past to a long lasting grief work and staying mood of mind 
after the death of a close friend or a near family member.  Also the power or intensity of 
experiencing varies greatly from a gentle touch of a feather to the deep and racking pains of 
the last days of a patient of mortal cancer.  Usually the power and stay of experiencing varies 
in accordance with the situation and actions the individuals are living through. The 
exceptionally long staying and negative moods of the mind are often connected with some 
disturbances of mental life, which need therapeutic treatments.  
As mentioned earlier, the mental primitives as sensations and the ‘windows’ - opened into our 
memory reviewing – must have a certain minimum intensity and durability in time to be able 
to act as a search attribute. If these minimums fall short of these limits – as in subliminal 
sensations – their functioning as a search attribute is not possible, which explains why we do 
not become conscious of the object. The unconscious can then be seen as a term that refers 
either to the processual or to that part of our store of memory representations that we cannot 
recall into our working memory for concept-based and thus conscious and understood review.  
I am assuming that it is possible to become conscious about those entities whose concepts are 
present in our working memory or in our minds. In ‘Taata’s – the Finnish Nobel laureate F. E. 
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Sillanpää’s - Christmas stories in Finnish TV and Radio programmes …”and the images 
floated”..., which referred to the way he described his creative processes when writing his 
novels. Thoughts are there recalled by other thoughts not only sensations describing the outer 
environment. Sillanpää's views remind somehow the picture theory of the meaning of 
sentences of the early Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1970, Hintikka 1981). 
The intensity of experiencing can vary greatly both in bodily and mental areas of causes and 
reasons. The threshold values present the minimum end and the pain spot is nearing the 
maximum end. It is difficult to compare the degrees of intensity in the cases when you are 
burning your skin and when your sole ‘burns’ when you boil over or you blow your top for 
some reason. One element of aggressive behaviour is often formed by the excited intensity of 
emotional reactions. 
  
4.4.3 The Centrality of The Situation Orientation in RA's steering system.  
Situation is a term, which is used both in everyday language and in philosophers' talks. All 
managers' speeches begin with a review of the market and competition situation. In a cocktail-
party, when moving from a group to another, we keenly listen to catch the items discussed 
and then the situation for own input.  Some philosophers have used the term situation 
referring to an entity whose ontology is often left without exact explication.  Lauri Rauhala - 
following and developing the long tradition of phenomenological philosophy of Brentano, 
Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre - has used situation as one dimension of his three dimensional 
ontology in his existental phenomenology (Rauhala 1989, 1990, 1993). The two other 
dimensions of his ontology are tajunnallisuus = consciousness and kehollisuus  = corporality. 
Rauhala's situation refers to that part of the world or reality to which an individual is or 
becomes in different kinds of relations (Rauhala 1993 p.70). 
In the RA-model situation orientation is man's basic mental state, which is processually 
formed of the actual sensory informations and their concept-based interpretations. As 
mentioned above RA is assumed to be a situation oriented being. RA's situation orientation is 
a function of the recalled and situation relevant elements of world-, role-, resource-, and 
situation and action views as presented in figure 4.4. Situation orientation means also that the 
subject is goal and value oriented or 'intentional' and has motivation that aims at the 
accomplishment of the action necessary in that situation. RA's actions and activities have 
always a purpose that the individual actions and their elements serve. Situation orientation is 
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part of our phylogenic and ontogenic rationality. In the familiar situations we have all the 
necessary mental tools at 'hand' in the situation and action view, which is recalled by the 
sensed cues.  
The attention and perception processes seem to be goal and situation oriented. The value-and 
goal-orientation in our situation-views determines what is important. Those, who have been 
able to observe the situationally relevant entities and factors in their environment, have 
survived in the evolutionary processes. The situation interpretation defines what the actor sees 
as a rational way of acting and then also what are the needed resources. Thus the resource 
features of entities are functions of the varying situations and their interpretations by acting 
subjects. So also, the values of entities are often functions of situations. At war operations the 
enemies - soldiers or civilians - are no more a human beings with global human rights but just 
enemies that can and must be killed otherwise you will be killed yourself, by them.    
RA's situation orientation can be understood by remembering the structure of RA's concepts; 
they all have an attribute, which is describing the hoped-for and often also planned future 
state of entities. Our situation views have also the future attribute describing the probable or 
hoped-for result-phase of the situation.  
 
4.5 A Brief Summary of the RA-model described in the Previous 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 form the theoretical basis for a new conception of man as a mentally 
steered rational actor. Man as a rational actor is created by the physical, chemical, biological, 
and cultural phases of the evolutionary processes. As an individual he is a product of his 
phylogenic and ontogenic histories. Man's mental life and actions are enabled by his brain's 
emergent transformations. Through these ontological transformations the sense encoded 
afferent action potentials are interpreted into our experiences. Our materially manifesting 
speech and other motor actions are enabled by our brain's steering effect, which transforms 
our thoughts and decisions into a situation relevant flow of efferent action potentials to steer 
their manifesting performances. The transformations between the material and mental and 
vice-versa have been and are still somewhat unexplained processes. These processes have 
created a continuous situation in which man has, during all his history, needed different kinds 
of gods, devils, good and bad daemons or spirits, and miracles caused by supernatural forces 
to explain the experienced and its relations with the outer and inner reality.  
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As explained earlier, in the RA-model of man, the human mental is explained by using our 
memory representations and their situation relevant interpretations as the testable and real 
basis for the phenomenal we experience. The memory representations of the entities of the 
being are stored in our long-term memories. Concepts as situation relevant sets of them or 
their attributes can be recalled into our working memory for conscious review to explain the 
sensed on-line information of our environment. We are meta-conscious about the content of 
our long-term memory, though we do not always succeed to recall all the items we know to 
know. Concepts are our mental tools, with which we can interpret the sensed and also all the 
products of our creative imaginations. In what follows is a short list of the main elements of 
RA-model of man:  
o Man's concepts are situation relevantly recalled sets of attributes of the memory 
representations of the objects of attention. Their function is to explain the meanings of 
sensed - and even imagined - objects of attention.  
o RA's steering system, which serves his planning, decision-making, and control, forms a 
metaphorically delineated model of the human mind. Its mental space is in our working 
memory, whose content we can be conscious. 
o RA's views of the world, of his roles, resources, situations, and actions form the frames of 
his steering system. Views are memory representations of entities in individual's long-term 
memory and are used to build the identity and personality of the individual. 
o The centre of RA's steering system is formed by RA's scene of experiencing and steering 
or SCES in which individuals are living through their cognitive, emotional, volitive, 
motivational, and even erroneous experiences and steering their actions and reaction on 
different levels of steering.  
o The levels of steering vary from the reflex-like to model use, model creating, and to the 
level of formation of the personal values and principles and their dynamics. 
o RA strives always to be situation oriented in his actions. This means that the concepts, 
conceptions, and views - recalled into his working memory - are selected to serve the tasks 
relevant in that situation from which the recalling sense-based primitives and cues are 
processed.  
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o Thus, one element of RA's basic substance is his situation relevant goal and value 
orientation, which often is referred by the term intentionality in philosophical literature.  
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 I have built the tools to handle the problems and the hypothesis of this 
study. They are connected with the core items of managerial psychology and philosophy 
implicit in my four intuitive definitions in Chapter 1. These tools are built on the results of 
human sciences and on the postulations of the system models of RA's concepts and RA's 
steering system. The most challenging task was caused by the intuitive definition of 
knowledge and its dimensions connecting it to the other psychlogical concepts of motivation, 
organisational culture, etc. In the managerial environment also the problems around 
motivation, values, norms, and language as elements of organisational culture are of great 
importance. They all seem to be intertwined with RA's concepts and the ways RA uses his 
steering system when planning, deciding, and accomplishing his actions. In the next Chapter I 
shall discuss the possibilities of the RA-model to advance the psychological understanding of 
man as a human individual and an object of managerial operations in an organisation 
pondering the problems of information, knowledge, motivation, language, and other mental 
dimensions of organisational culture. 
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5 RA'S CONCEPTS, MIND, AND THE FOUR DEFINITIONS  
  
Motto of Chapter 5:  
If we could understand the emergent genesis of the human mental from its material 
background enabled by the system effects of our central nervous structures, we might possibly 
discover what are the cognitive-, emotional-, volitive-, motivational-, and other areas, 
qualities, and dimensions of human experiences, of which the human mind is created. 
 
5.1 The RA-Model and the Mental of Man   
In the previous chapters I have built the RA-model of Man with the system models of man’s 
concepts and mind. I have left the problems of how the two transformations are performed by 
our 110 billion neurons and their system effects to the future brain researchers and used the 
results and postulations of the cognitive memory research. Can the RA-model of man with its 
'universal' system models of human concepts and human mind provide us with a simple and 
plausible - though metaphorical - set of descriptions and explanations of man's mental 
structures and functions? Can the postulated theoretical entities, describing the universal 
features of the human mental, explain, and give us a deeper understanding of those mental 
entities, which are implicated in the four intuitive and hypothetical definitions of action, 
knowledge, motivation, and organisational culture, which I presented in the introduction of 
this study in Chapter 1?  
 
5.2 The RA-model and the Psychological Theory of Knowledge  
5.2.1 Knowledge as an Area of the Mental States of Experiencing  
The postulations in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 justifies us to assume that subject's knowledge is 
concept-based mental state of experiencing the situation relevant meanings of the entities of 
the objects of attention. Thus, knowledge can function as a mental tool to direct individual's 
conscious decisions and actions in a situation oriented way. I am going to use the system 
model of human concepts as a tool to analyse the substance, origin, structure, and functions of 
human knowledge with its different dimensions. This is a way to formulate a concept of 
 125
knowledge and a psychological theory of knowledge, which I am depicting in Figure 5.1 on 
page 128. As I assumed in Chapter 3, the system model of human memory representations 
and concepts with their time-, value-, and theory-lines offers a multipurpose tool to build 
concepts and thus also natural theories of any material or theoretical entity; knowledge is one 
of the central theoretical terms whose referent has been discussed since Plato. Its genesis, 
substance, structure, and functions should be understood if we want to understand the 
substance or the material and mental dimensions of human beings.  
As stated above, the everyman's conceptions of entities differ from the scientist's conception 
of them mostly in the quality of the attributes in general and especially those on the theory-
line of memory representations and concepts. The attributes describing entity's substance is 
often totally lacking or filled with magical or traditional beliefs and explanations. The 
attributes of structures and functions are often limited to the materially manifesting features. 
Thus, individuals' common conceptions of theoretical entities such as knowledge, language, 
motivation, value, culture, etc., vary largely. The fact is that theoretical entities lack the direct 
and materially manifesting attributes besides their names and possible short linguistic 
definitions using other already known concepts. There hasn't been any possibility to use 
ostensive definitions, thus the situations in which they are used has formed the meanings of 
them. The use defines the meanings of terms, as Wittgenstein argued. This has led to the 
situation, in which one has had a philosophical freedom but an empirical difficulty to define 
the origin, contents, substance, structure and functions of the entities, to which the theoretical 
terms refer. Different kinds of metaphors have been and are used to compensate the lacking 
material features of theoretical entities. 
In the intuitive definition on knowledge in Chapter 1 I stated that:  
'Knowledge is a description and explanation of an entity of the being documented by 
concepts and/or signs.'  
This definition tried to incorporate the problematic and seemingly dualistic substance of 
knowledge as materially manifesting linguistic expressions and the mental, concept-based 
experiencing of it. This dualism appears in our everyday linguistic practice in which 
information and knowledge are used as synonyms. Compared with the Plato's definition, 
according which 'knowledge is a justified and true belief', the above definition lacks the 
normative features but explicates the mental substance of knowledge. It is maintaining that 
knowledge is a description of an entity, which is based on mentally subsisting concepts or 
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materially manifesting signs and information. Concepts in turn are assumed to be built of the 
recalled set of attributes of our mental memory representations of the object of attention. This 
definition accepts also materially manifesting information - built of different types of signs, 
sign-systems, and linguistic expressions - as knowledge.  
Basing on the postulations in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 we can state that man is steered or directed 
by his causally effective mental states. They, in turn, are often caused by the sensory or 
thought information and its concept-based interpretations. The end-result of this is the mental 
state of knowing. I am suggesting that knowledge is seen as subject's mental state, which 
enables us to define knowledge as follows:  
Knowledge is subject's mental state of understanding the meanings of the sensed, 
thought, or imagined object of attention with the help of the recalled and situation 
relevant set of concepts and their attributes.  
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The lacking normativity in the above definition is mended by the situation relevancy of the 
recalled and explaining concepts. As will be shown in Chapter 6 - when discussing the 
problems of truth - the referents of both these terms, truth and justification, are problematic. 
Situation relevancy is used as a normative expression instead of Plato's true and justified. In 
fact, we should discuss about the degree of situation relevancy of the recalled concepts, 
because it depends on the attention activating cues in the sensed or thought elements of the 
situation we are living through. As explained earlier, RA's conscious mental states take place 
in his scene of experiencing and steering or SCES. Its mental space is assumed to locate in 
subject's working memory. All our mental states are creations of our brains' emergent 
transformations, whose truth preserving features are not exactly known. However, their 
situation relevancy must be assumed if we believe on evolutionary processes. The dorsal - or 
other on-line - stream of sensory information offers a conscious and reality controlling review 
of the situation relevancy of the recalled descriptions, explanations, and meanings of the 
attended object entities. The on-line sensory information of the object of attention and its 
interpretation offer predominantly a functioning reality control of the experienced. At least, it 
is situation relevant, and possibly also true, as we all and most of the realists, empiricists, and 
pragmatists usually believe. 
Here the subject's mental state is based on the meanings of the attended entities mediated by 
the recalled concepts and their attributes. These usually create situation relevant 
interpretations of the attended object entity. The concept-basednes is enabled by our brains' 
ability to use the sensations, thoughts, and imaginations as search attributes, which recall the 
situation relevant attributes of subject's memory representations of the object of attention to 
explain its situation relevant meanings. As explained earlier, the sensed can be any sensory 
feature of the object entity as well as any linguistic expression, which is commonly used to 
refer to it. Similarly also imagined entities can function as search attributes, which initiate the 
concept-based abstracting or goal oriented mental actions.      
The attended object entity can then be a sensed entity or by inductive, deductive, or 
imaginative powers thought, created, or planned entity. This remark is important, because it 
shows that the initiative source leading to the mental state of knowing or knowledge can be, 
besides our senses, also our rational, fact based, or imagery thought or other mental and 
creative imagining processes. All the technical equipments of human life from stone axes and 
spears to electric shavers, atomic power plants, and airplanes are first designed and born in the 
human brains by the powers of imagining, creative thinking, and planning.  
 128
The above definition dismisses signs and thus also information as knowledge and maintains 
that only the experienced or mentally interpreted information can be used as a conscious 
tool to plan and decide over our actions. It also expands the explication of belief to involve 
also the relations of the object entity with its mental and material environment. As mentioned 
earlier, I see information as 'in form set material or energy', which is manifesting as sets or 
flows of conventional signs or symbols belonging to some commonly used system of signs or 
symbols. Thus, written or spoken words and sentences or their digitalized electronic packages 
on hard disks, knowledge bases, and in the extra-, intra- or internets etc. are just information. 
Thus, words, sentences, and other linguistic expressions as forms of information, can refer to 
their referential objects only through the concept-based interpretation process in the receiver's 
brain system.  
Even the memory-traces on the receptor molecule structures of the synaptic clefs and their 
systems in our neuronal nets are just information. To make use of this information one needs 
a complicated system-summation and interpretation process in the neuronal nets of our central 
nervous system to form a set of experienced and understood descriptions of the object of 
attention. Only the interpreted and understood information leads to the mental state of 
knowing or knowledge. Concepts and knowledge are used in our thinking and decision-
making operations and then they function as conscious tools in our mental processes of 
steering our actions. How this last sentence can be defended will be seen in what follows. I 
shall use the system model of RA's concepts when examining the time-, value-, and theory-
lines of the concept of knowledge by describing RA's mental state of knowing in the next 
sections. 
 
5.2.3 The Time-line of RA's Concept of Knowledge.  
Knowledge, as the mental state of knowing, is always an intentional or goal oriented mental 
state. Knowledge is mostly about something, about some entity, which has become as an 
object of interest selected by our attention process. The time line of our concepts – the left 
column in Figure 5.1 - explains the genesis and history of the mental state of knowing the 
object of knowledge, its sensed present state, and its planned or hoped for future states, which 
are in accordance with our values and norms. The mental state of knowing is caused by the 
recalled attributes of the concept of the object of attention. Attention is assumed to be a 
mental process that is able to select the object oriented and situation relevant items from 
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subject's sensory memories. They, in turn, are continuously available to be developed into 
mental primitives or sensations and then into concept based experiences of the selected set of 
objects of attention.  
Thus, knowledge gets its genesis or birth by the recalled concepts and their attributes. The 
attention process - enabled by the sensory memory and steered by subject's goal orientation - 
focuses the sensation process to the situation relevant object. The materially manifesting cues 
can be, for example, a spoken or written word or sentence, whose memory representations in 
subject’s situation relevant concepts function as search attribute causing their recalling into 
subject’s working memory for conscious review. As explained in Chapter 3 and 4 any 
material feature of the object entity can act as a sign and its memory representation as a 
search attribute recalling the proper concept to interpret the sensed object of attention and its 
meanings. Thus, both semantics and semiotics as research areas need the human memory 
representations and RA's concepts to build natural explanations to their theories of meaning.  
The present state of knowing is a result of how the flow of the on-line sensory information 
and the recalled concepts are processed in our scene of experiencing and steering or SCES. Its 
mental space is situated in our working memory. The quality, level, intensity, and duration of 
the state of knowing depends on the meanings of the object entity. The meanings are mediated 
primarily by the recalled value and other attributes of the recalled concept or concepts. In the 
mental state of knowing, we usually have many situation relevant attributes active in our 
working memory of the object of knowledge. Thus, there are also many areas of experiencing 
activated. This is depending on the relevant factors and recalled attributes in the situation one 
is living through. Besides recognising the object, the subject is influenced by the value 
attributes creating the emotional reactions and later volitional and motivational reactions 
toward the object of attention, as explained in Chapter 4. In the everyday routine situations the 
main emphasis of attention is - or can be - aimed at the cognitive, fact-based, meanings of 
object entity, although the emotional features are always on the scene. We usually rely upon 
our repeatable on-line sensory connections to our environment as the base of the true 
knowledge of the object of attention.  
In case the object of attention is something totally new for the subject he has to make trials to 
classify it and if it doesn't succeed extra efforts are needed to create new concept from the 
available sensory features and other information of it. Thus, to conceptualise an observed or 
thought theoretical entity means to name it and collect information to state its substance, 
structure, functions, its genesis, present state and possible future besides the sensory 
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descriptions of it. Very often we have at the beginning to satisfy just to some preliminary 
classifying features of the new and unknown objects we confront.    
The mental state of knowing - though it is always lived through at the present time - consists 
of the descriptions of the historical and the future states of the object of attention. We usually 
plan or improvise the future states in line with our values, norms, and our beliefs of how to 
accomplish the hoped state of affairs. Thus, human mental state of knowing usually consists 
of the whole time-spectrum from history to future. This seems to serve our need to understand 
the world by enabling the mental state of experiencing at a glance of the whole time line with 
its individual entities. The descriptions of the possible future states of entities serve often our 
security needs and play a decisive role in the formation of our motivations. The goal 
orientation or intentionality of humans - and other actors - seems to be based on the future 
features of the time-line of our concepts. 
The processual formation of the state of knowing through the consecutive processes of 
sensory memory, attention, sensation, and perception has possibly made it so difficult to have 
a mutually understood discussion about knowledge and its real substance. Philosophers have 
left these processes behind the common understanding of the term belief. The same concerns 
also the memory-based mental substance of concepts as I have explained through the analysis 
of its postulated system structure in Chapter 3. The brain-based processual genesis of 
knowledge in human mind can be followed through the results of neuropsychology and brain 
research. As neuropsychology has shown, our awareness of the entities of the outer material 
world is based on the energy impulses our senses receive and encode from them. They cause 
momentary sensory stimuli and detection activities in our brains. They are experienced as 
short flashes in our sensory memories like in the iconic and the echoic memories (Neisser 
1967, Baddeley 1997, Uusitalo 1997, Näätänen 1998). Our attention process – possibly 
steered by our situation relevant goal orientation - then selects a situation relevant set of 
impulses and creates the state of conscious follow-up of those objects, which are important to 
review in the situation one is living through. From the evolutionary point of view, the 
attention process can be seen as a necessary feature of actors’ central nervous system; only 
those individuals whose perception system could concentrate on the situation relevant objects 
in the environment could find food and shed and avoid enemies and other threats.  
As explained in Chapter 2, the results of brain research and neuropsychology show, the 
mental state caused by the visual information is a result of the interpretations of the dorsal and 
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ventral streams our brain's visual system is processing from the encoded electromagnetic or 
photon inputs to our eyes:  
o The 'direct' or the sense-based, dorsal stream after the primary processing of afferent 
action potentials encoded by our eyes, is seen as an on-line description of the visual 
features of the objects of our attention (Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982, Goodale & Millner 
1995, Kolb & Whishaw 1996, Haffenden & Goodale 1998). They can be material objects 
in our environment or words and sentences in a book we are reading. They all can act as 
signs or symbols, whose memory representations can act as search-attributes initiating the 
other stream of information from our long-term memory.    
o The other or the ventral stream of information – initiated by the sensed signs - is recalling 
the situation relevant set of concepts and their attributes from our long-term memory into 
our working memory for conscious review so we can recognise, name, and value the 
meanings of the object of our attention. As explained earlier this process of perception is 
leading the subject into the dynamic state of knowing, in which the situation and its goal 
setting determines the recalled and associated concepts and their attributes to explain the 
detailed meanings of entities present in the situation. These attributes outline the conscious 
mental content of subject's working memory or active mind. They form the basis when one 
is trying to understand to what kind of an entity the object of attention is. 
Thus, as I have assumed earlier, we are pre-aware about the items whose energy emitting is 
bombarding our senses and causing the momentary sensory memories. They could be named 
as the mental pre-primitives, because they form the selection frame for our attention process 
and then the beginning of our sensations or the first experienced descriptions of the outer 
world. Thus, the sensory memories are assumed to form the inputs for our attention processes, 
which, in turn, enable us to form sensation and become aware – German gewahr = watchful – 
about our environment and its changes. We become pre-aware about the items, which are 
selected by our attention process for formation of sensations. We are aware of our sensations. 
As explained earlier our sensations or our mental primitives and mental atoms act as search 
attributes and cause the state of conscious perception by the help of the recalled concepts. 
They enable the naming of the object as well as understanding its different meanings.  In these 
processes, in handling the visual information, both the ventral and dorsal streams are used for 
creating the state of concept-based perception and conscious reviewing of the object entity 
and its meanings.  
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Thus, the genesis of knowledge of our outer - or inner - world begins with the processes of 
sensory memories, attention, sensation, and perception and achieves the state of knowing as 
the end-result of this chain of brain processes. In neuropsychology, these processes can be 
described just as a follow-up of the movements of afferent action potentials to the phase in 
which they get into the corresponding areas of our brain system causing changes of the level 
and intensity of their activities. However, the experiencing human being must report the 
mental. Thus, the long denied introspection, as a source of scientific information, is the only 
way to study the human mental. 
If we see consciousness as a mental state in which we can observe and understand our 
environment and the situation relevant objects and their different features, we are very near 
the description of the mental state of knowing. Thus, we could define consciousness as a 
mental state in which our experiences are concept-based instead of being just sensed. 
Consciousness is then identical with 'concept-basedness' in our processes of experiencing. We 
become conscious of the object of attention first at the perception phase as the end-result of 
the above-explained chain of processes. Our ability of conscious experiencing is depending on 
our brain's emergent abilities. Sciences do not yet have any detailed explanation of this 
transformation. We just know that it happens and we understand that it is a necessary 
condition of our survival. How it happens is a challenging problem also for future brain 
research and neuropsychology.  
This emergent transformation from material afferent action potentials into mental conscious 
experiencing may get its scientific explanation at some time in the future. At this state of 
scientific research, it seems useful and justified to philosophize and postulate the two mental 
theoretical entities of concepts and steering system with its SCES to offer a metaphorical 
description and explanation of tools and phases of this unexplained transformation from the 
material into the mental and vice versa. Are these transformations truth-preserving is an 
epistemological problem. As said earlier, these processes must produce at least situation 
relevant descriptions of the object of attention; otherwise humans and the actors had not 
created and not survived in the evolutionary processes. 
The above described perception process leads the subject into the mental state of knowing, 
which corresponds with the present state on the time-line of the concept of knowledge. In this 
state the dorsal - on line - connection of sensations offers the reality control to the subject 
who has the ventral stream's memory or concept-based explanation of the sensed in his 
working memory. It is difficult to think how humans and other acting species had survived 
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without this kind combination of the on-line and memory-based connections to their 
environments.  All learning is, in fact, depending on this combination of our brains' on-line 
and memory-line mental operations. The mirror-neurons seem to offer a natural explanation 
of how we learn by aping our situation relevant linguistic expressions, speech acts, and other 
motor actions (Skoyles 2002). 
How is the future state of an entity's time-line created? As we know from our everyday 
experience, we are planning or imagining the future states of our lives and binding them with 
the dates in our calendars. We seem to process the future states of all of important persons and 
things in our nearest environment and of certain global affairs of interest. This future 
orientation is necessary in present day and it has been one of the necessary conditions of the 
survival of our ancestors.  In the evolutionary processes, those individuals and communities, 
which have had the functioning ability to learn from the past episodes of life and who have 
been able to forecast what will happen in the future, have had the greatest possibilities to 
survive.  
The human time orientation is possibly based on this phylogenically processed history-
present-future structure or the time-line of our concepts. If this is true, the understanding of 
this basic and substantial feature of man's mental structure can possibly solve the problem of 
the ontology of time. The experienced time seems to be our mental creation, that serves us to 
adopt to the processes of our planetary and solar systems with their annually, monthly, and 
daily appearing changes. The material or the physical and organic worlds do evidently not 
have time as an experienced phenomenon. They seem to have only structure-based processes, 
which are caused by some internal or interactional forces and which seem to follow quite 
regular frequencies or repeating intervals, as do the cycles of the quarts-crystal in my 
wristwatch maintained by the electric energy from its battery. 
These mental processes can be reviewed through RA's SCES, which has its different levels of 
consciousness and steering. As has been explained earlier, sensations are seen as the reflex-
level of our cognition during which we become aware or pre-conscious of the object of 
attention. Perceptions take place on the second level where the concepts act as interpreters and 
models, which are then used automatically to form a concept-based explanation of the object 
entity of our attention. The second level contains also the situation models of most usual 
everyday activities and then they form often the foundations of the mental state of knowing.  
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We could say that our perception processes lead us in the mental state of knowing; knowing is 
thus that mental state in which one can name the object or objects of attention and recall many 
of their situation relevant features, meanings, and relations to other entities in the actual 
situation. The mental state of knowing is caused by the recalled attributes of the situation 
relevant concepts and then there always are also the other qualities of experiencing present in 
our conscious mind. The value-attributes are defining the resource-based meanings of the 
entity and then the emotional, volitive, and motivational features of experiencing are often 
also present. 
 
5.2.4 The Base- and Value-line of Knowledge and its Value Attributes  
The English terms such as concept, comprehend and knowledge, have the Latin word 
'concipere' 'capere', and 'comprehendere' which can be translated approximately as 'catch or 
grasp mentally together'. We can infer that our mental state of knowing is enabling the 
understanding and control of the world and its changes. They are some of the main functions 
of our concepts and knowledge.  The need of understanding leads to the need to know the 
causes, reasons, or motives of the observed changes, actions, or processes. As explained 
earlier, the value and meaning attributes of the objects of attention define the dynamics or our 
perception processes. As assumed in Chapter 3 the value attributes of our concepts describe 
the resource features of the object of attention. They define the value-based meanings of the 
object entities. The qualities of the mental states are then mainly defined by the functions of 
the value attributes.   
Thus, I am assuming that the quality or the area of the experiencing of a concept-based 
interpretation of the sensed information depends on the value and meaning attributes 
connected with the object of attention and the object of knowledge in our minds.  On RA's 
SCES, there are always a whole spectrum of qualities, levels, intensities, and durations of 
cognitive, emotional, volitive and motivational experiences. The recalled concepts and their 
situation relevant attributes in subject's working memory are triggering the areas and levels of 
experiencing on the SCES. The focus of the mental state achieved can vary between 
cognitive, emotional, volitive and motivational and depends on the situation. In normal 
familiar and controlled situations, one can concentrate on the cognitive features. However, 
cognition is always mediated through concepts, and so it is always connected with the values 
and meanings connected with the object and its relations to other entities in subject's 
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environment. Knowledge is then always a multidimensional mental state whose steering 
power depends significantly on the value and meaning attributes of the attended objects.  
In the RA-model, emotions are connected with the values of entities. Values in turn were 
assumed to be associated with the value attributes expressing the resource features of the 
cognised objects of attention. As briefly explained earlier, our emotions can be seen as 
reflexive responses to the value and meaning attributes of the object of attention. For 
example, fear is an emotional and reflex-level response to a threat. Joy is a response to a 
positive emotion connected with the opportunities and resources connected with the object of 
attention. From the evolutionary point of view the reflex-like classification and response in 
interpreting the sensed object has been an important positive factor for actors' survival and 
well being. Even the motivational features the object, are functions of the value attributes of 
it, as will be explained later. Goleman's book of Emotional Intelligence offers many good 
descriptions of this kind of totality of our experiencing processes of which RA's SCES is built 
(Goleman 1996).  
 
5.2.5 The Truth and Value of Knowledge  
The main value of knowledge depends on its relevance with the situation subject is living 
through. A true and reliable knowledge enables us to make working and effective plans and 
decisions for our actual and future actions. Here again we see that RA as an actor values 
entities according to their resource features. Only those mental states of knowing, which are 
based on reliable information carry the real value attributes and are then useful. Individuals' 
self-image and identity may largely depend on their personal knowledge base or the 
intellectual capital they have been able to acquire. The classifying attributes of ones 
knowledge base are formed by the feedbacks one gets through the successes of his actions. 
They act as a summation of the truthlikeness and/or relevance of individual's situation-, 
world-, role-, resource-, and action-views. That's why it seems to be so important to be right 
in ones opinions, thoughts, and theories.  
As mentioned earlier, there is not any commonly accepted theory of truth. For example, the 
situation relevancy of the visual information achieved by the sense encoded afferent action 
potentials and interpreted by our dorsal and ventral streams of our brains, seems to be the 
most reliable description of our actual environments we can get. As stated earlier, the efferent 
and afferent action potentials form the only material interface to our environment. The 
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emergent and steering transformations form the necessary and the only mental interfaces to 
our environment. They form the connection with which the humans and assumedly all other 
actors have survived. However, we cannot directly compare the outer world and the 
descriptions our central nervous system offers us of it, because we have only our brain's 
interpretations in our conscious use. As stated earlier, if we believe on the evolutionary 
theory, we have to believe that the on-line sensory information of our environment offers a 
reliable source of knowledge of it. Naturally it presumes that the recalled interpreting 
concepts are properly tested ones to enable a true description of the object of attention. In 
Chapter 6 I shall present the concept of truth describing it by using the system structure of 
concepts in the RA-model. 
One important function of the value attributes is the classification of the entities into good and 
bad things, opportunities and threats, friends and enemies, etc. This classification initiates also 
the emotional reflexes enabling a fast assessment of the meaning of the situation and 
preparing the relevant response and action to cope with the encountered. As mentioned earlier 
this has been a crucial ability in the course of our evolutionary processes.  
Though, our everyday experience of perception and results of relying on them have processed 
rules covering the happenings in certain repeating situations. They have taught us to believe in 
the information we perceive through our senses, in spite of some exceptions of the rule. 
Layman's position seems to remind the tradition of an empiricist who believes on the repeated 
proof as a source of true knowledge. Individuals' ability to control themselves, their 
environments, and the relations with them depends largely on their intellectual capital 
collected during their ontogenic histories and stored as their knowledge base in their long-
term memories. The market-prise of individuals in the knowledge-society depends, as well, on 
the same factors. They seem to be formed of the quality and quantity of mental capacity, in 
which the ability to learn and adopt new information and transform it into working 
knowledge-capital has a central meaning. 
 
5.2.6 The Theory Line of RA's Knowledge 
The third line in figure 5.1 consists of the three squares representing the substance, structure, 
and functions of knowledge. The contents of them all have already been elaborated above. 
The mental and subjective nature of knowledge, its conceptual structure, and its functions as 
the main mental tool has been the core in all other descriptions of this theoretical entity. The 
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descriptions of the time-, value-, and theory-lines of the concept of knowledge have, in fact, 
revealed the contents of the squares of the theory-line of knowledge. These features are 
briefly explicated in the psychological definition of knowledge above and in the centre square 
of figure 5.1. When discussing about theoretical entities, we usually are satisfied with brief 
definitions, which are describing just the main classifying features of the entity.  
The definition of knowledge that Plato gave has survived two and half millennia in 
philosophers' discussions and minds. For most of them knowledge seems still to be: 'a true 
and justified belief'. My contribution to this discussion is here confined mostly to the 
substance, genesis, value, meaning, structure, and functions of the entity to which the term 
belief, in Plato's definition, is possibly referring. However, I have made some remarks on the 
normative features of the human knowledge by mentioning the necessity of the situation 
relevancy of the mental descriptions we experience as interpretations of the afferent action 
potentials our senses are encoding of the object of our attention. The truthlikeness of the 
experienced depends totally on the truth-preserving features of the transformation processes 
of our brains and the reliability of the information our senses receive from our environment 
and its changes. If we believe on the theory of evolution, we have to believe that the 
interpreting processes produce and offer us - in most cases - situation relevant descriptions 
and explanations of our environment, of its present state and probable future changes.  
 
5.2.7 The Tacit and Explicit Dimensions of RA's Mental State of Knowing 
Human knowledge is here seen as a mental state of experiencing the different features of the 
object of attention. It is combined of the processes of concept based manipulating of memory 
representations of the object. Thus, knowledge is as a multi-level, multidimensional, and 
situation oriented, dynamic and varying mix of cognitive, emotional, volitive, and 
motivational areas of experiences. They are caused by the recalled concepts of material or 
mental entities and their situation relevant attributes. How are these dimensions connected 
with the knowledge classifications into explicit - tacit, declarative – procedural, know-that - 
know-how dimensions of knowledge (Niiniluoto 1988, Baddeley 1997, Nonaka & al 1995, 
Lillrank 1997 and Lilrank & al. 1998)?  
As explained earlier all qualities of RA's knowledge get their manifestations through speech 
or other motor actions. They in turn are steered by a situation relevant flow of efferent action 
potentials our brain system is producing. Thus, these flows steering our explicit or declarative 
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knowledge are manifested as spoken or written linguistic expressions aiming at 
communicative interactions with the others in the situation.   
In our everyday language, we speak about knowledge when we have to formulate spoken or 
written answers to questions what, where, when, and why. The answers can be given or 
declared in an explicit way by describing what, where, when, and why something happened. 
In fact, we are using the recalled and situation relevant memory representations or concepts as 
basis for our report. Then, we are using our explicit or declarative knowledge, which in the 
RA-model of knowledge is formed of the concept based descriptions and explanations of the 
object of attention. The linguistic expressions are - as explained earlier - part of the sensory 
attributes of any concept and memory representation of an entity.  
The question, how, concerns often the tools, methods, and ways a certain task is performed. 
We often believe that the terms skill and know-how are referring to that unexplained entity we 
are seeking when we are speaking about one's ability to act in a proper way or to use a certain 
method on a production line. In the RA-model, all our manifesting performances are steered 
partly by conscious and partly by processual steering-system as explained in chapter 4. Thus, 
the skill and know-how refer to our brain's ability to process, store, and deliver a situation 
relevant flows of efferent action potentials to steer the manifestation of the wanted sequence 
of speech or other motor performances. This ability can be achieved by repeated exercises.    
As mentioned in Chapter 2, this ability is possibly based on the functions of our brain's 
mirror-neurons, which enable us to 'ape' the performances of others, teachers, or trainers who 
may have difficulties to verbalise the shown. This simple 'behaviour model-imitating-system' 
forms better part of this type of organisational tacit knowledge. In the RA-model tacit 
knowledge can be explained if we remember that all of our concepts are processually formed; 
they gather situation related descriptions and also the used linguistic expressions as a ready to 
use set of mental tools. The situation relevant linguistic expressions may be found from the 
situation related memory representations and the tacit knowledge could then get also its 
explisit manifestations. 
In verbal manifestations, we use our concepts and their linguistic interfaces manifested 
through words, sentences, mimics, intonations etc. When we use our tacit knowledge base, the 
search attributes and cues are often built in the situations in which the skilled performances 
are needed. It is easier to show, how, for example, a backhand over-twisted shot with a tennis 
racket is correctly completed than to try to put the method in words and sentences describing 
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the execution of the coordinated racket, hand, and body motions and their timing, which are 
needed, for its proper performance.  
We learn tennis by imitating the instructor or guide. We learn also our language just by 
imitating our parents' and others' situation relevant speech actions beginning already at age of 
11-13 months when the pronouncing of the first words is learned. The human ability to 
imitate both linguistic and other observed actions is the way we acquire the know-how of 
most of our speech and other motor actions. We learn the meanings of words by the automatic 
processes in which the memory representations of words are connected as name attributes to 
the concepts of entities and views of situations with which they have been used.  
Analogically, I am assuming, that we learn the meanings of sentences by living repeatedly 
through situations in which the sentences are used. The sentences and their varying forms are 
then processed as search attributes of the related situation views in our memory 
representations of them. Thus, I am assuming that our language of thought - if one wants to 
use this Fodor's and other linguistics' expression - is built into our situation and action views, 
which consist of a set of useable sentences as linguistic tools for situation relevant and 
creative ways to express and describe what is happening. Sentences can function also as 
search attributes recalling into subjects working memory a position relevant situation and 
action view explaining of the actual roles of persons and other factors and their meanings in 
the present situation. In the RA-model our words and special terms refer to entities but our 
sentences refer to situations, actions, interactions, changes, processes, etc. The mental means 
for referring are in both cases our natural and testable memory representations or our situation 
relevant concept types and structures. Propositional attitudes are then situation relevant 
linguistic expressions, which express individual's beliefs, hopes, wishes, etc. They are 
linguistic attributes of the recalled situation- and action-view describing its elements and 
happening.  
The know-how resources form part of our tacit or procedural knowledge that is often difficult 
to verbalise. Our cerebellum seems to be involved in the forming, storing, and using these 
resources of our know-how (Kolb & Whishaw 1996). Similarly, all our automatized speech 
and other motor actions seem to be steered partly by the system effects of the neurone nets in 
our cerebellum though their content and meanings, which are steered by our cortex and our 
concept-based knowledge and experiencing.  
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Through the RA-model, tacit knowledge can now be seen as brain's ability to form a 
repertoire of sets or flows of efferent action potentials ready for use when the outer situation 
requires a certain type of action or set of activities. All of our automatized actions such as 
speaking, walking, running, swimming, cycling, repetitive work on production lines, etc. are 
examples our tacit knowledge (Miller 1956, Vartiainen 1987). Tennis player's reflex-like 
actions at the net in doubles are examples of one type of tacit knowledge, in which the 
situation factors and opponent's movements are triggering the sets of afferent action potentials 
to steer the reflex-like performances. Even our speech actions are steered at least semi-
automatically. One can ask also that, what is the degree of automaticity and what is the role of 
creative artistic interpretation in the performances of top artists with violin or piano and circus 
virtuosi?   
What are the systems our cerebellum uses in storing the learned abilities and automatized 
performances, which are aroused and attuned with the needs of the actual situation one is 
living through, is a problem of future brain research. It is quite probable that those results will 
create many changes in our conceptions of man and his mental states of knowing.  
 
5.2.8 Situation Orientation of Knowing in the RA-model. 
As stated above, subject’s mental state of knowing is created by the concepts, which are 
recalled into subject's working memory for conscious reviewing. Our brains seem to serve us 
quite rationally by recalling only the minimum amount of attributes, which are related with 
the situation and the goal setting of the subject. For the great majority of the entities, we 
encounter in our everyday situations, we need only the fast recalled classifying or 
stereotyping attributes. This depends on the fact that the detailed descriptions are not needed 
until with the real and practical interactions, actions, and exchanges with the encountered 
individual entities or the singular particulars. This may explain why Vygotsky, Piaget, 
Baddeley, etc. have seen concepts in their research work just as a set of classifying attributes.   
The processes of classifying and stereotyping may be seen as mental laziness, but it can be 
seen also as our brain's natural rationality not to burden the limited capacity of our working 
memory with items not necessary in the situation. As a result, we are context- and situation 
bound in our understanding of things. As I maintained in Chapter 4, our SCES in figure 4.5, 
illustrates the dynamic and varying ratio between the concept-based and the processual in all 
of our mental operations.  
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As assumed above, even certain parts of our rationality, can be explained by these processual 
features of our mental actions. Our situation orientation is based on the situation view that is 
recalled into our working memory by the cues in the actual environment. Situation views 
form thus the frames for further mental operations of thinking and problem solving, which are 
possibly needed in the situation. Situational views are kind of maps how to interpret the 
sensed and how to behave and act. The automaticity of this situation orientation can also be 
seen as part of our processual rationality, which, of course, can carry certain risks and lead to 
misinterpretations. Illusions are examples of these misinterpretations. Sometimes the recalled 
attributes are not all we should have needed in a certain situation as we can afterwards 
discover and criticize ourselves by pondering that why did I not remember those details of the 
case, though I very well knew and know them. Aren't we sometimes accusing ourselves and 
also our friends having acted against our or their 'better' knowledge? 
 
5.3 The Resource Attributes of Entities and the Human Values  
5.3.1 The Time-line of Values 
In the previous chapters, I have maintained that the dimensions of our mental states - varying 
from cognitive to emotional, volitional and motivational - are strongly connected with the 
value attributes of entities in our concepts of them. Similarly, our values, goal-orientation, and 
many of our needs are depending on them. In chapter 4, I explained that all dimensions of our 
experiencings are based on the conceptual structures, which are recalled into our working 
memory for conscious review. Value-attributes were assumed to describe the resource 
features of the recalled object entity. Rational actors seem to value only entities and things, 
which have actual or potential use in some of his actual or prospective actions now or some 
time in the future. In what follows, I shall briefly repeat the explanation of the value thinking I 
applied in Chapter 3. I am going to illustrate the theoretical entity of value by using the 
system model of concepts, which was developed in Chapter 3 and which is presented in 
Figure 5.2 on page 143. Values, seen as resource and meaning features of entities, can be 
described as the other theoretical entities by answering the questions in the eight squares on 
the time-, value-, and theory-lines of the RA-model of concepts.   
On the time-line of the concept of value, we can see that values - or the value attributes of 
entities - are formed processually as side-products of individuals' interactions and exchanges 
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with the object entities. The majority of the values of entities are then dynamic and situation 
related entities and they change along with the experienced changes in the value bearing 
entity and its behaviour. We can remember the resource features of entities and perceive their 
meanings on the situations we are living through with them. Thus, we can compare if the 
observed corresponds with the remembered. However, it is possible that we have to call into 
question or even totally change our earlier conceptions of the object entity.    
 
The future values of entities are based on its speculated resource features in the future. The 
prevailing situation – when it is experienced as a drawback, harm, or inconvenience – initiates 
a creative process of finding something better. RA seems to have the need and capacity to 
imagine what the future resource features of an object entity could and should be. Thus, the 
state of affairs - as they are now - causes the planning process aiming at something, which 
suits better to subject's values, norms, needs, and hopes connected with the future. All the 
'revolutions' and other changes in human conditions – I assume – have attained their executing 
physical and the steering mental energy or motivation from this basic human ability to 
imagine a better functioning and more satisfying state of affairs in the future. Even G.E. 
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Moore's 'autonomous moral faculty' and the ideas of connections between individual's values 
and emotions, could get their explanation through the value attributes and their postulated 
time-line structure in RA's concepts. In Chapter 6, I shall briefly return to some problems of 
ethics and moral seen through the RA-model.  
 
5.2.2 The Base-and Value-line of Values 
The base-line of values consists of three squares. In the middle is the definition of value as an 
attribute or a set of attributes in RA's concepts describing the resource features of the object 
entity. As mentioned earlier, RA's resource needs are situation dependent and thus the 
activated attributes vary as function of situations. The territory fights of animals, mafia-
groups, and business companies, and nations have a common explanation in the resources of 
the area in question. 
In the upper square is an explanation of the value and meaning of values. The resource or 
anti-resource features of entities enable individuals to define quickly the meanings of the 
entity and to classify them. In the evolutionary process, the ability to immediately classify 
objects into friends and enemies, edibles and inedibles, threats and possibilities has been a 
necessary condition for survival. Besides, the value attributes are able to initiate the emotional 
processes steering the areas of experiencing and the functions of endocrinal glands causing 
changes in the blood chemistry – for example, the concentration of adrenaline - and thus 
enhancing individual's ability to encounter the challenges of the situation. Our brain’s limbic 
system with its thalamus, hypothalamus, pituitary gland, hippocampus, and amygdala are in 
important roles when the value attributes of entities are arousing emotional experiences and 
corporal reactions. 
In the lower square of the base-and value-line of the concept of value are the collections of 
entities classified by using the value attributes of them. These are formed as by-products 
during the earlier encounters with these entities. Values and value attributes serve thus 
individuals by classifying the objects in accordance with their resource features on different 
areas of actions and processes, interactions and exchanges. This process of classifying entities 
can serve subjects on his individual and social, metabolic and mental, sexual and intellectual, 
religious and ethical areas of life and activities.  
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5.3.3 The Theory-line of Values 
In the theory-line of values, I maintain that values are subjective as all features of our memory 
representations and concepts. However, certain - sometimes quite high - degree of 
intersubjetivity may appear among individuals living in the same communities and using the 
same resources. Thus, intersubjetivity is a function of similarities in individuals' living 
environments, actions, interactions, and exchanges. As explained earlier our common 
concepts are mostly by-products of common operations and experiences between members of 
social groups and communities.   
The structure of value concept varies from a single value attribute to a large and situation 
relevant set of attributes describing the objects resource features. A religious person may have 
his God or Gods and their value as a Redeemer, a Rescuer, a Holy Spirit, or a Saviour. Even 
in these profound areas of mental actions, the resource features are important and explicated 
by the names of the object of worship.  
Many humans seem to be also religious actors with values and needs, which are fulfilled by 
the resources the divine object of worship offers. These divine powers evidently subsist as 
resource attributes in the concepts of their Gods. The steering power of these theoretical 
entities can be seen in the religious rites and in the innumerable wars, which Gods' will have 
justified and executed by armies blessed by the priests serving the same Gods. Millions of 
human lives and thousands of billions worth of material losses have been sacrificed on the 
shrines and altars of these theoretical entities called with various names in different cultures. 
A doubting Thomas or a sceptic might say that the real reasons for wars have always been the 
resources the invaders has been aiming at and Gods has been used just as means of hiding the 
real motives. Anyway, the steering causal power of theoretical entities seems to be astonishing 
high and easy to be distributed among masses of people. The RA-model seems to give a 
natural explanation also to these functions of our values. All the leaders and other 
manipulators of masses have used them through the known history.    
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5.4 Motivation as the Mental Steering Energy  
5.4.1 The Base- and Value-line of Motivation  
In what follows, I am using the system description of concepts to examine the content of 
motivation. The time-, value-, and theory-lines of motivation in Figure 5.3 on this page give a 
condensed account of the content of my concept of motivation. The base-and value-line of the 
concept of motivation is made up of three squares containing the value, the definition, and the 
classifying accounts of the motivational states of human mind. In the previous sections, I have 
briefly examined the value concept in the RA-model and maintained that values of entities 
materialize in their resource features seen from the subject's point of view.  
Values are then subjective and situation related features of entities, though intersubjetivity 
occur between members of communities using the same resources. I am assuming that values 
form also the source of our motivations. In the upper square of the base-and value-line I have 
stated that the two main values of human motivation or the motivational state of a rational 
actor are formed of its intrinsic and its instrumental values. The previous refers to the positive 
mental state that is experienced when being motivated. The latter is here interpreted as the 
mental steering energy, which is needed to initiate and accomplish the activities to achieve the 
decided goal state of affairs. Motivation is then as a processual mental force or tool created by 
the evolutionary processes to stimulate the actors into effective pursuit of valued goals needed 
for survival and well being. 
In my intuitive definition of motivation in Chapter 1 I described as follows:  
Motivation is a goal oriented mental energy that is sufficient to lead to the results the 
subject is aiming at. 
In this definition the term motivation is substituted by another theoretical entity the mental 
steering energy. The energy of an entity is its ability to act or work.  Here, it is referring to an 
energized mental state, which is needed to initiate and accomplish a set of activities leading to 
the aimed goal. According Newton's laws, we can assume that in all actions and changes one 
needs energy to form the powers needed in them. In all human and goal oriented and then 
mentally planned and decided actions one needs both the mental steering energy and physical 
muscular energy.  
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Though we do not know what steering energy is, we all have experienced the feelings we 
have when being motivated. The steering energy needed in an action grows or gets its genesis 
from the value features of the planned goal state of affairs. The level of the experienced 
energized mental state is affected by factors such as: the individual's personality, his attitudes 
and needs, the action or work itself and its different features, and - of course - the working 
environment the management practice included (Maslow 1985; Peltonen & al. 1987).  
  
The main impact to the experienced motivational state is - in this meta-model of motivation – 
seen in the individually experienced value of the goal state of affaires and the belief that it is 
possible to achieve by reasonable use of mental and material efforts. The psychology guiding 
the planning of commercials has used this fact by describing the wonderful end states of 
affaires one can achieve by using the advertised product.  
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The postulated theoretical entities in Chapters 3 and 4 enable the redefinition of motivation. I 
am assuming that motivation is one of the dimensions of human knowledge or of the mental 
state of knowing. I am assuming that this motivational feature of individual's mental state is 
caused mainly by the value attributes of the object or objects of attention. The definition of 
motivation as a dimension of human knowledge can now be reformulated as follows:  
Motivation is an experienced and object oriented mental energy, which is caused and 
maintained by the value attributes of the possible and wanted goal state of affairs, which 
is attainable by a set of situation relevant actions. 
This can be interpreted in the way that motivation is that dimension of the multifaceted state 
of knowing in which the experiencer must:   
o be an actor who is able to know, imagine, plan, and decide about a valued goal situation  
o have the needed resources and methods of their utilisation to achieve the wanted end 
result  
o have an energising experience, which has a proper level of actuality, intensity, and 
duration to initiate and fulfil the operations needed for the action 
o believe on the possibility of achieving the wanted goal situation.  
I am building this hypothetical description of motivation on the features of concept-based 
state of knowing that I have briefly presented above. The value attributes are assumed to 
describe the resource features of the object entity. Human motivation seems to be connected 
with the actions, which are aiming at gathering, maintaining, or safeguarding the resources, 
which are needed for the actual state of well being or its advancement towards the valued goal 
level. The resources of which individuals seem to be worried can be his or those of his family 
or other important communities to which he/she belongs as a member. As explained above 
human beings seem to be situation and resource-oriented, because resources form always the 
indispensable prerequisites of all actions. The preferential order of things seems to be defined 
by the quality and quantity of the resource features of the object entity. Thus, the motivational 
power correlates with these features and the probability of their accessibility (Helkama & al. 
1998). 
In the lowest square of the value- and base-line of motivation is some classifying and 
qualifying comments of human motivational states. One possibility to classify motivation is to 
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base it on the needs behind it. According the RA-model needs are based on the lacking 
resources of our material or mental processes or actions. As seen above, RA is biological, 
social, and rational actor and his needs and motivations can be classified on these three areas. 
The Aristotelian view of man's substance as a social and rational animal and Alderfer's (1972) 
classes of human needs fall into the same categories with the RA's action areas, as will be 
seen in the next section. We are motivated to keep up our existence by experiencing the needs 
evoked by the lack of balance of our metabolistic processes. Analogically we seem to be 
motivated to achieve a balance on social exchange with the individuals in our communities.  
As rational beings, we are continuously aiming at advancing the intellectual or conceptual as 
well as the material control and power over our environment and its changes. This motivates 
us to gather information of it and to find ways to utilize it. When trying to comprehend the 
origin and purpose of Man and our Universe, one is possibly motivated by scientific curiosity 
and the intellectual need to a new and better explanations to these eternal problems. 
Another way to classify human motivation is review them through ethical and moral values 
and norms. Aren't we just selfish and envious when demanding freedom to act, fraternity from 
other citizens, and equality from our communities and our society. In the previous section, our 
values seemed to be just the resource features of entities. These features were seen from our 
and our communities' actual or future actions' point of view. The politicians are often accused 
of being unjust and partial instead of aiming at results, which serve all citizens equally. The 
questionable motives of the members of the resent Olympic Committee were recently pop 
items in Internet and other news arenas on the eve of the Olympic games in Sydney, 
Australia, in September 2000. 
 
5.4.2 The Theory-line of Motivation  
On the theory line of motivation in Figure 5.3 on page 146 are brief characterizations of the 
substance, structure, and functions of the mental state of motivation. These states are 
subjective ones, though intensively cooperating members of groups and communities can 
experience 'similar' states of motivation. Mass hysteria, panic, and horror are examples of a 
simultaneous and somehow primitive interpretation of the meaning of some happening in the 
environment of a group or crowd. The behaviour of one or some individuals of the group is 
transmitted fast to all members of the group or crowd.  Save yourself if you can! A chaotic 
escape reaction can be fatal for many individuals as has been seen in many cases of panics. 
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Thus, the substance of motivational energy is individually experienced need, want, and 
power to achieve a certain and valued goal state of affairs. 
The structure of motivation has at least four mental dimensions:  
o intellectual orientation toward an object of attention  
o emotionally qualified orientation toward the object, which can be valued, feared, or 
unspecified of its nature  
o intensity or power of the emotion and desire toward or from the object 
o duration of the mental state aroused by the values of the object. 
These structures create the steering effect on individual's manifesting behaviour. Motivation is 
thus kind of a time and intensity bound mental vector variable transforming individual's 
mental energy for activities, which are aiming at a valued goal state of affairs.  The intensity 
and duration of motivation are important factors, because without a proper degree of them the 
action will never be commenced and never completed.  
The functions of motivation, as has been expressed above many times, is to provide 
individuals with the mental steering energy, which is intensive and enduring enough to 
accomplish the planned actions. The mental state of being motivated has its own intrinsic 
value as a positive energizing experience as mentioned above. Our quality of life is strongly 
affected by this mental state. Without valued and motivating goals, we may loose the purpose 
and meaning of our activities and with them the significance of the whole life. If so, a proper 
state of goal orientation and motivation is a necessary condition for a purposeful human life. 
 
5.4.3 The Time-line of Motivation and Human Needs  
Motivation can then be seen as a mental state in which one has a reason or an incentive to 
perform a certain task or duty, which is assumed to lead to the valued goal state of affairs. In 
figure 5.3 is the content of the concept of motivation analysed by using the common system 
model of concepts developed in Chapter 3. Following the order on the time-line we can see 
that the mental state of motivation gets its genesis through the observed or imagined value 
attributes of the object entity. It is often experienced as a need to achieve a valued state, role, 
or situation in the future. This happens when one is 'moving' on his SCES and directs his 
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attention on those characteristics of the object entity, which are carrying the real or speculated 
resource features of it. The present state of motivation and its duration in the future depends 
on the continuous 'freshness' of these features. In practice, this 'freshness' needs actual and 
positive feedbacks from the entity, which carries these features. The feedbacks use the 
different on-line sensational-streams exemplified by the on-line dorsal-stream in handling the 
visual information. 
The mental state of motivation can be taken as an object of self-reflection. Then the classes 
and qualities of the experienced can possibly be analysed and the backgrounds of them found. 
Our motivations are mostly based on our needs, which often arise from the homeostatic 
imbalance on the metabolic or mental area of processes. The topmost criteria for classification 
of motivation are based on the core items of one's personality. They consist of entities such as 
the basic values, norms, and principles according which one is orientating towards the world 
and its changes and happenings. 
Motivation theories are often built on some grouping of human needs. Maslow (1954) has a 
six-level system of motivation. He named the levels of needs as physiological-, security and 
safety-, love and feelings of belonging-, competence & prestige & and esteem-, self-
fulfillment-, curiosity and the need to understand. Alderfer's three areas of needs are 
existence, relatedness, and growth (Alderfer 1972). McClelland (1985) has four motive 
systems in his theory of motivation. He grouped them into achievement-, power-, affiliate-, 
and avoidance motives. Kaila (1952) maintained that man is a condensation of thousands of 
needs. He grouped them into animal and spiritual classes of needs. In the former belong 
species-typical needs of food and sexual partner and in the later, for example, the aesthetic 
and religious needs. 
In psychology and in management literature needs are often grouped or classified on certain 
areas as mentioned above. Often the groups fit with the Aristotelian view of man as a rational 
and social animal. In RA-model, man is seen as rational, social, and biological actor created 
by the evolutionary processes. According to the RA-model, needs can be seen and defined by 
man’s basic essence as an actor. In any action, resources are essential and crucial elements 
and, if they are lacking, needs arise as a feeling of missing means. Using the RA-model as 
background and as a meta-model, needs can be defined as follows: 
Need is an experienced lack of resources or their use caused be the metabolic or mental 
processes or by the execution phase of a planned physical or mental action.  
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The experiencing of needs can then concern an actual or a presumed future lack of resources 
of some of the planned actions or processes. Thus, needs are experienced through an 
emotional kind of feeling of a state of imbalance between existing resources and suspected 
resources which are needed to maintain the homeostasis of our metabolic processes. The other 
balance we are aiming at is our personal conception of the balance of communicative 
interactions and material exchanges in the situations we are living through with the other 
members of our communities.  
This definition of needs opens new criteria for understanding human needs and human 
behaviour, which is mainly based on them. Many of our basic needs grow from the biological 
processes, which are steered by the biological homeostasis. Homeostasis is usually 
understood as the maintenance of metabolic equilibrium. The same phenomenon can 
analogically be found also on the mental area of actions as a need for equilibrium of 
exchanges and interactions between individuals in social groups. This homeostasis of social 
exchange can easily be understood by the structure of human concepts. Human beings are 
processually and often fully unconsciously storing their experiences of interactions and 
mental and material exchanges as attributes in their concepts and views of the lived situations. 
The actions, interactions, and roles of the participants of the situation are stored and used 
when a similar or analogous situation occurs. The need for mental balance of social 
homeostasis in its extremity can be seen, for example, in the vendetta and feud traditions in 
some cultures.  
If we see needs as experienced lack of resources, so Kaila's view of needs seems to be correct. 
Man as an actor needs resources for his actions. Actions in turn are situation oriented 
planning, decision making, and implementing the use of proper resources to achieve the 
valued goal. In the RA-model, needs are then dynamic and situation related experiences of the 
lack of resources, be the resources material or mental of their nature. It is easy to see the 
connections between needs and motivations; they both are often aroused through the resource 
features of the valued and achievable state of affairs in the future. 
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5.5 RA's Concepts and the Mental Foundations of Language 
 
5.5.1 The Linguistic Attributes on Concepts' Base- and Value-line 
In Figure 5.4 is a system description of the concept of human language. I shall use its time-, 
value-, and theory-lines to briefly review the basics ideas concerning the RA-model of our 
linguistic abilities.  The basic idea of the RA-model is that the main part of the human mental 
is based on the on-line sensory connection with our actual environment and on the recalled 
elements of the explaining memory representations. Our sensory 'touch' with the linguistic 
expressions in our environment connects us to situation relevant concepts and through them to 
the meanings of them. In the RA-model linguistic expressions are stored as names or 
descriptions of the object entity in their memory representations. Thus they can function as 
any other material feature of the entity and recall the situation relevant concepts to explain the 
sensed. 
According to Ferdinand de Saussure (1916 > 1990 p.15): "…language is a system of sings 
expressing ideas, and hence comparable to writing, the deaf and dumb alphabet, 
symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so on".  
De Saussure thought that language is just one of the many different sign systems, the study of 
which could be called semiology. Contemporary semiotics researches the substance, structure, 
and functions of signs (Tarasti 1990, Forrester 1996). As explained in Chapter 3, besides the 
name attributes, any materially manifesting element of an entity can function as a sign of it.  
The only condition is that its memory representation is processed as a sensory attribute into 
the memory representation of the entity. A scent of a familiar perfume or after-shave lotion 
can remind us of our old friend who used to use it. The way a man walks on the street ahead 
of you may act as a sign of your old friend whom you have not seen for years.  
In the RA-model of language linguistic expressions act like De Saussure's signs; the spoken or 
written words and sentences have their attributes on the base- and value-line of entities' 
concepts. They function as mental interfaces between the material and mental by recalling the 
situation relevant set of other attributes to explain the sensed elements of the situation.  
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Human linguistic abilities manifest in written or spoken words combined - rule or model 
steered - into meaningful sentences.  In steering our speech acts we are using the situation 
relevant set of concepts and express our thoughts with a set of conventional words and 
sentences, which are recalled or created with the cues of the other features of the situation. 
Apparently we are apt to follow the 'ready made models' when forming our situation relevant 
linguistic expressions.   
Our actions manifest in our bodily movements leading to a purposed change or end-result in 
our environment or in our relations with it. In our bodily actions, we are using our tacit 
knowledge, which, in the RA-model, is seen as our brain's ability to process a situation 
relevant flow of efferent action potentials to steer the thought set of actions. All conventions 
concerning our manifesting speech or other motor actions have then an analogous steering 
system in our mental structures.  
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The mental entities steering of the conventional linguistic and other expressions in the RA-
model are our concepts, conceptions, views, and situation relevant sets of performance 
models. The words we use function as name attributes in our concepts. Our sentences are 
often expression models connected with the situation relevant views and actions recalled into 
our working memory. I am assuming that we often use in our speech acts the 'ready made 
models' and their situation relevant modifications as well as we use the models in our other 
motor actions.  It is easy to understand that children at age of three or four years can manifest 
their thoughts in perfect sentences, if we see it as a use of sentence models learned and 
adapted with similar situations one is just living through. But it is difficult to see it as a 
manifestation of the control of complicated sets of rules linguistics have invented in searching 
invariables in the manifestations of our linguistic abilities. Rules of linguistic expressions 
seem to be situation related conventions, which form linguistic elements of the sensory 
attributes of the actual situation and action views. 
The RA-model's explanation of the genesis of our linguistic abilities through the processual 
formation of the linguistic attributes in our concepts of entities reminds the early 
Wittgensteinian picture theory of language. We comprehend the situations in the world with 
the help of views. When needed we can use the ready model or rise on the creative level and 
find a new linguistic expression or motor performance better suited with the requirements of 
the situation. As seen in Chapter 4, we are apt to use automatized or other wise spontaneous 
models in our manifesting actions. This may depend on the fact that the performance models, 
or the flows of the efferent action potentials steering our manifestations, are easier to initiate 
and process when they are done and repeated thousands of times before. As explained above, 
our tacit knowledge is needed to steer all of our speech and other motor actions. 
The value and meaning of the human linguistic ability has become clear above. It is based on 
the fact that language enables our communicative actions and then helps to build and maintain 
our social roles in our communities. It offers us also the mental tools for expressing and 
executing our thinking, planning, and decision-making operations. With our linguistic 
abilities we rise above the animal level of life, though all animals seem to communicate by 
using their own species-specific sign systems. 
Languages can be classified many ways. In the lower square of the base-and value-line is a 
short set of classes of languages. Our natural language is the most flexible. Formal languages 
such as mathematics and formal logic are thought to enable more exact linguistic expressions 
than our natural language. However, even in the formal languages the meanings of the signs 
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are always mediated through our memory representations and concepts recalled by the used 
formal expressions. Thus the semantics, syntax, and pragmatics of any language are usable 
only through our conceptual structures formed when we study and learn the language. If the 
number of signs used is limited, the linguistic expressions may be more exact, but also the 
expression power of the language may become more limited.  
 
5.5.2 The Theory-Line of Language 
In Figure 5.4 on page 152 are some brief notes of the substance, ontology, structures, 
functions of the human language. I state there that language is a form of human actions and 
then its material manifestations or our speech and writing acts need the mental steering 
operations as all of our motor actions. Our subsisting concepts and views have the names of 
entities and sentences as situation relevant linguistic expressions as sensory attributes. They 
are stored and usable in the same way as the other sensory attributes of the entity. This offers 
a natural base for our linguistic ability.    
Thus, the structure of language is connected with the structures of other memory 
representations. Linguistic expressions are just situation relevantly used words, phrases, and 
sentences, which are conventional in the subject's communities. If we accept RA's situation 
views as the basic orientation to the world, we can see all rules of grammar just as situation 
relevant linguistic conventions. I assume that they are stored as usable linguistic elements 
with the views of situations and actions. As mentioned earlier Wittgenstein's picture theory of 
language can be understood by the RA-model of views and their linguistic expressions as one 
type of sensory attributes.  
RA's concepts and views of the world, roles, resources, situations, actions, interactions, etc., 
offer the structural tools for the functions of language.  As stated above the main function of 
our linguistic ability is to enable communicative actions and mental tools for our planning, 
decision-making, and creative thinking. The conceptual structure of our linguistic ability is of 
course part of our thinking and planning abilities. They, in turn, are used to formulate the 
matrix of our decision criteria, which are needed to systemize our decision-making procedures 
and rules. Our linguistic abilities are then a central role then discussing the basic substance of 
man. Our concepts and linguistic capacities are able to extent our power to understand and 
control the world from here and now to the past and future and anywhere in our Universe.   
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5.5.3 The Time-line of Language 
In Figure 5.4 the time-line has three squares. The lowest presents some words connected with 
the genesis of language. The development of the mirror-neurons in the course of evolutionary 
processes seem to offer a natural meta-theory of the genesis of the human linguistic and other 
learning abilities (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998, Ramachandran 2001, Motluk 2001). As 
described earlier our brains' motor neurons prepare to produce the proper flow of efferent 
action potentials to steer the same speech or other motor action that has just been perceived 
through senses. We seem to be 'apes' or we learn by imitating. The voices used in the common 
activities of hunting and other affairs have formed the first cases of naming the referents of 
the objects of common attention. After that occasion the used voice and sound recalls the 
situation and the referental meaning of it. The RA-model of human concepts seems to offer a 
natural base for the genesis of human language. Linguistic expressions are stored as the other 
sensory attributes of the episodes, which were lived through. This meant that words became 
symbols or representations of something earlier seen and done, which was not here and now. 
The genesis and development of individual's linguistic abilities is a function of one's 
ontogenic history. At age of two most children already speak fairly well and at four quite 
fluently and correctly the languages of their environments. And this happens without 
thousands of rules needed to produce grammatically correct linguistic expressions. The 
situation relevant use of language models, stored as the other sensory elements of the 
situations, seems really to offer a natural explanation to our linguistic abilities.  
As explained earlier, RA's concepts are dynamic and situation relevant sets of attributes 
describing and explaining the sensed in our environments. But it seems that our whole 
conceptual systems are in a continuous dynamic change process. Linguistic expressions and 
their mental referents are changing as is seen in the innumerable amounts of different dialects, 
linguistic fads, new special terms and expressions of professional groups or gangs of 
youngsters or criminals, etc. We can interpret the heard and read by the most common or the 
latest concepts and views of the being. In fact, we have to choose the conceptual frame, which 
we apply to seen or heard when moving to new area of scientific or other culture.  
Though the roots and nervous basis of our linguistic abilities are products of our phylogenic 
history, we seem to be social butterflies in our linguistic praxis. The need to be accepted by 
the other members of the community guides us to use the same or similar linguistic 
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expressions as the others do. At the same time we adopt or espouse the situation relevant 
meanings of the used linguistic expressions. This happens, as explained earlier, by processing 
a proper set of attributes to the formed memory representations of referents of the used 
linguistic expressions. 
Thus, the present state in the time-line of linguistic connections to the world is built on the 
changing past. Usually the changes are hardly noticed because they come gradually, like 
creeping in your mind. As always on the time-line the present even here is just the point 
between the past and future. We live in situations with their ongoing linguistic expressions 
and speech acts. The history lives in our minds and steers the linguistic actions we take. It 
changes little by little opening new features in the future views. The time-line in the linguistic 
expressions manifests through the inflexions of verbs and the time defining adverbs. The past, 
present, and future have their own forms in verbs in most languages.  
The future of languages seems to be formed by a continuous change, as explained above. 
New linguistic expressions and structures are found and adopted into common use. The 
builders of linguistic norms seem not to be the linguistics in universities but everybody in the 
practical everyday life at homes or in businesses and industries. The entities and the linguistic 
expressions to refer them are created in our everyday life. Even the old familiar entities can 
get new, handier, or more fashionable linguistic expressions. Our concepts are in a continuous 
change-process and so are the linguistic expressions in them. This means that our speech acts 
get new words and sentences to communicate about the happenings in our environments. 
Thus our language is as dynamic as our concepts, with which we interpret the sensed.     
 
5.6 The main Mental Dimensions of Organisational Culture 
5.6.1 Values, Norms, and Language of Culture in the RA-model  
Organisational cultures manifest in the ways its members think, speak, behave, and act and 
also in the artefacts they produce and use (Deal & Kennedy 1982, Schein 1986). I have 
discussed the mental dimensions of organisational culture briefly in my article (Martikainen, 
1986). I explicated my intuitive definition of organisational culture in Chapter 1 as follows:  
The core mental elements of organisational culture are formed by the values, 
norms, and language adopted by its members.  
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I have formulated the substance of this definition in Figure 5.5 on this page . The basic 
thought in this definition is that values control the goal orientation and the norms steer the 
performances of an individual.  
 
Thus our behaviour-models are based on these mental features of the culture we have adopted 
as members of it. The common language enables the communicative actions needed in all 
interactions in organisations. In Chapters 3, 4, and in the above sections of this chapter we 
have seen that values have the steering power on individuals' ways of thinking and acting. 
Values steer the goal-orientation and the intensity and duration of motivation to perform the 
planned activities to achieve the valued goal. This, of course, requires that the values have 
been internalised or processed as value attributes into individuals' concepts concerning the 
entities in question. 
Accordingly, norms in the RA-model are attributes in the concepts of entities describing their 
hoped-for or ought-to states of affairs, which are within acceptable limits, allowed, legitimate, 
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or some other way 'normal'. We adopt these 'norm-states' of affairs as norm-attributes on the 
time-line of our concepts of the entities in question. This adopting process is using either our 
own basic values and principles or the organisational values and norms as the judging base.  
Norms are important part of the behaviour-models our communities are mediating us through 
the roles we are given by them. Norms can concern the quality, quantity, intensity, timing, 
results, costs, productivity, profitability, etc, of our actions and activities. When our values 
and goals define the purpose and end of our action, our norms define the detailed ways and 
methods by which they are assumed to be executed. Thus, norms express the commonly or 
even officially permitted or approved performances in the direction of values. They describe 
the limits of acceptable zone of behaviour and achievements in different areas of 
responsibilities in life and interactions. 
Thus, when our values and norms subsist as attributes in our concepts and in our mental 
steering system and if they are genuinely adopted, they are also elements in the organisational 
culture, which is assumed to steer our actions. As mentioned above, the steering power of 
culture depends on the degree the advertised values and norms are internalised by the 
individuals in the organisation. Internalising in the RA-model is a process, in which a proper 
set of value attributes is processed into individual's concepts of the entities in question. As 
explained in Chapter 3, concepts – as all memory representations of entities and their 
attributes - are processed as by-products during the everyday interactions and exchanges 
between individuals and the entities in question. These processes furnish the value attributes 
only to those entities, which have really functioning resource features seen from the 
individuals' point of view. As Martinsuo (1999) has noticed, values are not implemented into 
an organisation by proclamations. In my OD-programmes, I have seen that individuals' value 
adoption and internalising can be promoted by combining the monetary and other managerial 
positive feedbacks with those entities we want to be valued.   
The mental features of our language and linguistic abilities are briefly discussed above in 
section 5.5. The importance and central role of language as one of the mental dimensions of 
cultures has been as a natural precondition in this study. In my brief article (Martikainen 
1986), I assumed that language is the third of the main mental dimensions of organisational 
culture used to steer our behaviour and actions. Language as a mental element of all cultures 
is important, because our mutual understanding depends on our ability to common 
interpretations of the meanings of the used words, special terms, and sentences and their 
contextual or situation relevant variations. As seen in Chapter 3, the meanings of words, 
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sentences, and other symbolic expressions are in the structures of our concepts, conceptions, 
and views. They in turn are processed during our communicative and other actions with the 
entities in our environments. Different types of teaching and training programmes can 
intensify the conscious elements of these processes. The end-results of learning manifest in 
the easiness of recalling a proper set of memory representations or bodily performance skills 
in planned test situations.  
 
5.6.2 Action, Behaviour Models, and Artefacts as Dimensions of Culture 
As explained above all our speech and other motor actions and our behaviour models are 
steered by our values, norms, and situation related rules of behaviour. The tools, buildings or 
their ruins, and small collections of linguistic signs are often the only manifestations of many 
ancient cultures. The tools, cloths, and buildings tell their stories easily, but some hieroglyphs 
and signs of Maya's, for example, have been hard problems for archaeologists and linguistics. 
There has not been any individuals whose memory representations and concepts have had 
those signs as linguistic attributes, which carry the conventional meanings of the signs. That's 
why it has taken so long to decipher the found linguistic information. 
I am not going more deeply into the different features of organisational culture, because they 
do not belong to the core ideas of this study, though they will form one of its main application 
areas. Understanding that the mental dimensions of our knowledge, values, norms, and 
language form the essential features of managerial work. In Figure 5.6 are some pragmatic 
areas of the problems of managing organisational culture. These areas are formed of 
materially manifesting, mental, and managerially changeable features of organisational 
culture. I am just mentioning that rules, routines, rituals, feedback systems, behaviour-models, 
and different types of artefacts are often used as tools to implement the planned changes of 
organisational cultures.  
One can start by mapping the manifesting features of organisational culture as listed in Figure 
5.6. However, the core problem of managing organisational culture is defining its mental 
essence. This means that the steering values, norms, language, rules, hopes, fears, and 
expectations of individuals and groups must be found. They must be known when planning 
the changes of the culture. They form the present state from which the new growth must start. 
The future state of culture needs a series of planning phases with all of the interest groups of 
the organisation. 
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In the implementing phase of the new organisational culture is to plan the changing tools. In 
the RA-model all concepts and their attributes are built during the actions and interaction with 
other members of the organisation. The value attributes describe the resource features of 
entities. Thus, the way individuals interact in the organisation form the basis on which the 
experienced culture is built in its members' minds. As mentioned earlier in forming 
organisational culture proclamations and lip service doesn't change anything. The power of 
change is based on the real feedbacks individuals get from the organisation and its members 
especially from their bosses and managers.  
Thus, the main tool in improving the management of an organisational culture is the 
systematic rebuilding the feedback systems on all levels of the organisation. This change 
should include a thorough training in the managerial behaviour models, which support the 
other new feedback systems. The elements of culture are formed and maintained in the course 
of interactions and exchanges between individuals and organisation.  
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6 RA-MODEL'S CONNECTIONS WITH PHILOSOPHY  
6.1 RA as Meta-Model for some Philosophical Problems 
In the postulated and abducted substance, structures, and functions of the RA-model in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I assumed that in the conquering of the unknown mental we could use the 
same analytical approach the physicists and other natural scientists have used. The afferent 
action potentials and efferent action potentials function as material interfaces between the 
human mental and his outer or inner material world. The postulated mental primitives, atoms, 
and molecules are objects of empirical neuropsychology and memory research and function as 
mental interfaces between the material and mental worlds. Different formations of them are 
used as the basis in cognitive psychology. As seen in Chapter 5, the postulated system 
structures of human memory representations, concepts, and human mind enable us to take a 
psychological grasp of the elements of the problematic theoretical entities such as knowledge, 
emotion, motivation, value, norm, language, intellect, culture, etc.    
The system model of RA's concepts and mind offers a very flexible frame of the human 
mental and for handling the different features of object entities and their descriptions. The 
recalled attributes may describe just the stereotyping or classifying features of the object 
entity or they can comprise a perfect collection of the latest scientific and best explaining 
theories of it. The set of recalled attributes seems to depend on the challenges of the situation 
one is living through and, of course, on the availability of the situation relevant memory 
representations of the objects of attention in subject's long-term memory. 
The atoms and molecules of the human mental seem to offer natural explanation grounds for 
many of the so-called eternal problems of psychology and philosophy. If we accept the reality 
of the human memory representations and their system structures as postulated in Chapters 3 
and 4, the multidimensional mental state of knowing is understandable. Depending on the 
situation and the recalled attributes the main focus of the mental state can have cognitive, 
emotional, volitive, motivational, or some special features. As seen in the previous, the 
recalled value attributes have many important functions, which seem to have had a central 
role for the survival of the human kind and other actors.  
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The ability to estimate the resource features of the objects of attention has created the primary 
qualifications for successful interactions with one's environment. Actor's memory 
representations with descriptions of entities' actual and potential resource features, now or in 
the future, carry values of the entities. Goal and situation oriented actors usually have the 
value attributes always present when the interpreting concepts are recalled. Thus cognition is 
always connected with values, emotions, and meanings although they may stay at the 
background in all familiar situations. In what follows I shall briefly discuss the four central 
content items in my four definitions when they are seen as philosophical opinions instead of 
seeing them as psychological explanations of these basic problems of human sciences.   
 
6.2 RA's True Knowledge and Epistemology 
In the Chapters 2, 3 and 4 I have postulated a preliminary draft of a system model of man, his 
concepts, and mind. Concepts and mind as formations of our memory representations and 
frames and tools for mental actions and experiencings create a set of the mental apparatuses 
we use to plan and control our everyday actions and interactions. In Chapter 5, I ventured to 
search the psychological dimensions of human knowledge seen through the RA-model and 
described in Figure 5.1. The genesis of the mental state of knowing is caused by the recalled 
concepts, which explain the meanings of the attended object entity or entities. Our working 
memory offers the mental space where the conscious and concept-based phases of these 
processes which are lived through. Thus, human knowledge is a concept-based mental state of 
experiencing and understanding the meanings of the objects of attention. They can be material 
or imagined entities or perceptions of entities or their changes in our environment. This 
analysis of the birth of the mental state of knowing is a psychological explanation of 
knowledge. It refers to the mental entity to which the term belief in the Plato's definition of 
knowledge is probably referring.  
Plato's beliefs had to be true and justified for to be valued as knowledge. These two normative 
attributes have caused most of the discussions in philosophy. The content of belief seems 
often thought to be understood without further analysis. The truth and justification of belief 
have been the main problems of philosophy. The postulations in the RA-model offer a 
possibility to view the truth and justification of the mental state of knowing from a new point 
of view. As explained earlier the sources, which can initiate or change our mental states, are 
either the sensory impulses or our mental processes and actions of thinking or imagining. In 
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any case, the descriptions of the objects of attention, which we experience, are products of the 
interpretations-processes our brain-system offers for our conscious use.  
Thus, the RA-model shows that both rationalists, such as Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, and 
empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, have been partly right in their thoughts 
about the sources of knowledge. The mental state of knowing can be caused both by our 
sensed, thought, or imagined objects of attention. Even Kant's trial to combine the two 
schools of philosophy would have succeeded better by using the postulations in the RA-
model. He thought that our sensations get their meanings through the human perception and 
understanding mechanisms, which can be fully understood by the RA-model of concepts and 
their role in perception process. If Plato and Descartes had left their ideas and spirits inside 
the creative and emergent human brain-system, the philosophers of the following millenia had 
avoided the problematic dualism of the material and spiritual.  
The reliability of the mental state depends then on the trustworthiness of the information our 
senses are encoding and the truth preserving qualities of the interpretations our brain 
processes. The RA-model of the concept of truth is presented in Figure 6.1 on page 164. Its 
base-, time-, and theory-lines analyse the concept of truth and defines it as the situation 
relevancy of the mental state of knowing. The first interpretation from afferent action 
potentials to sensations offers us a situation relevant description of our environment. This 
seems function even in advanced cases of Alzheimer disease, but the second phase of 
interpretation may be faulty. The patients have sensory information of their environments but 
the interpreting concepts are faulty or totally lacking. In the RA-model this means that the 
sensation as search attribute does not manage to recall the correct set of concepts to explain 
the sensed. Illusions are typical examples of these faults. Hallucinations are examples of 
pathological malfunctions of the central nervous system.        
If truth or truthlikeness is seen as similarity, correlation, or sameness between the experienced 
description of the object entity and the object entity as it is in reality, we can never solve the 
problem of truth and truthlikness of the experienced. Kant was partly right when maintaining 
that we do not have access to 'Das Ding an sich'. According Kant (1787 / 1986), our 
perceptions are formed by our sensations and the human ability to knowledge. As 
neuropsychology shows us, the experienced is and will always be a product of the two-phase 
of interpretations; the sensory interpretations are our sensations and the concept-based 
interpretations are our perceptions forming the concept-based conscious mental state of 
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knowing. We do not know whether these transformations from material afferent action 
potentials into experiences are truth preserving or not. 
 
As explained earlier, if we build our beliefs on the theory of evolution and believe our 
everyday experiences, we can say that these transformations into the mental state of knowing 
are in most cases situation relevant ones. The humans as a species and all other actors have 
survived by relying upon the mental states of knowing, which these transformations create as 
planning and controlling tools for our and to other actors' use. 
If the truth is seen as the reliability of linguistic expressions the same criteria can be applied. 
The information source of knowledge should be trustworthy. In most cases we just have to 
rely on the quality of our sensory on-line connections and our memory representations as 
tools for the interpretation processes our central nervous system offers us to create the mental 
state of knowing. As explained earlier, linguistic expressions are just one group of the outer 
information our senses encode to form the sensory attributes in our memory representations of 
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present entities and situations. If they recall a set of other attributes, which fit the received 
linguistic information, we can ascertain its relevance with the situation. 
 Thus, the truth seems to hide behind the transformation processes of our brain system. 
Relying on the evolutionary thinking and the results of brain research and neuropsychology, 
we can though say that our mental states of knowing are in most cases trustworthy and they 
offer situation relevant descriptions of our environment for successful interactions and 
exchanges with the entities existing and living there.  
In the mental state of knowing individuals attain concept based conception and 
understanding of the object of attention. I am assuming that individuals become conscious of 
the objects of attention when recalling concept-based descriptions about them. As explained 
earlier, consciousness can now be seen as 'concept-basedness' when forming or processing 
one's mental state of knowing. In the state of knowing individuals are then able to recognise, 
name, and comprehend the meanings and some other features of their object of attention. The 
number of attributes recalled depends on the cues, which are present and activated by the 
stimulating energy impulses subject's senses are receiving in the situation. It depends, of 
course, also of the contents of the memory representations stored in the long-term memory of 
the subject.  
The recalled attributes vary from a few stereotyping or classifying attributes to a full set of 
attributes on the time-, value-, and theory-lines of RA's concepts.  In effect, the quantity and 
quality of our knowledge is often measured by the descriptions we have acquired as attributes 
on these lines. They are results of our learning processes. As explained earlier, the attributes 
on the time-line are descriptions of object's history, present state, and of the speculated or 
hoped future states. The descriptions on the theory-line consist of descriptions of object's 
substance, structure, and functions. The attributes on the value-and meaning line are based on 
the observed features of the object. The name, visual, or audible attributes function as search 
attributes recalling first the classifying and value attributes to explain the sensed. They in turn 
are able to trigger the emotional reactions, which are strengthened by the functions of the 
endocrine glands and their secretions, like adrenaline or other types of hormones. These 
compilations of the mental, neuronal, and biochemical interactions and steering effects are 
here seen as one form of the phylogenic rationality. Their cooperative effects have optimized 
the opportunities of survival of our ancestors. They are functioning even in today's human 
beings, but it may cause some behavioural problems, if the cultural polish of values, norms, 
and habits of individuals are too thin. 
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If we see human knowledge as one of the experienced steering elements of individual's 
mental, then it must be seen in all its multi-dimensional and multi-level richness. This totality 
is on the background when individuals try to make situation relevant decisions about the 
proper ways of acting and reacting to achieve the valued end state of affairs. Situational 
relevancy is a pragmatic normativity requirement for knowledge, because this criterion 
describes its ability to help in generating the planned results. Through the decision-making 
operation, knowledge has the causal steering effect to the actor's speech and other manifesting 
motor operations. For a RA knowledge is thus a mental tool for planning, decision-making, 
and control of actions and interactions.  
Thus, in order that the experienced state of knowing or knowledge is a good and working tool, 
it should be situation relevant and enable effective actions, which can lead toward the aimed 
goals. Situation relevancy does not mean that all what matters is here and now, but all the 
short-term and the main long-term effects should be taken into account. This is made possible 
by the attributes on the time-line of actor’s concepts and by the basic values and principles, 
which are guiding individual's decision-making. 
Since Plato, knowledge has seen in philosophy as justified and true belief (Niiniluoto 1988, 
Lammenranta 1993). According to Lammenranta, belief is a mental entity called proposition. 
It is something which can be true or false and on which we can aim or address our beliefs 
(Lammenranta 1993 p. 81). In the RA-model a proposition might refer to the mental state, 
which is caused by the linguistic expression referring to the object of attention and recalling 
the situation relevant concepts explaining its meanings. Sentences usually refer to situations 
and actions or their changes and outcomes. Thus, the mental states to which sentences most 
often refer are situation and action views as explained earlier.  
This mental and unexplained 'something' is a proposition to which one can refer by using the 
popular term belief.  What propositions then really are, is left on the mercy of the interpre-
tations made with the colloquial linguistic abilities of everyman. This unknown entity is then 
used in all arguments of the truth-value and justification of our beliefs. Aren't philosophers 
running in a vicious circle when the true and justified features of the belief have been chased 
by using beliefs - or the unknown something - in their arguments? 
Thus, it looks that the ontology of the belief and knowledge is often left in a minor role in 
many philosophical studies of epistemology. One has seldom asked what is the real substance 
of belief and where and how does it exist or subsist. The real referent of the term belief has 
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been left at the mercy of everyday understanding. However, Plato's theory of knowledge was 
based on the immaterial and everlasting ideas. Their ontological position was contrasting that 
of the changing material. Thus, Plato's ontology was also part of the confirmation of the truth 
and justification of belief.  
While Plato's forms were immutable and everlasting, RA's concepts are the recalled sets of 
the features of the individuals' memory representations of the attended entities. Thus, they are 
mentally subsisting and situation related dynamic entities. We cannot observe Plato's forms, 
but we can test our memory representations and that part of them, which form the situation 
relevant set of attributes to interpret the sensed. The mental state of knowing in the RA-model 
is based on the recalled concepts and their attributes.  The recalled sets of attributes are the 
only ones, which can have their effect on our decisions. That's, why it is important to realize 
that concept and knowledge are terms, which are often referring to different mental entities.  
In the RA-model, beliefs and propositions are memory representations or situation and 
action views in the subject's mental. They can be manifested by spoken or written words and 
sentences adopted through the conventions of the communities, in which one has been living. 
They in turn are fitted with the situation related requirements, and other rules of linguistic 
practice. If we interpret the belief element of human knowledge through the RA-model – 
Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5 - we are able to build a new 'psychological epistemology'. In this 
theory of human knowledge the genesis, substance, structure, functions, and the roles of 
our concepts and memory representations have an emphasized position. This is opening a 
new set of criteria also for the normative elements of justification and truth-likeness of 
knowledge. I have explained earlier how the processual phases of sensory memory, attention, 
sensation, and concept-based perception materialize the factual and empirically testable 
elements in the formation of our mental state of knowing. When seeking the truth of our 
beliefs, one could and should first see what the empirical psychology and brain research 
already know of this mental state and its material base and components.  
When the epistemic problems are seen through the RA-model, the core of the problems are 
moved on the two transformations our brains are processing during all of our interactions with 
our environments. Our sensations as mental primitives and mental atoms function as search 
attributes, which are able to recall – in most cases - the situation relevant memory 
representations to describe and explain in detail the objects of attention. As explained before, 
the dorsal and ventral streams of the visual or other information processing exemplify our 
on-line and memory-line connections to our environment. The 'directly experienced', or the 
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sensory on line reality control, is interpreted by the remembered or the memory-stream 
which offers the conceptual explanations of the sense encoded information (Kolb & Whishaw 
1996). 
A flying swallow as well as the Formula 1 driver Mika Häkkinen needs these two - or the on-
line encoded and interpreted or the remembered - streams to process the visual information to 
catch their prey. The former is hunting insects and Mika possibly Michael Schumacher in a 
certain Formula 1 race. Mika's job may be harder, because he has to remember the detailed 
features of the racetrack, proper places of bypassing, the resources of the motor and gasoline 
tank in his car, and guess the behaviour of the hunted and possibly of the other drivers in the 
rapidly changing situations.  
This two-phased structure of our visual perceptions explains why our perceptions are 'theory 
laden' as Hanson has maintained (Hanson 1959).  The concepts of a RA have their time-, 
value-, and theory lines and so his perceptions of are always theory laden.  The RA-model 
explains why we often see what we are waiting or expecting to see; it is depending on the 
cues we are drawing from the situation we are living through without sufficient control of the 
sensed. Thus, our illusions can often be explained by this phenomenon connected with our 
perception process in which the sensed is interpreted by the concepts recalled. 
Folkpsychology has long known this human disposition to misinterpret the sensed.  From my 
adolescence years, I remember how my uncle reminded my cousin to watch twice before 
triggering the small-bore rifle to avoid shooting a pine marten instead of a squirrel. Though 
this inclination to faulty interpretations is well known, many men with red caps in Finnish 
forests have been shot as a deer or an elk.  
The theoretical entities postulated in this study seem to move the genuine problem of 
epistemology inside our heads and behind the on-line and memory-line streams, which are 
processing our sense-based information and producing the transformations between the 
material and mental. The compound processes of the dorsal and ventral streams of our visual 
information form an example of the two channels in our brain processing of our sense-based 
information. When leaning on the evolutionary theory, the survival of species seems to need 
both 'the direct' or 'the on-line' or sense-based connection to our environment and the 
memory-based interpreting connection to utilise the earlier experienced and to make the 
sensed understood.  
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When abandoning Plato's ideas and other immaterial, spiritual, or otherwise eternal entities, 
the only forum for our knowledge seems to be in our brains. Its neuronal nets form the 
material space for our memory functions. They in turn are creating the mental space, where 
we are experiencing our knowledge as concept-based interpretations of the sensed or thought 
object of attention. In this interpretation, we are using the recalled sets of attributes of our 
concepts as tools to understand the meanings of the objects of attention. Human concepts and 
SCES in the RA-model seem to be able to give a new approach and an illustrative description 
of that mental state, which we usually call human knowledge. They open slightly also the 
unexplained emergent and steering processes of our brains, which are enabling our mental life 
and rational steering of our actions.  
 
6.3 RA's Values and Axiology 
The 'Copernican revolution' of the structure and functions of human concepts in Chapter 3 
opened new possibilities to review the human mental, values included. Classes, which were 
previously often understood as concepts, became reduced into a group of classifying attributes 
on the base- and value-line of our concepts of entities. In the previous chapters, I have 
explained how the resource features of the entities determine the values of entities in the 
eyes of Rational Actors. These features are processed and stored as value attributes in 
subjects' concepts of entities. In the RA-model, concepts are the situation relevant and 
recalled sets of attributes of the memory representations of singular particulars, their 
systems, or their classes. Entities as such are not values they are then just carriers of values, 
as Ahlman (1920) has already maintained. Values are then mental and thus subjectively and 
situation relatedly experienced resource features of entities. The pragmatist - and everyman - 
finds the value of an entity by asking: 'What is its value and meaning to me?' or, 'What can it 
be used for?'  Entities, which do not have any actual or any foreseeable use, have hardly any 
value for a RA. In chapter 4 I have explained the structure of the RA's scene of experiencing 
and steering, in which the highest level of steering consists of among other things the basic 
values, norms, principles, and long-term goals. Though value attributes are processed into our 
concepts of entities, RA can consciously use his basic values and goals to determine and 
define the value attributes to the entities he has been or is interacting or confronting. 
The above concerned the values of material entities. As presented earlier, the same rules seem 
to apply even on the moral, ethical, esthetical, religious, and other values, which are built on 
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different types of theoretical entities.  Man as a social and rational actor is bound to the moral, 
religious, and even esthetical norms, which have been valid in the communities he has been 
raised and lived during his ontogenic history. Through the community's norms we are taught 
the values, which then are steering our goal settings. Even individuals' valuing of their Gods 
is based on the learned esteems and rituals used in the community one is born and raised. The 
real value of one's God is based on God's omnipotence of being the sinner's Saver from the 
earthly problems and from the hell's fire to the heavenly glory. Again, the real value seems to 
depend on the resource features of the valued entity.   
Even a subject's intrinsic valuing of oneself seems to depend on one's material and mental 
resources. The quality and quantity of resources determine the degree of freedom to act and 
fulfil oneself. Thus, both the mental and material entities are carrying their values in the 
resource attributes of their concepts. The basic values in the French Revolution were: 
Freedom, Fraternity, and Equality. Aren't they all carrying the most basic and common 
resource features for every citizen in any society?  It is easy to think that I have got lots of 
social resources if I am free to choose my education, occupation, and my way of life and have 
a society in which this is made possible by fraternal links to my fellow-citizens and the 
different institutes where I am treated in an equal way with all other members of my 
community. 
If we review the value problem through the RA-model, we can easily explain that both the 
value objectivists and value subjectivists are partly right. This depends on the fact that there 
are no values without entities carrying them and without valuing actors who need these 
entities as resource factors in their actual or future actions or metabolic processes.  The value 
attributes are always mental entities but the carriers of them can be either material or mental 
entities. The actions in which the resources are needed and used can be either mental 
operations or materially manifesting acts or activities. The most usual mental operations are 
our thinking, planning, and decision-making actions when preparing some goal oriented 
interactions with our environment. The most important mental resources are our knowledge 
and values, which are needed to do the planning and setting the criteria matrix for our choices 
and decisions.  
According to G. E. Moore's value objectivism, values and goodness are like colours, special 
properties of entities. They can be 'sensed' only by an 'autonomous moral faculty', like colours 
can be seen by our eyes' visual abilities. Moore maintained that values couldn't be reduced to 
material entities. Moore's 'autonomous faculty' and the anti-reductionistic position can be 
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understood by the RA-model, in which values are processually formed attributes in subjects 
concepts and then often unconsciously built properties explaining object's resource features 
seen from the point of view of the subject and his actual and/or potential future actions. 
The RA-model explains the basis of the naturalistic way of seeing values. There are as many 
values as there are needs. As we saw in Chapter 5, there are as many needs as there are 
actions and processes because in each of them we need and use different kinds of resources. 
All lacking resources are experienced as a need of the failing resource factor. Thus, the most 
natural way of classifying values and needs is to do it along with the main areas of actions and 
processes in which individuals are involved by their phylogenic and ontogenic histories. As 
explained earlier, the RA's main areas of needs and values are based on the metabolic, social, 
and rational dimensions of his processes and actions.  
Hume's Guillotine rejects the possibility of logical deducing the ought from the is, or a 
norm from a description. In our everyday decisions and actions we do not use Hume's logic 
at all. Our goal orientation seems to be based on the value attributes our brain processes have 
formed into our concepts of all the situations and entities we have encountered and interacted 
during our ontogenic histories. As Rational Actors we simply infer that unsatisfactory 
situations can and must be changed and that the change can be done in a way, which means a 
betterment of their resources and thus a promotion in their living conditions. We seem always 
and in each situation to be able to say what is the direction of improvement of present. RA's 
creative imagination and his value attributes seem to be the mental tool to break down these 
old and much discussed beliefs in the philosophy of David Hume. Everyman's logic is his 
systematic way to solve practical problems and it seems to be different from that of Hume.  
For human actors the situation one is living through or the experienced 'is' seems always to be 
a valued object of attention. Entities have their value attributes because these are processed 
into the concepts of entities. Entities have always their resource features in the eyes of actors. 
Man as an actor is always future oriented being. The future states of entities are formed by 
increased quantity and/or quality of resources.  Thus, even all descriptions seem to be value 
classified and then norm set from the individual's point of view.  One can ask if it is possible 
for a human being to experience a value- and norm free entity or situation. If not, then the 
Hume's rule has not much use in human life. It seems that we do not use and need Hume's rule 
at all, because we continuously are braking it by applying our values and norms, which are 
processed into our concepts of entities.  
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The histories of the evolutionary changes of species and those of sciences and nations give 
strong evidence that all revolutions and even evolutions in nature, sciences, and societies have 
been created by this everyman's logic of decision making and acting. Individuals, groups, and 
communities have – through all the human evolution - had the idea that, creative thinking and 
goal oriented and cooperative activities can change the unsatisfactory states of affairs. 
Otherwise, we hardly had survived as a species. Of course, Hume was right in a way, because 
the resources, which have secured man's survival and increased his well being, have carried 
man's natural and leading values. But you can ask like Moore that do they represent the 
absolute good? This question is an inessential one in the long run, because all organic life in 
our planed Earth will be burned into gases when our Sun turns into a red giant. Thus, 
knowledge, power, money, good relations, and different kinds of Gods are examples of the 
resources, which advance the survival and well being of individuals and their communities. 
They seem to be carrying the basic values of most actors in our Globe.  
 
6.5 RA's Values and Norms and the Problem of Ethics. 
When confronting with ethical questions, RA is a pragmatist, who thinks that the goodness 
and badness of actors or the rightness and wrongness of their actions can be judged by the 
effects and/or consequences they have on the objects of their actions and the interest groups 
of them. Then, the effects are always seen from some interested subject's or his community's 
point of view.  RA evaluates the other actor's actions in accordance with the norms, values, 
and principles to which he is accustomed. RA judges both norms and consequences according 
to their effects on the resource features of the objects of actions. As explained above, for the 
RA, the resource features of entities form their values. RA's norms describe the accepted 
qualities and quantities of performances in the direction of the adopted values and principles. 
The productivities of work, capital, material, and time are important values of any business 
company. The competitiveness of a business company is a function of the level of the total 
productivity of these production factors.  
Thus, norms are the tools with which communities teach their members the pragmatic 
meanings of their values. As explained in Chapter 4, norms are mediated to individuals by the 
roles given to them by the other members of the communities, in which one is and has been 
living. Usually, the role consists of besides the norms of behaviour and actions, also the 
responsibilities and rights of the individual. Roles are usually adopted during the interactions 
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between the members of communities. In the systematic and participative organisational 
development work, the individuals themselves, guided by their managers, elaborate their roles 
and explicate them in written form. 
Resources form the necessary conditions for the RA's' survival and well-being. Thus, the RA's 
ethical thinking is based on values, which describe the resource features of entities. 
Consequently, actions, which increase or safeguard subjects and his/her communities' actual 
or potential resources, and do it without unbalanced exploiting the resources of other's, are 
good actions. Analogically, actions, which decrease or damage the subject's or his/her 
communities' resources, or which unashamedly exploit the resources of other's are bad ones. 
If all the individuals on our Globe could adopt RA's ethical thinking, Global ethics would get 
its beginning toward a balanced exchange and interactions between individuals and nations. 
This may take some time, because the discussion of the need of global ethics has hardly begun 
(Kung & al. 1993). 
The RA's naturalistic ethics seems to have similar features as the virtue ethics of Aristotle. 
Good actions are based on good values, which steer them. And doing good deeds one learns 
the good values. RA's ethics avoids the extremities both of the utilitarian ideas and the 
Kantian universally binding Categorical Imperative. It accepts that human beings are formed 
by the evolutionary processes as social individuals, who must take care first of themselves and 
their communities. The mental growth of individuals to see themselves as inhabitants of the 
one and same Globe using the globally adopted values and norms as criteria of their decisions 
and actions is a gigantic challenge for the whole of humankind and may take some hundreds 
or thousands of years.  
For the RA, the good as such does not exist it only subsist as a resource attribute of actions 
and their consequences as explained above. The goodness of a knife is based on its sharpness 
as George Henrik v. Wright has explained (Wright 1963, 2001). To be more exact, the 
goodness of entities is based on the value attributes on the base- and value-line of their 
concepts. Sharpness is one of the good features or resource features of a knife; its bluntness is 
an anti-resource factor and then a feature of badness causing difficulties and harm. 
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6.5 Semantics, Semiotics, Meanings, and RA's Concepts  
As seen in the previous, the RA-model of concept offers simple and universal descriptions 
and explanation of signs, symbols, linguistic expressions, and their referential and value-
based meanings. Any materially manifesting entity can act as a sign if and only if its memory 
representation is processed as one of the sensory attributes of the memory representation and 
concept of the entity whose sign it is agreed to function. This rule concerns also all written or 
spoken linguistic signs and symbols and then all words and sentences. Thus, signs, symbols, 
and sentences get their referential meanings through conventions. They are processed and 
stored in the memory representations and concepts of the members of the community. 
The universality of languages seems to be based on these features of the RA's concepts. Any 
set of phonemes, graphemes, words and connectives can be agreed to symbolise a certain 
entity commonly known to the members of the convention creating and using community. 
This feature of RA's concepts explains the big variety of written and spoken languages and 
the continuous dynamics of them. This feature explains also the difficulties anthropologists 
and linguistics have had in finding, for example, the meanings of the hieroglyphs of Egyptians 
or stories hidden in Maya signs. There is no people and no minds having these signs as 
sensory attributes of their concepts of the referents of them.  
As presented in Chapter 5, the sentences have their referental meanings often in RA's 
situation and action views. Sentences usually describe situation, actions, events, or different 
kinds of happenings, in which several participants may be involved. The easiness of under-
standing the heard or read sentences depends on the recalled set of situation and action views. 
They in turn are formed of situation relevant sets of world-, role-, resource-, action views, 
which materialize the real options to act or react in the situation. This concerns also the 
communicative listening and speech actions. Thus, the substance of human language and the 
ontology and basis of semiotics and semantics is found in man's memory representations and 
their situation relevant use as concepts. They are creatively used as mental tools built on 
individuals' memory functions situated in his/her long-term memory and working memory of 
the human brain system. Signs, words, and sentences get their referential meanings through 
our concepts.   
Besides the referential meanings, words and sentences have often value-based meanings. As 
seen in the previous, these meanings are carried by value attributes of the concepts of the 
objects to which the words and sentences are referring. In fact, these value attributes describe 
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the resource features of the object entity, as explained earlier. The resource features of entities 
are RA's values and they are dynamic, situation, plan, action, and need related properties of 
the object entity. We all know the everyday expression of entities' value and meaning. It 
seems to refer to this universal referent of their combined existence and subsistence; all values 
need a carrier and these 'value-meanings' are based on the resource features of the object 
entity carrying them. It seems to be difficult to find other values in our World. As mentioned 
earlier even the basic values of the French Revolution such as liberty, fraternity, and equality 
can be seen as the basic resources of every member of each nation and community. 
 
6.6 The Mental Atoms of RA's Concepts and Universals  
The analysis of concepts into its sense-based and structural attributes in Chapter 3 opened 
new tools to approach the philosophical problems of universals. In the RA-model, universals, 
such as classes, properties, redness, relations, Plato's ideas, etc. are mental or experienced 
entities, because they do not manifest in the observable material world. Thus, they can be 
either mental primitives - which are sense-based and sensed properties of material entities - or 
theoretical entities formed by definitions using other, already known concepts. Mental 
primitives are qualities of experiences, which our brain-system produces as the first and 
unanalyzed interpretations of the sense-coded afferent action potentials. They can be called 
universals, because they are produced by the phylogenically formed neuronal system and are 
possibly 'similar' to all members of a species. The names of these primary experiences are, of 
course, conventions valid in the community, whose members have jointly had them. 
The redness of a tomato and redness as such are examples of mental primitives though the 
name of the experienced is convention bound.  Motherhood is an example of a theoretical 
entity called relation, which in this case refers to the relation between two particulars, 
between a mother and a child. Common nouns are referring to universals like car, dog, house, 
man etc., which in fact are referring to a collection of classifying attributes or classes of these 
entities. Classes in the RA-model are theoretical entities formed of sets of attributes, which 
are describing the most common features of the particulars, which are – usually by convention 
- included to the class in question, as explained in Chapter 3. Classes can, of course, have 
their Carnapian intensions and extensions. In the RA-model intensions are formed of the 
selectively common features of the entities belonging to the class. The extensions are formed 
of the entities, which can be included to the class. In the RA-model they are naturally 
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processed features of our memory representations and concepts. Aristotle's universals were 
'shared attributes' which were arrived through experiences as RA's universals are.  
 
6.7 The RA-model and Intentionality 
 According to the RA-model, man is a situation and goal-oriented actor aiming and intending 
to the survival and well being as an individual and as a representative of humankind. Situation 
orientation is the normal mental state of any RA. As explained earlier, it has also been a 
necessary condition for man's survival and well being. The RA's concepts and views consist 
always of descriptions of the future states on the time-line of the concepts of all of the 
important entities in one's environment. There are descriptions of the future states in the time-
lines of one's roles, resources, actions, and oneself as a person. The values and norms, which 
one has adopted during one's ontogenic history, steer the setting of the attributes describing 
the proper future states of entities in one's environment and the views concerning oneself. 
Intentionality is thus a natural feature in RA's thinking and in the overt behaviours and 
actions. RA's actions have always a goal; they are purposing to a certain and valued end-state 
within an acceptable time limit. Thus, the RA is always time- and goal oriented or intentional 
in his/her actions. 
Man's intentionality seems to be a product of man's phylogenic history. The variations of 
weather and temperature along with seasons and between day and night have forced to learn 
the calendar for planning and acting in the proper time. Those who learned these basic 
features of intentionality survived, others not. Even to day the leading industrial countries are 
situated in the northern hemisphere, where the heavy changes in seasonal weather enforced 
one to learn the time scheduling early in the history of mankind. The degree and effectiveness 
of purposing and timing seems to be, at least partly, in our genes. However, the modern life 
with its calendar bound arrangements forces everybody to some level goal-orientation or 
intentionality and regularity in one's way of living. Nevertheless, the main source of man's 
intentionality is in the structure of his/her concepts and the future states of entities on their 
time-lines. They are forming our mental states toward some situation relevant goal and giving 
our thoughts and actions a meaningful intention and purpose.  
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6.8 RA's Consciousness  
6.8.1 Consciousness as Concept-Based Mental State  
Consciousness is RA's mental state, which is caused or created by the emergent processes of 
the human peripheral and central nervous systems. Of course, it is and will be a continuous 
problem area for neuropsychology and brain researchers how this transformation process 
really happens. I have used the dorsal and ventral streams - found in our brain's processes 
when they handle our visual afferent action potentials - as an example of how our sensations 
and perceptions are formed. The modern memory research can anyway show us that all our 
mental experiences need normally functioning memory processes and most of the mental 
phenomena can get an understandable though metaphorical explanation through our concepts 
and memory representations. Thus the human mental can be a natural and realistic object of 
memory research and introspective ponderings. If the research of consciousness is aiming at 
explanation of the emergent transformation processes in our brains while the afferent action 
potentials are interpreted as our experiences and in which our thoughts are transformed into 
the efferent action potentials steering our speech and other motor actions we still have to wait 
some hundreds of years.  
In the RA-model, consciousness refers to a mental state in which the individual's processes of 
sensory memory, attention, sensation, perception, and knowing function normally. The 
subject is then able to perceive, know, and understand the objects, changes, and happenings in 
one's environment. Consciousness is thus closely related with the mental state of knowing. 
This relationship is clearly shown in the Finnish terms referring to these states. Consciousness 
is 'tietoisuus' in Finnis. This term is derived from the term 'tieto' = knowledge. Thus, the 
Finnish terminology connects consciousness to knowledge. The same connections can be 
found in English, if we go back to Latin etymology of the terms. As I mentioned earlier, the 
English terms consciousness and knowledge can be related by remembering that knowledge is 
a mental state in which one finds the meanings of the object of attention through the process 
of concept-based experiencing. Thus, consciousness can be defined as the 'concept-
basedness' of one's mental state.  Concept-basedness is a mental state, in which you know 
and, for example, name, classify, and understand the meanings of the perceived objects of 
attention. This happens through the recalled and situation relevant attributes describing the 
important features of the object. 
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Of course, this mental state presumes that your brain system is working normally and you are 
not experiencing illusions or hallucinations. In the RA-model, this means that both the on-line 
stream and the memory-line function and bring the proper set of concepts and their attributes 
into one's SCES or mind to explain the sensed objects. If the memory-line does not function 
properly, as in many cases of Alzheimer disease, one can be aware of one's environment 
through sensations but does not understand the sensed. In the previous chapters, I have 
outlined the degrees of consciousness from pre-awareness of our sensory memory or the 
mental primitives, awareness of sensations or of the mental atoms, and consciousness of our 
concept-based perceptions, which is thus leading to the mental state of knowing. Concept-
based perceptions function as our mental molecules, which are usually built of many 
concepts, which in turn can consist of many combinations of mental atoms or sense based and 
structural attributes describing the different features of the object. 
 
6.8.2 Dennet's Consciousness Model 
Daniel C. Dennett's book Consciousness Explained (1991) had this very promising name. 
However, Dennett's search for naturalized explanation of consciousness via his Multiple 
Drafts model in this book ends - as Dahlbom (1993/1995) finds out - "with the declaration 
that our attempts to understand consciousness is a search for illuminating metaphors".  Antti 
Revonsuo in his dissertation work (1995) sees that Dennett's (1991, 1992) Multi Drafts Model 
does not give any explanation to the core-problem of consciousness.  Dennett himself notes in 
his Consciousness Explained on pages 454 and 455 that he has not managed to explain 
consciousness with something unconscious. He has only presented a new set of metaphors 
instead of the Cartesian Theatre with its central material locus in pineal gland. However, he 
sees that our metaphors are our tools for thinking. From that we could infer that better 
metaphors lead to better thinking. 
Dennett seems to confuse our awareness of sensations and our conscious perceptions. Our 
perceptions are based on situation relevant set of concepts and their attributes, which build us 
the understood experiences of the sensed. Dennett spends lots of pages to postulate Orwellian 
and Stalinesque demons to make the Φ-phenomenon understood. Kohler's colour Φ-
phenomenon (Koehler and von Grűnau 1976, p. 330) manifests when two round green and red 
spots seem to jump and change their colour during the jump from one spot to other. This 
seems to happen though there are in reality two different spots lighted alternately and staying 
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in two different positions. In the RA-model our conscious perceptions are triggered by the 
sensory attributes of an entity and our brains produce us an understandable visual or audible 
explanation of the sensed. The colour Φ-phenomenon can be understood by the normal 
processual phases we have in all of our perceptions. In the evolutionary processes a running 
or flying prey has changed colour when being in the sunlight or in the shadow or behind of 
trees. For our brains a moving and colour changing entity is the most natural explanation of 
the sensed. Consciousness is also the most natural mental state caused by the on-line dorsal 
and the memory-line ventral streams of processing the encoded visual information. I am 
assuming the analogical double streams are in use in all sensory channels. It can be studied 
scientifically by the cognitive memory research. The research of the transformations from the 
material afferent action potentials to the mental and vice versa into efferent action potentials 
is another area of future brain research. It may take some time before the material bases of 
these ontological transformations are really understood. 
 
6.9 Can Philosophy be naturalized through Memory Research?  
As seen through the above examples, the RA-model seems to be able to give new points of 
view to some of the age-old problems of philosophy. The postulated and testable structures 
and functions of our concepts, memory representations, and our scene of experiencing and 
steering are able to produce a naturalistic psychological descriptions and explanation of many 
philosophical problems. The more we get testable knowledge of the structures and functions 
of our mental dimensions and their connections with the processes of our central nervous 
system, the better the models of the mental can be developed. The structure of our mental 
atoms conveying the meanings of entities can probably be adjusted with the results of brain 
research and neuropsychology. The same concerns the model of the scene of experiencing and 
steering, which serves as the mental space for our experiences. The structures and functions of 
our working memory seem to be bound with the structures and functions of our brains’ 
neuronal nets and their system effects. When we learn to understand them better, we possibly 
learn to comprehend more fully also the human mental. However, as explained above, even 
all empirical research come on the boarder of the known and unknown and then you need the 
philosophical contemplations and metaphors about the necessary presumptions and postu-
lations to form hypotheses, which then can be tested.  
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7 RA'S SELF, I, AND ACTION REVIEWED 
7.1 RA's I, Me, Self, Identity, and Personality 
Before reviewing the first intuitive definition of this study, the definition of human action, I 
am going to recall briefly the used conceptions of man as a rational actor and the different 
features of his agency. As explained earlier RA's agency is based on his value-based long-
term thinking, goal-oriented planning and decision-making, and situation relevant use of 
available resources in implementations of plans. In the RA-model I is an actor who can form 
an image of his environment and him-self only by using the memory representations of them 
as tools and objects of attention. To speak about Self and Me means, in fact, that there is an 
actor, I, who observes him-self and as the results of these findings forms an image of him-self 
and his material and mental dimensions and other qualities. Person and personality are terms 
whose referents are individual actors with their special mental and biological features and 
behaviour models, often as seen by others. The contents of them are built of their views of the 
world, their roles, resources, situation relevant actions and reaction, and the achievements and 
successes through these actions. Individual's personality manifest for others through their 
actions and interactions. 
In the RA-model, self, person, personality, and I are implicitly in the contents of chapters 
two, three, and four. I am not going to discuss these theories here but want just to mention 
that they can be seen as dimensions of RA's agency. Carl Roger's personality theory and 
William James' I-self and Me-self can easily be understood against the RA's meta-model of 
mans mental structures and functions. When RA plans and makes decisions by using his 
SCES and its frames formed by his world-, resource-, role-, and situation-and action views, 
he, in fact, sees himself as an actor and individual person in a certain situation with the 
abilities and resources which are in his position or otherwise usable. His conceptions of his 
roles, resources, and practical know-haws as an actor form the main areas of his self-image 
and identity as explained in chapter 4 and Figures 4.1 to 4.5. Our self-image is then also a 
product of our brains memory functions and our abilities to use them as tools in our mental 
operations. Successes in one's endeavours create the feeling of a good control of oneself and 
one's relations and exchanges with the other actors. These successes function as feedbacks 
and form an important part of our conception of what we can and what we really are.  
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7.2 The Main Dimensions of Human Actions 
Human actor and his actions form a huge object of research and it can be approached by a 
multitude of the human sciences and from their different points of view. In its totality, this 
study has been aiming at a preliminary outlining of the mental steering system of an 
individual's actions. I see it central, because even in organisations and communities the 
individual actors are the decision makers who determine what resources are used and how 
these resources are used in a certain situation relevant action. In this chapter, I am returning to 
the first intuitive definition. I am trying to deepen the intuitive definitions of actor and his 
actions in Chapter 1. The intuitive definition of action gave the original impulse to the other 
intuitive definitions of this study. Instead of going deeply in the processes of all the elements 
of human actions, I am going to review briefly the concept of action. This can be seen as an 
embryo of a psychological theory of the human action. It can possibly be used as basis for a 
wider research of human actions. Going through the system structure of the concept of action 
offers at the same time a brief repetition of the main issues of this study.  
The idea, in Chapter 1, was to see human action as goal oriented use of resources steered by 
actor's mental planning and decision-making activities. This definition initiated the work that 
lead to the postulations of the system structures of human concepts and human steering 
system with its SCES as a memory-based model of human mind. The universal features of 
these basic elements of human mental in turn offered new tools to analyse the other intuitive 
definitions and some of the eternal psychological and philosophical problems, which was 
done in Chapters 5 and 6. These tools enabled the analysis of actor's knowledge, motivation, 
and the mental dimensions of organisational culture like values, norms, and language.  
The above elements seemed to play the central role when trying to understand the human 
mental and human actors as individual decision makers and as members of different types of 
organisations and communities. The RA-model seems to show that man as an individual is a 
mentally steered biological and social actor, whose rationality is based on his personal value-, 
norm-, knowledge- and skill-bases formed during his ontogenic history. These bases and 
stores offer individuals, in most case, a situation relevant set of mental tools for different 
applications although they are under a continuous and dynamic change and development 
process. 
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7.3 The Base-and Value-line of Action 
In what follows, I shall make an analysis of the concept of action by using the system model 
of memory representations and concepts, which I illustrated in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3. I am 
going to use the steering factors of action, which I described in the situation and action view 
in Figure 4.4, in chapter 4. The model in Figure 4.4 explains the main planning elements of an 
individual working on his own or his community’s or organisation’s strategic and operational 
plans of future actions. Of course, the contents of the elements vary greatly depending on the 
level of action. If the elements are seen as areas of an individual's mental operations, we are 
studying his adaptation process to the changing situations in everyday life. On the level of an 
organisation, the process consists of large number of specialists collecting and analysing the 
information connected with the different areas of planning and decision-making. As 
mentioned earlier the decision-maker is always an individual, which justifies to review action 
and its steering processes here from an individual’s point of view.   
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Figure 7.1 on the previous page offers a condensed delineation of the main elements of the 
concept and theory of action. I shall use it and its base-, time-, and theory-lines to recall 
briefly the main ideas of the substance of the action of a human individual who usually is 
member of several communities and organisations. I shall use the elements of the situation 
and action view to examine some areas of the concept's lines. Thus, the actor is seen to be 
bound in his actions to the values, norms, duties, and rights, which are elements of the roles 
he is given by those communities of which he is a member. The system model of concept is a 
way to integrate the mental and material features of the human action. I see it as a useful tool 
when researching the human actions in organisations.  
As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the RA-models of the human concept and steering system offers 
a natural explanation to some of psychological and philosophical problems, which are always 
present in the practical managerial work in organisations and in the research work practiced in 
the human sciences. These models enable us also to review some of the psychological features 
of the strategical management. Even if strategy is mostly seen on the level of the whole 
organisation, the strategic thinker and planner is always an individual who makes the 
decisions. If strategy is seen as a set of decisions and principles guiding all the interactional 
operations between individuals or organisations and their environments, so every individual is 
a planner and maker of his own strategical decisions. In an organisation, these decisions are 
based on the information, which often is compiled by a large number of specialist groups 
gathering, analysing, classifying, and storing all the situation relevant knowledge, which is 
seen as necessary to solve the actual problems and to select the assumedly successful 
direction of operations. Still the decision maker is an individual, whose mental world must 
cover the total picture of the different factors. A set of proper models can make this 
complicated task somewhat easier. 
 
7.3.1 The Value-Attributes of Human Action 
The upper square on the Base- and Value-line of the concept of action refers to values of 
human actions. As assumed in the basics of this study Man is an actor, whose survival and 
well being are totally depending on his abilities and possibilities to react and interact in 
situation relevant way in the changing environment. As shown earlier RA's ability to act 
depends on the availability of situation relevant mental and material resources. The resource 
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features of entities are so central for RA's survival and well being that RA seems to see all his 
values through this resource grid. Entities, which do not have any use in the foreseen future, 
have hardly any value for RA. Actions in turn get their values through the achieved results 
and through their potential abilities to be or to create resources for actual and future actions. 
The ability and freedom to act along with one's own preferences is often experienced as one 
of the main values in human life. Freedom was one of the three values of the French 
revolution. Even the two other values have their connections to resources. Brotherhood refers 
to social resources and equality to individuals' rights to get the same treatment or the same 
portion of the common goods as all the other members of one's communities. 
 
7.3.2 The Sensory Attributes of RA's Actions 
The central square on the base- and value-line of RA's actions consists of nine elements. 
There are six areas of descriptions, which we get 'directly' through the on-line connections 
offered by our senses and the sensational interpretations of the sense-encoded afferent action 
potentials. These interpretations are our sensations, which vary from visual, auditory, 
olfactory, gustatory, and tactile to motor descriptions of the objects of our attention. In the 
middle square is the name of the action and linguistic descriptions of the seen and 
experienced. These descriptions may be used or expressed by other actors and heard by the 
subject. They may also be created by the subject's inner speech actions explaining the 
experienced. Thus, we can see how the linguistic expressions form a natural part of the sense-
based descriptions of the set of observable episodes and happenings stored as the sensed of 
the experienced. Thus, linguistic expressions function as ostensive definitions of entities. The 
same concerns the observed changes and actor's own and other's reactions to it. They get also 
situation relevant linguistic descriptions in their memory representations. 
The situation and action view, in Figure 4.4, offers the model to review the mental 
explanations we recall when observing the events and happenings in our environments. We 
try to understand the seen actors and their doings by recalling their backgrounds, world-views, 
the roles and goals they possibly have taken, and the other situational factors. Thus, all our 
perceptions of the elements of an action are 'theory-laden' as mentioned earlier. We live 
through the sensed via the situational views we recall.  
The situation and action model was briefly discussed in Chapter 4. I have used it as material 
in my seminars connected with OD-programs in organisations. It is a total frame of pragmatic 
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strategic and operational planning systems. The problems and tasks it is addressing are the 
same also on the individual level, though the resources to work on each of them are very 
different when working on the level of an organisation. When planning our speech or other 
actions we have to observe the situation and its threats and opportunities, our role and 
resources, the roles of other participants and their resources before deciding about the goals 
and the actions we are going to perform. 
 
7.3.3 The Classifying Attributes of Action 
RA's own actions, actions of others, as well as all interactions with other actors in his 
environment are classified by furnishing their memory representations or concepts with 
classifying attributes describing their qualities and meanings to the subject in different 
situations. As explained earlier, actions and actors are good if and only if they bring about an 
increase or advancement of subject’s or his communities’ material and/mental resources. 
They are bad if they cause a decrease or destroy subject’s and his communities’ resources.  
Rational actors seem to be consequence-oriented in their ethical and moral classifications. The 
other set of criteria for classifying actions is based on their rationality and success of reaching 
the aimed goal state of affairs. Actions can be classified also by the system they are steered.  
On the scene of experiencing and steering - Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4 - the steering of RA's 
actions are divided on four main levels starting from the reflexive level of steering and 
ascending through the model use and model creating levels to the fourth level where the basic 
values and principles are sometimes put under a change pondering. 
 
7.4 The Time-line of Action 
7.4.1 The Genesis and History of Action 
Already Aristotle said about action and its origin: "The origin of action - its efficient, not its 
final cause - is choice and that choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end" (Aristotle 
1980 p.139).  This sentence consists of the same main elements of the steering of action, 
which form the contents of the time-line of human action. There are the goal, planning, and 
decision-making, which are the mental elements of any action. Aristotle continues: "This is 
why choice cannot exist either without reason or without a moral state" According Aristotle, 
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action is always aiming at something good, be it the product of the action or the action itself. 
This point of view of action brings the ethical points of view to any action, because actions 
are also seen as interactions and exchanges between members of the producing or performing 
community and its environment. Thus, the values and moral rules valid in the community or 
society have or should have their steering effects on human actor's operations and behaviour. 
There are always dissidents who have not adopted – or even never taught - the values and 
norms of the community.  
Planning is the human method to move on the time-line of actions. As explained earlier, the 
present is seen through the experienced history and the hoped future. The pragmatic rules of 
causality or the experienced consequences of our doings guide our thinking and actions. The 
if- then-logic is everyman's logic in planning one's actions. Often our actions get their genesis 
and timing via the daily, weekly, and annual programmes to which we have committed 
ourselves. The other group of initiators are our needs based on the lack of metabolic or mental 
balance. The anticipated end-states of actions function often as the initiators and motivators of 
our activities.  
 
7.4.2 The Present of Action 
The present is in fact a moment between the history and the hoped or planned state of affairs 
in the future. The situation analysis consists, besides the state of affairs, as they are perceived, 
of the assumed actions and reactions of the other actors to the prevailing situation and its 
changes. The available resources and possibilities of their use and control are the defining 
factors when deciding over the execution of any action. Thus, it is easy to understand, why the 
ready-made models of action are used whenever there are any situation relevant ones 
available as explained in Chapter 4. 
 
7.4.3 The Future achieved by Action    
The planned future state affairs of individuals are based on their values. As explained earlier, 
human actors are value-oriented. When RA's values are formed by the real or thought 
resource features of entities, rational actors seem to be resource oriented in their value 
settings. As explained earlier, even the deeply spiritual and religious values seem to serve us 
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as resource factors of the entities we have postulated in our mental through the beliefs and 
doctrines to which we have been exposed during our ontogenic histories. The humans seem to 
be model-learners and adapters both on the bodily and on the mental areas of actions. 
 
7.5 The Theory-line of Action 
7.5.1 The Substance of Action 
As all concepts, also the concept of action has on its theory-line brief descriptions of the 
ontological status of action and descriptions of its structure and functions. The virtual dualism 
of action is unobservable when its mental steering system is hidden behind the materially 
manifesting performances, which can be, for example, different kinds and combinations of 
speech or other motor action. Thinking, planning, and decision-making are examples of 
purely mental actions. Even they have their material base in the processes of our brains' 
neuronal nets and in the lasting changes in their molecular structures. Thus, both the mental 
and material elements of the steering processes are always present in all structural and 
functional features of actions, which I shall briefly describe in what follows. 
 
7.5.2 The Structure of Action 
In this chapter, I have retuned to the intuitive definition of action, which was presented in the 
first introductive part of this study. The structure of the processes of action and activities - 
describing at the same time the functions of them  - are combined of the following three 
processes, which consists of:  
o Processes of goal seeking and defining, 
o Implementation, and 
o Utilization of results 
These processes are formed of the mental and also of the materially manifesting tools and 
equipment as elements and bodily performances of actions.  
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The processes of goal seeking and defining process consists of the conscious and/or tacit 
mental steering processes of the actor's brain-system ensuring the situation relevant 
executions of the actions. This process in turn is combined of subprocesses of information 
collecting, checking, and storing, another process of planning, decision-making, and 
controlling with their systems and techniques. In these activities one needs the third process 
of steering. This process consists of the interactions between the actor and his environment. It 
is leading to the exchange of material and/or information. These exchanges form also the 
feedback tools, which can, if properly used, formulate the organisational culture with its 
values, norms, and language.  
This brief analysis of the definition of the main elements of action, have proved to be a useful 
aid in all the management-consulting assignments in which I have been participating. I am 
assuming that these elements of action can be found on all levels of action hierarchy from 
strategic planning to the execution of the simplest repetitive routine performances on the shop 
floor level of a production line or on the interactions in the service business.  Of course, the 
goals, resources, and the system of steering varies considerably when moving from level to 
another, but these basic invariances of goals and steered use of resources can always be found.  
In this study, I have concentrated on the problem of steering or directing and on the role of 
individual's knowledge, values, and language in it. I have thus limited the object of my 
research on those items, which really are connected with the directing of individual’s actions. 
I am seeing man as a rational actor, RA, though his rationality may sometimes look rather 
limited. 
The RA-model with models of human concepts and mind enables us to review Man's actions 
and their steerability from new point of view.  In Chapter 5, I have explained how human 
knowledge, values, norms, motivation, and language are connected with human concepts. 
They form at the same time the mental dimensions of organisational culture. Concepts as 
recalled sets of our memory representations are the tools of which our mental processes create 
our states of knowing, feeling, choosing, etc. In Chapter 4 Figure 4.4, I presented an analysis 
of RA's situation based action orientation, in which I am using the system model of RA's 
concept as a basis. It illustrates the basic substance of Man showing that he is a mentally 
steered actor operating in the material world.  
 190
 
7.5.3 The Functions of Action         
Man's survival and well being has always depended on his ability to plan and execute his 
action in a situation relevant way. His actions' situation relevancy is based on the analysis of 
the proper cases of his world-, role-, resource-, and potential action views before deciding 
how to proceed to solve the actual problem by a rational way. His situation analysis 
culminates in a SWOT-analysis, in which he the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats are scrutinized, when forming the options of a proper goal setting for the necessary 
actions. The decision of a valuable and possible goal is then steering the selections of 
resources the ways they are used and controlled, and ways the results are divided between the 
interest groups of the action.  
The degree in which the above logic of steering is used in individuals' decision making varies 
extensively. A managing director in a big business company may have several groups of 
specialists collecting, analysing, organising the information, and explaining the ways it can be 
interpreted in changing situations when connected with the different areas of the above 
analysis of action. Still, he must make the decisions as an individual who is responsible and 
must consider the opportunities and threats of all of his choices.  
As explained earlier, individual's ability to interpret the sensed information depends on his 
situation relevant concepts, which can be recalled to make the information understood and 
then form a part of his knowledge base. Thus, individual's preparedness for decisions and 
actions is always at the mercy of one's knowledge base or the availability of situation relevant 
concepts to interpret the sensed information. The problem of steerability is then intimately 
connected with our concepts and our abilities to explain them in a situation relevant way. The 
steering mental powers seem to be created and maintained by the resource features of the goal 
states of affairs. Thus the value attributes of entities steer our motivational states and their 
durability. Another steering effect comes - as explained earlier - from the adopted norms of 
individuals. Human actions are then value oriented and norm controlled use of available 
resources to achieve the planned goals. 
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8 THE RA-MODEL'S USABILITY IN HUMAN SCIENCES 
The original idea when I built the RA-model was to find the mental core features of the 
human action, knowledge, motivation, and organisational culture. The common core was 
found in the memory-based and situation relevant structures and functions of concepts. As 
seen in the previous they opened a new way to view the above eternal questions of 
psychology, philosophy, and managerial development work. Besides these questions I had to 
use the RA-model to examine the concepts of values, norms, and language, which I found to 
form the main mental dimensions of organisational and all human cultures. The basic features 
of RA-model are 'universal' in the sense that the problems and theories connected with the 
human mental dimensions can be approached by using it. The research-strategy in the RA-
model is, in fact, based on two principles: 
1. In the fact-based RA-model the problems of two postulated transformations from the 
material into the mental and vice versa are seen to be out of the scope of this study. I have 
left their solutions to the future researchers of the human brain, neurophysiology, and 
neuropsychology. These areas of research may little by little open the secrecies of how the 
experienced or the phenomenal world is created by our central and peripheral nervous 
systems. Examples of these are the findings of the dorsal and ventral streams and the 
mirror neurons as told previously. The more we know what the causal effects of the 
neurotransmitters and other chemicals and the system effects in our neuronal systems the 
better we can explain how our experiencings are processed. But this does not wipe out the 
necessity of understanding the phenomenal, which always will be based on structures and 
functions of our memory representations. 
2. The problems of the human mental can be based on empirical research by systematic 
analysis of the results of the memory research and our abilities to conscious introspection. 
If we believe in the basic assumption that our mental states steer our actions, memory 
research will - even in the future - be the main area of the rational research of the human 
mentally steered actions.  
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With these limitations the RA-model could be applied to quite many of the age-old problems 
of psychology, philosophy, and managerial development work. Discussions with my 
reviewers, professors Ilkka Niiniluoto and Göte Nyman lead the trial of using the RA-model 
to the concept of truth and an enlarged handling of the concept of action, which I have done in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Their suggestions caused also a trial to handle the concepts of free will, 
emotion, learning, and perception of space, which implicitly are present in the content of the 
model but are mentioned only en passant in the previous. Though these items are not on the 
core area of my study these discussions led to a short pondering of the differences of the RA-
model and some other total models of man. In what follows I shall limit to describe how these 
problems can be seen through the RA-model as a meta-model of human mind.  
 
8.1 Sensation, Qualia, Perception, and Consciousness 
In the RA-model the above terms refer to a natural chain of mental processes at end of which 
we become conscious of the object of attention. As explained earlier this process gets its 
genesis by the attention process, which selects the situation relevant items of the sensory 
memory to be developed in concept-based, and then conscious mental state of perception. 
During or after the moments the processes take place in our central nervous system we live 
through a set of subjective experiencings, of which most can be named along with the 
customs in the communities one has adapted one's linguistic expressions. Colors, pains, 
situations, actions, interactions, emotions, feelings etc. get the names and linguistic expres-
sions from the common experiences in the culture in which one lives.  
In the RA-model qualia is seen as subjective living through the experiences, which are 
caused by the primary interpretation of the sensory information of subject's object of 
attention. It is a natural, but short-lived phase in each process of perception. It can be seen 
also as the quality of experienced mental state or mood. Our brain's concept-based 
interpretations of the object of attention are then our conscious perceptions. All perceptions, 
the perceiving the space, are based on the recalled concepts. The cues in the sensed form the 
set of search attributes and define the concept-based interpretation of the sensed. Misleading 
cues in the available sensory information form most, if not all, of our illusions.   
As explained in section 6.8 consciousness is seen as a natural end phase in all processes of 
perception. It is a mental state of knowing and understanding. It is concept-basedness in 
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experiencing. This consists of all the qualities, levels, durations, and degrees of intensities and 
prosessuality of experiencings. These mental states are based on the situation relevant set of 
concepts and their attributes. 
If the brain researchers solve the problem the two transformations, we may know better how 
our brains as a totality functions and organise the system effects of the 110 billion neurons to 
enable our mental experiences. But the processes in our brains are not our experiences. 
Human beings represent the only species of actors who can report their experiences through 
their introspective abilities. Concept-basedness seems to be good explanation for the mental 
states, which have been called consciousness.  
 
8.2 The RA-model, Behaviourism, Cognitive Science. 
RA's universe and world are formed of material and mental entities. The human and some 
other actors have - through the evolutionary processes - highly developed nervous systems. 
These systems enable actors to experience different kinds of mental states and perform mental 
and mentally steered bodily actions. These mental states and actions have causal relations 
with actors' environment through their materially manifesting speech and other motor actions. 
As presented in Figures 2.1 to 2.3 in Chapter 2, actors' brains create the experienced world 
and its steering effects by two transformations between the material and the mental.   
Behaviourism denies the existence of the human mental and tries to explain human actions 
and interactions through mechanical responses to the situations and changes in subject's 
environment. In the RA-model - see Figure 4.5 on page 108 - both behaviouristic and 
cognitive approaches into the human mind and action can be understood. As discussed in 
Chapter 4 RA's scene of experiencing and steering consists of levels and areas of steering and 
its division between the conscious and processual steering of actions. 
On the reflexive and model level of steering the processual element of steering is in the main 
role, which is often assumed in behaviouristic explanations. 'Ready-made' or learned models 
make acting easy and fast especially when they are formed on the level of automaticity. It is 
just rational to use the situation relevant models if they have been built already. In new 
situations RA uses his creativity and plans his action according to the values, goals, and 
resources, which are actual and available in the situation. 
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The RA-model seems to be flexible. Through it the different schools in psychology and 
philosophy and their views of man's mind and thinking can be understood. If cognitive 
science is seen as a multi-disciplinary approach to human mind and thinking so RA-model 
should serve also its purposes.  The RA-model explains through its model of human concepts 
how our linguistic abilities are natural functions of structures of our concepts. The linguistic 
attributes of our concepts and views of the entities of the being form the bases for 
communicative actions. 
In the RA-model I have I am not using the computer metaphor of the human brains and its 
abilities to the emergent transformations from material into the mental and vice versa. Search 
attribute is the only terminological similarity referring to computer science. RA's sensations 
are assumed to function as search attributes to recall into the working memory the situation 
relevant set concepts and their attributes to explain the meanings of the sensed. The main idea 
has been to base the research of the human mental on the empirical memory research. As seen 
some basic results of brain research and neuropsychology has been used. The functions of the 
dorsal and ventral streams and the mirror neurons have been mentioned earlier of these 
connections. 
I have left the problems of our brains structures and functions behind the emergent and 
steering-effect transformations as explained earlier. These transformations form the 
interfaces between the material and mental in human actions and thinking. To find out how 
our brain system performs them may take some time of the brain researchers. The base in the 
RA-model has been the functioning postulations of the cognitive psychology with its working 
memory, long-term memory, episodic memory, etc. as explained in Chapters 2 and 3. Our 
mental world can through these postulations be based on empirical research and they can be 
understood even by our introspective abilities. It is hard to see how the human mental could 
be explained without our memory representations and their structures and functions. Only 
functioning memory systems can do the emergent and steering transformations between the 
material and mental. 
 
8.3 RA-model's Cognition, Emotion, and Free Will 
As seen in Chapter 4 RA's mental states are caused by the actual situation view and the set of 
recalled concepts. The areas, levels, intensities, and durations of experiencings can vary in 
large scale. In well known situations actors usually concentrate to items connected with the 
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goal towards which one is aiming at. However, the areas of experiencings need not to be 
sharply differentiated. The cognitive, emotional, volitive, motivational, and other features can 
be present at the same time. If the sensory or other cues of the object of attention recall 
concepts and memory representations of a familiar and known entity actor can focus on the 
situation relevant features of it.  
The value attributes of the object entity steer the better part of the emotional reactions. If the 
object were a bear walking towards you on your forest path your reactions would be a lot 
more emotionally oriented than when meeting a car in a street corner. Emotional experiences 
are often in the main role when something new and unknown occurs. Is the unknown friend or 
enemy, preyer or prey, is the question in your mind. In the evolutionary processes this 
readiness for emotional reactions has evolved because the supposed prey has often avoided to 
be eaten and his genes have continued their steering effects in new generations. The modern 
man seems still to have similar features in his behaviour models. Emotional elements such as 
joy, love, happiness, delight, satisfaction, sorrow, disappointment, grief, sadness, regret are 
often present in our everyday life. In their background we can often find the value attributes 
or their real or speculated changes of the object of attention.  An unknown entity does not 
have any value attributes and then it forms question marks and can mean a hiding danger.  
RA's SCES or his scene of experiencing and steering consists elements for cognitions and 
emotions as well as for volitions and motivations. Our needs, wants, and conscious decisions 
are based on the value attributes of the planned goal state of affairs. Emotions are - the Latin 
emovere = mover - our motivating powers and then with in all our actions. Emotions form 
often the first experienced ideas of the directions of our actions. Is our will free if the 
processual elements of our steering system trigger also the volitive elements of our actions? 
This question of the freedom of will is one of the eternal questions in the history of human 
thought. In the RA-model will can be seen as the as the balance between the processual and 
conscious steering. The human will manifests in the RA-model as one quality of the mental 
state. It is the state in which the acting individual chooses between the options he has been 
able to form. These options may concern the goal and resources of the planned action or the 
ways of using the resources when implementing the plan. The options may concern also the 
ways to use the achieved end results of the planned action. 
The essential question when discussing about the freedom of actor's will or the quality of his 
mental state when he is forming the options and then when he is choosing the factors in his 
criteria matrix guiding his decisions. In conventional situations we are guided by the values 
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and norms belonging to the roles we have achieved in the communities or organisations in 
which we are acting members. The same values and norms are limiting our freedom both in 
forming the options and in choosing between the options. 
The degrees of freedom of actors will are implicitly in Figure 4.5 on page 108. The SCES or 
RA's scene of experiencing and steering shows that on the reflexive level we are steered by 
phylogenically formed nervous system. On the model level of steering we are steered by the 
models we have adopted from our environments during our ontogenic histories. These models 
can, of course, be consciously planned and tested but very often they are just adopted by the 
help of our mirror neurons or by other imitating powers like the will to follow the appreciated 
mode or fashion. On the third level of steering when building the models of acting one could 
think the actors have more freedom. The decisions on this level concern the choosing of the 
ways actors want to act or to form the goal settings of their actions. In fact, even here our 
basic values and norms form the limiting factors for our will and decision-making.  
The fourth level in Figure 4.5 is the level on which individuals could possibly consciously 
build the dimensions of their personality and the core self. This could happen by personal 
growth to the level of self consciousness that the selecting of the basic values and the basic 
principles can happen after conscious planning and choosing processes and decision-making. 
On this level we could possibly reach in our mental growth to the level of 'progressive 
mentality' of Zarathushtra on which our values, norms, and basic ideas could lead to 
beneficial consequences and to good life of our fellowmen and ourselves. As mentioned 
earlier a good deed for RA is a deed in which all participating resources are used in balanced 
exchange with their owners and which leads to growth of the resources of all members of the 
participating communities or perhaps of all inhabitants in our Globe. 
As seen in Chapters 3 and 4 our values are formed mostly processually in the interactions 
with other actors in the communities we have spent our ontogenic histories. The answer to the 
problem of free will depends on our ability to advance and grow to the conscious level of 
analysing and choosing our basic values and principles guiding our everyday decision-
making. Even here the laws and regulations valid in our communities limit our freedom. 
Anyhow we can say that the degree of freedom is highest when we analyse and select the 
basic matrix for our decisions by conscious choosing of our basic values, norms, and our 
guiding principles. If we can do it, we have freedom of deciding along with them; if not, we 
stay on the level of mode and fashion followers where the masses of the human kind seem 
continuously to stay.  
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8.4 The RA-model and Learning 
Each school of psychology and pedagogy have their theories of learning. Instead of describing 
the special features of behaviouristic or constructivist approaches to learning I shall shortly 
explain how the meta-model of the human mind explains the human learning process. Both 
main schools of learning are partly right. The processual formation of our concepts and their 
value and other attributes explains the behaviouristic ideas of reward and punishment as tools 
of teaching and means of learning. Value attributes define how the meanings of entities are 
seen. The processual formation of values justifies to explaining the processes of learning to be 
mechanistic response to the feedbacks one gets. The structure of RA's concepts and the SCES 
in Chapters 3 and 4 shows that there are different levels of learning. The creative level of 
learning and acting is based on the total situation relevant view of object entity and its 
relations to the other factors and actors in the community in which one is living. Learning is a 
proces of constructing new concepts and their attributes, which form the basis of the enlarging 
knowledge base.   
 In the RA-model learning can be seen as a process of advancing learner's brain's ability to 
produce a situation relevant solutions either to cognitive control or manual skill problems. On 
the level of central and peripheral nervous system learning means that the exchange of 
information between the individual and his environment leads to the state of affairs in which 
the learners nervous system can produce a situation relevant flow of afferent and efferent 
action potentials to steer the needed sets of speech and other motor actions. This means that 
the learning process improves his skills to perform both new mental and bodily actions. Thus 
the results of learning process can manifest in enlarged knowledge base or betterment of 
bodily skills. We can enlarge our knowledge base by building and rebuilding our concepts 
with witch it is formed and controlled. Our skills are improved if the sets of efferent action 
potentials steering them are more situation relevant ones.  
The RA-model of the human concepts with its time-, base-, and theory lines could serve any 
teacher and learner to catch the essential of new entities and items. A well-planned learning 
process leads to good control of the total system in which the elements belong. Similarly the 
new skills achieved by bodily exercises form an integrated part of individual's know-how and 
skill tools. Anyhow, we learn by doing both mental and bodily exercises. The Latin proverb 
still holds: 'Repetitio est Mater Studiorum'.    
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As told in Chapter 2 Ramachandran (2001) thinks that the mirror neurons, which were found 
by Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998), will play a central role in the new theories of learning. If 
learning is seen as a process of building concepts, the results of teaching might be better if the 
teachers and learners knew what the human concepts and their structures and functions are.  
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9 CONCLUSIONS  
9.1 Facts behind the RA-model 
As premises of this study I have used the beliefs that man is a creation of the evolutionary 
processes, which have formed his biological and mental features fitting to the changing 
environment. I believe also that the best explaining theories are approaching the situation 
relevant or truthlike descriptions of their research objects. I have used some results of 
cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and brain research, whose results offer a firm 
empirical ground for pondering the substance of the human mental. The dorsal- and ventral 
streams and the mirror neurons are examples of the findings of the on-line and memory-line 
interfaces between our central nervous system and our environment. This systemic interface 
consists also the two ontological transformations between the material and mental as 
explained in the previous. They form a set of psychological and neurobiological facts on 
which the RA-model is delineated in Chapter 2 and condensed in the Figure 2.1. These facts 
seem to open new views to the genesis of our mental world, learning, and the processes 
steering our actions.  
  
9.2 Conquering the Mental through its Atoms 
The main idea in study has been that the mental can be understood if we understand what its 
primitives and different elements are. As seen in Chapter 3 both the Latin and Finnish 
etymology of the term concept refer to its function. Concipere and 'käsittää' = means to 
comprehend and understand, to get or grasp into mental hold and control the sensed object. 
The system model of RA's concepts aims at solving the problem of comprehending and 
understanding by offering testable memory-based descriptions and explanations of the 
theoretical entities these terms seem to refer. The time-, value-, and theory-lines of the RA-
model of concepts delineate and group the descriptions we usually remember of entities we 
know well. But we usually judge the sensed by those situation relevant descriptions, which we 
recall and of which we become conscious when they are present in our working memory. The 
situation relevantly recalled set of descriptions of the object entity is here seen as the concept 
of it. Often all we need is just the classifying or stereotyping attributes, which explain the 
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main features necessary in the situation. This shows the internal or evolutionary rationality of 
our brains functions; only situation relevant elements of our memory representations are 
recalled into conscious review to explain the sensed and form the mental state of perceiving 
and knowing. 
In Chapter 4 I showed that individual's mind is built of his memory representations of the 
World, of his roles, resources, situations, actions, interactions, relations, etc. I named these 
theoretical entities views. Some of them I have described in figures 4.1 to 44 by using the 
main features on all the three time-, value-, and theory-lines of which the descriptions of them 
are formed. The hoped for and value descriptions of entities form an important element when 
trying to understand the human intentionality, motivation, and goal orientation. RA's mind is 
framed by the views and SCES - or his scene of experiencing and steering - forms its center. 
SCES is a mental space, where he lives through the experiences caused by the situation 
relevantly recalled concepts of the objects of attention. Thus our memory representations and 
their situation relevant use offers us a natural explanation ground for most of the mental 
phenomena we experience. 
9.3 The main Contributions of this Study 
The RA-model of man and his mental structures and functions can be seen just as a 
metaphorical description of how our peripheral and central nervous systems build our 
phenomenal worlds and their relevance with the reality. As stated earlier, if we believe in the 
evolutionary theory, we have to accept that the experienced descriptions in actors' minds are 
usually situation relevantly processed explanations of the sensed world and its changes. Most 
models and theories in human sciences and even in philosophy are connected with the 
problematic - but often unexplicated - transformation processes in our brain systems. These 
are formed of the emergent- and steering-effects between the material and mental worlds, in 
which the afferent and efferent action potentials are in the interfacing roles. Theories of 
memory, mind, role, emotion, qualia, knowledge, chunks, etc. can often be seen as metaphors 
illuminating the real brain processes enabling the human mental. Their function is to make the 
experienced descriptions of the world easier to understand. Our memory representations and 
concepts are functions of our ontogenic histories and then our concept-based experiences are 
individual and subjective though a varying degree of intersubjetivity is always formed 
between people living in the same communities and cultures. This is necessary for 
communicative and other interactions and exchanges between the members of them. The most 
universal in our experiences are those sensory attributes whose formation is based mainly on 
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our phylogenically defined structures. The naming of the sensed is, of course, a function of 
the culture in which one is living. Eskimos have many names for snow, which can have many 
different qualities depending on its temperature, crystal structure, humidity, etc.       
The RA-model can be seen also as a trial to satisfy the many needs of human sciences and 
philosophy by proposing a universal model of human concepts and mind. The RA-model 
grounds them on testable and introspectively approachable memory representations of the 
entities of the being. As a meta-model of man's mental its basic features can be seen also as 
abducted from the findings of theories in psychology and other human sciences. As 
mentioned earlier, abduction can be seen as inferring from effects to causes. In the RA-model 
this happened by asking what the structures and functions of the human mental are or should 
be when their 'steering effects' manifest the observed way in the human actions and 
behaviour.  Our brains' transforming emergent and steering-effects are processes, which may 
stay as an eternal, deeply cryptic, but always enchanting object of research; however, they 
manifest continuously in our everyday activities and are the real ones. To understand them we 
can only try to construct metaphorical models to help the forming a picture of the human 
mental. As a repetition of the discussions I had in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 I shall list following 
points of possible contributions of this study:  
o The RA-model purports to bring up the main dimensions of the totality of man's real 
substance as a biological, social, and rational actor, whose survival and well being has 
been secured by the mentally planned and controlled goal oriented actions aiming at the 
valued actual or futures states of affairs. 
o The RA-model's simple ontology and metaphorical descriptions of the basics of the 
human mental seem to offer understandable explanation grounds for quite many 
problematic questions in human sciences and new points of view to some of the eternal 
problems of philosophy. 
o The testable realism of the system-structure RA's memory representations and 
concepts' offers a memory-based and partly by introspection achievable and 
understandable ground and tools for reviewing the human mental life. 
o The system model of RA's concepts and memory representations as atoms and molecules 
of the human mental offers a commonly usable model of the human theory building 
processes. Though, as metaphors they may offer a ground for building useful and testable 
hypotheses for psychology and other human sciences. 
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o The system-structure of RA's mind as memory based steering construction - framed by 
individual's views of the World, of his roles, resources, situations, actions, etc. - shows the 
multi-dimensionality of the human experiencings caused by the recalled sets of views, 
concepts and their situation relevant attributes. This structure of human mind explains also 
the central position of the situation relevancy in all human mental and materially 
manifesting actions. 
o The RA-model clarifies how our brains' sensory and memory streams of information 
processing creates the double-phase process of perception. It enables the subject's 
transfer from sensations to the concept-based multidimensional mental state of knowing. 
This means that the values and meanings of the objects of attention become conscious and 
have their effects on subject's cognitive, emotional, and volitive experiences and then on 
his thoughts, plans, decisions, and actions. 
o As seen in the previous the double-phase perception process explains in a natural way our 
ability to perceive reliably entities in the three-dimensional world and most of the common 
illusions. Our brains build our perceptions always in the frames of the recalled situation 
views. The sensed or thought cues form the search attributes recalling the explaining set of 
concepts and their attributes to our working memory for conscious perceptions. 
o The RA-model of human knowledge draws attention to the fact that knowledge is 
individual's concept based mental state of understanding the different meanings of the 
object of attention.  Understanding is then a conscious mental state, which serves his 
conscious planning and decision-making concerning his actions. Often the mental state of 
knowing is initiated by the outer materially manifesting sensory information, which can 
be spoken or written linguistic expressions or other sign formations. The same information 
may cause greatly varying mental states of knowing depending on the situations and 
situation relevantly recalled concepts of the interpreting individual. That's why we so often 
make the question: What do you mean? This shows that our frame of reference or the 
recalled situation and action view has been inadequate. 
o The RA-model of knowledge shows the necessity of understanding that the ontological 
difference between knowledge and information should be a matter of course to everyone. 
However, these terms are often used as synonyms. Though this faulty practice causes many 
problems in human communicative interactions, its change may be difficult to bring about.   
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o In the RA-model, values are seen as resource-describing attributes of entities in subjects' 
memory representations and concepts. This enables a natural explanation of values of both 
material and mental entities. Even the postulations of theoretical, religious, and spiritual 
entities and their values can be understood by the structure of RA's concepts and their 
value attributes. 
o RA's values and situation orientation offer a natural explanation also of the human 
intentionality and goal orientation.  
o In the RA-model the memory representations of linguistic expressions are seen as 
sensory attributes of memory representations of entities and situations in which they are 
used. This offers a natural explanation of our linguistic abilities. Nouns and verbs are 
name-attributes of entities' memory representations. Sentences are commonly used 
linguistic expressions to describe actions, changes, or different types of situations. Their 
memory representations are usable linguistic attributes in the recallable 'picture-like' views 
or memory representations of situations, actions, changes etc.  
o Knowledge and truth, values and meanings, wants and motivations, thoughts and 
language, time and future, etc. are terms whose referents are theoretical entities. Some 
features of these have been analysed in this study by using the system model of RA's 
concepts as the basis. They seem to get an understandable explanation through the causally 
effective human concepts and their attributes. Thus the memory-based mental of man 
seems to form a necessary but often also sufficient base for the sciences aiming to increase 
the understanding of the human actions and behaviour.   
Thus, I see the RA-model of man and his mental just as a simple trial to delineate a natural 
and 'total' picture of man. Of course, all of its elements should be researched in detail taking 
into account all of the earlier scientific results. However, this trial to build a total view of man 
seems to be useful even it is lacking and even faulty in many detailed features. I have drawn 
this interim view of man hoping that it will provoke a fruitful discussion about the possibility 
of a universal base for understanding the mental features of the materially manifesting 
corporal man and its base in our central and peripheral nervous systems. The main message of 
this study is to show that the different human sciences and philosophies can have only one 
and the same mental grounds in the testable and introspectively experienceable human 
memory representations and concepts. As seen in the previous they seem to create the 
experiential world we live through in our minds. Thus the search for the primitives, atoms, 
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and molecule of the human mental might be useful and worth-wile investment for the human 
sciences. I hope that this study is a positive input to the endeavours trying to find the real 
mental grounds from the processes, which our central nervous systems offer us to steer our 
actions and interactions with our environments.  
 
9.4 The RA-model and my Future Research Interests 
The RA-model as a memory-based metamodel of the human mind and concepts seems to 
offer a useful set of tools to approach the human being as a totality formed of material and 
mental elements. Its applicability to help in forming hypothesis of the human mental for their 
experimental testing by memory and brain research is a big question mark. My own interest is 
to research the RA-model's usefulness in trials to clarify the importance to see differences of 
the mental and material dimensions of man in all human sciences connected with the 
problems of human oriented management and its philosophy. The main issues I am going to 
study are found under the following three problem areas, whose preliminary titles are: 
1. RA-model's applicability to open a new kind of discussions of the problems in psychol-
ogy, philosophy, and in other human sciences.  
2. RA-model's applicability renew the conception of the dirigibility of man and his goal 
orientated actions 
3. RA-model's applicability to reveal the mental dimensions of organisational culture and 
their use as managerial tools  
These themes have as their common issue the importance of seeing the mental dimensions of 
man. I hope that my future research and development work of the RA-model creates 
possibilities to apply the RA-model of man as a tool in developing research strategies in 
human sciences and in the studies of managerial thinking and practices in organisations. 
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